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Approximately stable committee selection. (English) Zbl 07298262

Makarychev, Konstantin (ed.) et al., Proceedings of the 52nd annual ACM SIGACT symposium on theory of computing, STOC ’20, Chicago, IL, USA, June 22–26, 2020. New York, NY: Association for Computing Machinery (ACM). 463-472 (2020).

MSC:

68Qxx Theory of computing

References:

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