Finally, we have the full transcripts of the pivotal 1947 meeting that F.A. Hayek set up, not only to save liberalism in an illiberal age, but to saveFinally, we have the full transcripts of the pivotal 1947 meeting that F.A. Hayek set up, not only to save liberalism in an illiberal age, but to save Western civilization in an era of barbarism. This is an absolutely marvelous book for two reasons: 1) As we know, a lot of crusty mythology has built up around the Mont Pèlerin Society since its founding. Sadly, a lot of it is false or misleading. This is natural when people have little to go on, but now, instead of relying on hearsay and imagination, it is possible to actually go back to the original source to unearth the real motivations, goals, and agendas of the participants to the first meeting. Here they are, in plain sight, the complex reasons for the society's founding as a vehicle for liberal ideas. 2) The editorial work of Bruce Caldwell is superb. As as result, the book is very accessible and adorned with a lengthy and informative introduction. The chapters encompass the 19 meetings in a chronological order. The footnotes are modest but helpful. The list of participants and the index of names are handy. The binding of the book is excellent. One has to appreciate a document that feels good to look and browse.
Formally, the transcripts are "complete." However, this comes with a major caveat. (A fact which, responsibly enough, is repeated multiple times in the editorial sections of the book.) Namely, the transcripts are NOT word-for-word transcripts. Rather, they offer imperfect and often sketchy secretarial notes jotted down by Dorothy Hahn. This is more evident in some sections than others. Therefore, statements attributed to "Milton Friedman" or "Aaron Director" may be partially misattributed, or at least somewhat mangled, as a result of the laborious, indirect process of partial transcription. This point is absolutely crucial for any scholar wishing to quote the book. No doubt a lot of nuance is lost and there may even be a few substantive errors. However, Mrs. Hahn's handiwork, as the chosen secretary of Mr. Hayek, can be taken to be generally reliable.
I do not wish to use this review to summarize the whole meeting (which would be a momentous undertaking anyhow!). But let me make some brief comments. Overall, it is clear that the "neoliberal thought collective" (as Mirowski et al. have called it) has been, since its inception, a deeply pluralistic, wide-ranging, globally divided, and internally contentious group. Although they share the joint appreciation for the values of individual freedom, robust property rights, open markets, limited government, an active government involvement in protecting the competitive order, in other issues, like foreign policy, democratic federalism, culture and religion, macroeconomics, welfare policy, and agricultural policy, the group was often struggling to find a univocal opinion. And indeed, its Statement of Principles, which it finally adopted, reflects, on a very abstract level, the shared GENERAL views of its members in the form of an "overlapping consensus" that respects this pluralism by abstaining from commenting on many PARTICULAR issues. At the same time, it is worth recognizing the remarkable consistency and shared passion, among the participants, for the general outlines of the new liberal program. This is best represented in Friedrich Hayek's initial distinction - which frames the whole conversation - between "laissez-faire liberalism" vs. the "competitive order." This framing reminds one of German Ordoliberalism but it was chosen, no doubt, to be equally palatable to the members of the Austrian and the Chicago schools of economics. And in providing a shared program, it mostly succeeded, as the transcripts show. Differences continue to pop up, sometimes to the point of strident disagreements, among the different schools (and the individual members of each school) on issues like anti-trust legislation, countercyclical fiscal policy, religious toleration, or the desirability of social insurance, the general framing of the Competitive Order as as alternative to both market fundamentalism and socialism was an immensely powerful framing that influenced generations of subsequent liberals.
Lastly, before concluding, since it is my current area of interest, I must comment on the session on welfare policy. I found this chapter fascinating for many reasons, both as a harbinger of what is to come (especially in Friedman's "Capitalism and Freedom" and Hayek's "The Constitution of Liberty") and as an interesting sign of the times. I was surprised to see that both Aaron Director and Milton Friedman, representing the Chicago School, were pushing for what later became known as Negative Income Tax, while Friedrich Hayek, who has been interpreted as a proto-UBI advocate (and not incorrectly based on some of his writings), was here actually suggesting a regimented military style labour service, albeit with an opt-out option, for the voluntarily unemployed! This seems like a solution in line with the Poor Laws and Victorian workhouses. (It should be noted that Hayek later somewhat modified his stated opinion and, in subsequent books, advocated for a guaranteed minimum income scheme, ideally paired with some conditionalities.) Karl Popper's laconic interjection has become my favourite takeaway from these transcripts: "Professor Friedman’s idea is an attractive alternative to socialism. But Professor Hayek’s idea is not." I will leave the discussion of whether a NIT, UBI, or a conditional minimum income is the best solution to poverty under conditions of the neoliberal Competitive Order for another occasion. (You can read my published articles, and upcoming book on Hayek and UBI, to learn more on this topic.)
Overall, this book is a gift to scholarship. It curates an important historical document, dealing with a historic moment, in an informative, accessible, and restrained way. It lacks heavy-handed or misinformed editorializing. Beside explaining the context and correcting for some errors in the transcripts, it lets them speak for themselves. Substantively, the event was a success. The participant list looks like a real who's-who of the key classical liberal (and adjacent) thinkers of the time. The resulting discussions are some of the most transformative and historic of the latter half of the 20th century. But the biggest influence of the meeting was what it spawned: a trans-generational society of scholars, devoted to liberal discussion of the highest caliber, that has lasted, with some modifications, to this day, and certainly expanded beyond its original shell. Despite the omissions in the transcripts, we get a wonderful picture of the substantive agreements, disagreements, and ongoing evolutions in the views of the neoliberal thinkers. Both sympathizers and detractors of the classical liberal project will find something valuable here. The fanciful mythologizers (of both the left and the right) will hopefully have a harder time confabulating their fake narratives when the real history, although it does not speak, is staring them in the face....more
"Foucault is unlikely to go away soon or get “cancelled” for being too neoliberal – anymore than for being too libertine, immoral, obscurantist, or ep"Foucault is unlikely to go away soon or get “cancelled” for being too neoliberal – anymore than for being too libertine, immoral, obscurantist, or epistemically relativistic. None of these descriptions exhausts his philosophy. Despite the vast cottage industry of cliched, substandard, and rote uses of Foucault in the social sciences, there is still much untapped potential in his output for serious intellectual engagement. The publication of the Collège de France transcripts has opened up a treasure trove of many new “Foucaults” (in the plural). The neoliberalism controversy is only the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, I hope that ideological debate does not overshadow his theoretical work. But Dean & Zamora’s gripping narrative demonstrates that Foucault’s rather brief theoretical encounters with neoliberalism had deep and long-lasting connections to his anti-totalitarian and emancipatory normative commitments. It also demonstrates the fluidity of his political alignments, united only by a common concern for reimagining and reinventing relations of power and knowledge in ways that leave more room for minority practices, experimentalism, and “limit experiences.” After books like this, it is no longer possible, without qualification, to characterize him as a “man of the left,” although it would be equally wrong to describe him as a “conservative” or “neoliberal” either. To the extent that he partook in the project of the “Second Left” and other manifestations of post-60s radicalism, he was part of the “neoliberal-curious” segment(s) of the libertarian left. As such, he was interested in expanding the repertoire of 20th century “left governmentality” in ways that can break away from the dogmatic, statist, and totalitarian tendencies underlying the Marxist dreams of a perfected revolution. (...) Scholars should pursue further synergistic connections between the Foucauldian and neoliberal analyses of emancipation, experimentalism, decentralized “power-knowledge,” and agential self-creation. And new questions should be asked: “Are our old conceptual tools and ideological categories ill-equipped to tackle the novel challenges of 21st century emancipatory politics? What does it mean to rethink social emancipation, beyond the hegemonic left-right mapping, after Foucault?” Dean & Zamora’s book, aside from being an informative, provocative, and fun read, prompts many questions and challenges us – in one of Foucault’s favourite phrases – to think and act differently."
This collected volume is essential reading for anyone interested in the history of ideas in the 20th century. In order to avoid using the word "neolibThis collected volume is essential reading for anyone interested in the history of ideas in the 20th century. In order to avoid using the word "neoliberalism" as a meaningless catch-all term, it is especially important to go to the intellectual sources of the movement. The reality, as always, is more complicated than the convenient narratives of most contemporary commentators. The 1938 Lippmann Colloquium was spurred by the recent publication of Walter Lippmann's "The Good Society" (1936) on the occasion of the pending French visit of its author. The event was notable for attracting many of the leading classical liberal (broadly speaking) thinkers of the era, including F.A. Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow, Louis Rougier (the instigator of the event), Michael Heilperin, and Étienne Mantoux. It was also historically significant for contributing arguably the first self-conscious stage of the elaboration and crystallization of the "new liberal" program into something distinct from both "Manchester school" (or "laissez-faire") classical liberalism AND the "New Deal" liberalism and Keynesianism prevalent at the time. These ideas would live on primarily through the Mont Pelerin Society - at whose inaugural meeting in 1947 many of the same people who attended the Lippmann colloquium were also present. Indeed the present volume should be studied closely together with the recently released Mont Pèlerin 1947: Transcripts of the Founding Meeting of the Mont Pèlerin Society.
Why do I give the book 5 stars? This is for three reasons: excellent presentation, important historical context, and inherent theoretical value. First, the presentation is excellent. The introductory sections are not exhaustive, but they suffice to contextualize the historical moment, introduce the participants, and summarize the key themes of the meeting. The list of participants is carefully curated along alphabetical lines. (Some of the participants have been forgotten today.) The index, bibliography, and footnotes make for an excellent scholarly companion. And, of course, the main transcript itself is allowed to take centre stage with minimal editorial meddling. Second, the historical context is absolutely crucial to understand the events of the 20th century. Everybody who writes about "neoliberalism" should be forced to read these transcripts to get a better sense about the complexities of what they are writing about. (If only to learn that that "neoliberalism" is not a term that many people in the movement frequently used on themselves.) And third, the debates around freedom vs authority, individualism vs collectivism, growth vs redistribution, economic prosperity vs social cohesion, democracy vs. markets, etc., remain with us today. Indeed, as I was reading through the transcript, I became acutely aware of how little the basic debate has changed - and indeed, how eerily similar some of the discussion today (2024) sounds to what they were worried about then (1938): the inherent "contradictions" of free markets, the need for a safety net that does not undermine the functioning of the competitive market order, the persistent allure of socialism, the lack of economic education among the masses (but also the elites!), etc. (Unfortunately, even the threat of another World War feels all too present tense...)
I will not attempt to summarize the discussions, but I will point out a few key takeaways: 1) The neoliberal project, if you can call it that, was not uniform or univocal, but highly diverse and subject to many permutations, disagreements, and factional disputes. 2) Far from equating it with laissez-faire unregulated capitalism, we should remember that neoliberalism was founded on its explicit rejection. 3) The Lippmann consensus (much like the Mont Pelerin consensus a decade later) accepted the "Manchester school" emphasis on competitive markets and economic liberty but wanted to complement it with an newfound emphasis on the institutional and cultural trappings of an orderly society, as exemplified by the Ordoliberal emphasis on the "strong state" that oversees the markets, and Hayek's idea of the "rule of law." 4) The early generations of neoliberals (from Lippmann to Mont Pelerin) were generally very supportive of providing various public goods, government regulations, and robust welfare support to the poor, although the extent of such support varied from person to person. Hardliners like Mises who supported only very minimal government intervention were clear outliers, as were people who fully embraced the welfare state. 5) There was tremendous interest and emphasis on the cultural and social dimensions of the free society; the goal of maximizing prosperity was not to be accepted as a blind economic mantra.
I believe that most of the substantive issues debated at the Lippmann Colloquium (and make no mistake, it was a vibrant debate, not a church where likeminded people confessed their faith) remain as important today as they were in the pre-WW2 era. Finding the right balance between individualism and collectivism, economic values and moral values, remains an active puzzle. There is much to be learned from these transcripts. It does not matter whether one sympathizes with or detests the ideas that the neoliberals advocated. Studying them first hand, through primary sources, is absolutely the best way to get a grip on the values and stakes involved....more
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