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| 3.89
| 6,155
| -322
| Jul 01, 2018
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really liked it
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In the Art of Rhetoric Aristotle does more than it seems possible given the length of the book. In under 160 pages he provides a comprehensive descrip
In the Art of Rhetoric Aristotle does more than it seems possible given the length of the book. In under 160 pages he provides a comprehensive description of virtually all components of effective, persuasive, logical, and stylish communication. Even this description is too limiting. He captures the essence of knowledge, how it can be tested and known, how it is best relayed to others, and how one should go about using rhetoric, which he treats as a counterpart of dialectic. Fundamentally it is about forming and defending good arguments, challenging and understanding the bad ones, and presenting a case that is not only factually true but composed in a way to convince an audience without spectacle, trickery, or manipulation. His characterization of rhetoric as an art seems apt, considering the forms it takes and the many dimensions of it that can be practiced and mastered and executed with varying degrees of success. Because of everything that goes into this art, it is only the third and final part of the book that directly discusses the formulation and application of rhetoric - in poetry, in political speeches, in courts, in legislation, in dialogue, in epics. Parts one and two lay the ground work. Logic, inductive and deductive arguments, proofs, probability, goals, ethics. These are some of the critical parts of rhetoric, and Aristotle makes good use of examples and abstractions when explaining the role of each. Even more basic elements are important for the underlying philosophical substance: understanding of pleasure, expediency, virtue and vice, justice and injustice, praise and blame, reasons for doing wrong, the character of criminals. These items are explored in the first section. The second section focuses on “the materials out of which a speaker has to construct his attempts to persuade or dissuade, to praise or blame, and to prosecute or defend”. Here we delve into the causes of anger and its opposite, the qualities of gentleness, what qualities people look for in friends, how fear operates and what events might cause it, shame and likewise its many faces, gratitude and pity and resentment and emulation and envy and character and luck and age and wealth and power and judgment. Proofs are revisited in the context of these themes, and how speech might be designed to use these ideas effectively. Again, many examples from Greek tragedy and epics and philosophy help him articulate his thoughts. By this point Aristotle has given us a thorough look at many parts of philosophy and human nature and has dissected the very essence of intellectual existence. Without even connecting his examinations to the uses of language he has given us more than many philosophers offer in books four times the length. Part three sees his introduction of the intricate uses of language and speech, tying together everything previously discussed into a whole picture. Here he gives treatments of lucidity, metaphors and similes, novelty and artificiality, clever interplay between rhythm and turns of phrase, how one might avoid frigidity of language and instead favor good style by avoiding ambiguity, having fluency in the language, and giving language weight through description instead of dependence on cliches or common phrases. Expressing emotion and character, shaping the language to the purpose of the writing (whether prose or poetry or persuasion), employing analogy to give a concept fullness and depth, and using wit artfully. The differences between Ancient Greek and modern English make some small part of Aristotle’s analysis mere historical artifacts rather than useful insight, but the majority of what is here has not aged in over two thousand years. In fact, most of this has become standard practice for writers and speakers across the world because the points Aristotle put into writing have proven themselves to be as enduring as any idea can be. While we may not be conscious of the heritage or development of our ideas on good thinking and good speaking, the Art of Rhetoric has long been a concise and yet expansive study of these ideas. I know of no place else that they have been so eloquently and expertly studied in a systematic manner. ...more |
Notes are private!
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Dec 2023
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Dec 31, 2023
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Dec 01, 2023
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| 3.94
| 13,308
| -380
| 1977
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really liked it
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Plato’s Gorgias is one of the longer Socratic dialogues. Its principle topic is the examination of the merits of oration, or Sophistry, with Gorgias a
Plato’s Gorgias is one of the longer Socratic dialogues. Its principle topic is the examination of the merits of oration, or Sophistry, with Gorgias and Polus, two orators, arguing that there is no finer profession for a man. Socrates challenges them on this point, eventually exploring more interesting topics with Callicles, like morality, the pleasures, whether it is worse to do evil or suffer evil, how to follow the path of virtue, the pursuit of truth undaunted by shame, and the roles of discipline and punishment in righting one’s character. The conversation between Socrates, Gorgias, and Polus only makes up about the first third of the dialogue. This exchange sees Socrates questioning the men on what is so good and important about their profession, oration, which they claim to be the greatest skill and art. Socrates exposes it for the shallow, false pandering that it is, revealing its misdirection, its ways of subverting the truth in favor of emotional manipulation. This topic is returned to throughout the dialogue, but eventually more substantial subjects are uncovered. Once Callicles enters the fray, we get a more interesting study. Callicles proclaims the supremacy of might-makes-right moral principles, and praises the unquenchable appetites as the sign of a man superior to those who live in content moderation. He ridicules Socrates in a manner that seems realistic and modern, less patient and reflective than the usual figures Socrates talks with, but perhaps also more honest. His views are stated with such bold, emphatic confidence that Socrates sees in this man a worthy partner: “I have noticed that anyone who is to form a right judgment whether a soul is living well or the reverse must have three qualities, all of which you possess: understanding, good will, and readiness to be perfectly frank. I encounter many people who are not qualified to put me to the test because they are not wise like you; others are wise but unwilling to tell me the truth because they have not the same regard for me as you; and our two foreign friends, Gorgias and Polus, though they are well-disposed towards me as well as wise, are nevertheless somewhat lacking in frankness and more hampered by inhibitions than they ought to be. How far these inhibitions extend is shown by the fact that each of them has been reduced by false shame to contradict himself before a large audience and on an extremely important subject.” Socrates carefully unpacks Callicles’s beliefs and challenges them, logically laying them out for complete examination. He follows reason from fundamental principles, catches Callicles’s mistakes in confused language and misuse of words, and with clarity of mind shows how Callicles has arrived at wrong conclusions. Socrates uses a clever analogy to dispute the superiority of the immoderate appetites, by comparing a leaky and non-leaky vessel. Those with appetites always seeking new gratification and never able to be satisfied are like a man trying to constantly fill a leaking vessel, or always scratching an itch that cannot be satisfied, while the moderate who is able to find contentment in little and satisfaction in what he has is like the man who must fill a vessel once, but never worry about losing that water and thus always seeking new gratification. Their dialogue goes in many directions, with Socrates taking the time to explore new ideas coherently. He looks at the importance of jobs as they compare to one another, often examining the differences made by doctors or engineers or statesmen in their work, and whether it is for the better or the worse. These are used as analogies for other, more basic questions. This leads to the discussion of moral significance and what makes a man good or strong or weak or evil, and what these terms really mean. He discusses the worth of goodness for its own sake, the character of vice and wickedness and how to deal with these in a person. Justice is reflected on, and the confusions that abound regarding it. He shares his thoughts on the wisdom of the ancients, the myths of their time, and what lessons can be learned about how to properly order one’s life. As in other Socratic dialogues, difficulties in translation sometimes lead to imperfect representations of the arguments and logic Socrates is following. These are elucidated through numerous footnotes explaining when the intricacies of language come into play, which are lost in translation. It is an excellent, thoughtful dialogue. Socrates’s conclusions are that oration is ultimately pandering, and should only be employed in the service of right, as is true of all other activities, rather than in the convincing of uneducated audiences to believe things that are untrue; if a man does wrong he must be punished, and paying the penalty for one’s faults is the next best thing to being good; one should avoid doing wrong more than one should avoid being wronged; opinions that are worth anything must be forged in the extreme heat of intellectual back and forth and the uncompromising search for truth; the ultimate goal of a man’s efforts must be the reality rather than the appearance of goodness; and that the life spent in philosophy and serious reflection is of more importance and is more in our interest than may be evident to those who abandoned philosophy long ago. ...more |
Notes are private!
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1
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Jun 19, 2023
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Jun 24, 2023
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Jun 24, 2023
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| 0691229198
| 9780691229195
| 0691229198
| 3.64
| 1,472
| 2020
| Aug 24, 2021
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really liked it
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Lost in Thought is about the move from learning for the purpose of status seeking to learning for its own sake. It’s a philosophical examination of fi
Lost in Thought is about the move from learning for the purpose of status seeking to learning for its own sake. It’s a philosophical examination of finding meaning in an intellectual life, not from racing to publish the next paper or prove one’s intellectual dominance or superiority, but to quietly live a life of constant learning, exploration, reflection. Zena Hitz shares her own background in academia, which I related to more than I expected, and her search for purpose and satisfaction in her work. Her passion for knowledge and deep learning is obvious. She spent time searching for a stimulating, vibrant intellectual culture like what she experienced as an undergrad but never could find again. After 9/11 she reflected on the futility of her academic existence and wanted to make a difference, helping the poor and living without luxury. She became Catholic and lived for a time in Madonna House, a primitive Catholic commune. This, like many of her prior experiences, shaped her impression of the importance of an intellectual life separated from status, from social performance, from the disingenuous urge to please others or the self. Her book is a study of the contemplative life based not only on her experience, but the experiences of philosophers and scientists and thinkers, the worlds of novels, and characters from other forms of fiction. She distinguishes between instrumental uses of the intellect — motivated by results and outcomes, like a spy gathering intel, a Wall Street quant maximizing profit, a political activist supporting their cause, and the intrinsic value of learning, not as a means to an end but as something worth pursuing, what she calls hidden learning, withdrawn from the pressure to produce economic, social, or political outcomes. She points to mathematics, science, philosophy, and literature as examples, all of which have instrumental uses but like anything else can be enjoyed purely on their own merits, as a fulfilling thing to study and find beauty in. She aims to answer the question she anticipates many might ask: what good is it to learn if it is hidden, and not used for good or healing? Aristotle argued our ultimate end has to be for its own sake or our actions will be empty and vain. Hitz seeks the ongoing development of a rich inner life, through books and understanding and learning. Living to work is a futile existence, she argues. A redundant and unsatisfying life. Leisure must be used and not merely as rest to prepare us for more work. She discusses how we can use our leisure time to pursue intellectual life, even if we are short on time, or do not think of ourselves as intellectuals. Reading and contemplating for ninety minutes a week, for example, or setting aside 30 minutes a day. Manual labor is in fact quite fruitful to this, leaving the mind free to ruminate in ways other vocations may not. Contemplation in the form of learning is worthy for its own sake and worthy of time and resources. In cultivating an inner life, we set aside concerns for social ease or advancement, we instead follow self development without concern for how it appears to others. Inwardness and withdrawal manifest as thoughts and imaginings that are unspoken and invisible. Many examples of common humanity are shared through her study: an instructor teaching prisoners Shakespeare dissolves barriers between teacher and student due to the substance of material; WEB Du Bois finds in books a world without a color line division. Something beyond community produced by work is offered in the realm of the intellect. Bonds transcend time and space, to those dead or foreign or vastly different and removed from our familiar world. She addresses the perceived uselessness of intellectual life, in Thales and Socrates and others, addressing its popular perception as childish and empty. It is distorted by ideas of civic and economic and political usefulness. We do not see intellectual life clearly because of our devotion to lifestyles rich in material comfort and a sense of social superiority. We are fixated on the superficial and mundane and hollow. We are petty and shallow and infantile-we want the benefits of an intellectual life without the devotion to it or the sacrifices needed, like obscurity or poverty or lack of material wealth. She raises valid points about the sacrifices that should be made for true intellectual life. She looks at the self-serving wishful thinking of watered down, instrumental forms of intellectual life. Social justice and think tanks and entrepreneurship and economics and politics, and ways to flex a pseudo-intellectual muscle but never for the sake of intellectual pursuits, as means to an end. Hitz reflects on the self deception of social advancement. She evaluates Aristophanes’s play Clouds as a critique of wealth and empire and disdain for true knowledge. Its main character Strepsiades is a bundle of incoherent impulses. In her view, the Athenians were blind and self deceived if they took this as an attack on Socrates, which they did. Strepsiades represents the shortsighted simplistic man whose distorted view is that only things of practical value are of any worth. Wealth, Hitz remarks, should be seen as a tool, not a goal. The theme of redemption of the mind through philosophical discipline is visited over and over, primarily through Augustine’s Confessions, examining his journey of learning and questioning, his egoism, sexual preoccupation. Hitz contrasts the transformative discipline of philosophical search for truth with the love of spectacle and the news media and social media preferring outrage, shock, horror and unpleasant falsehoods over agreeable truths. Untrue sensationalist things spread fast and garner mountains of attention and become ingrained in the public subconscious. But the corrections go barely noticed, and don’t attract the same attention. “Love of spectacle wallows in novelty and negativity.” Our culture prefers the horror or thrill of shock and revelation rather than the quiet truthful correction. We also want to become the spectacle, and this gives rise to legions of bored, vapid addicts to outrage performing for each other on the internet, an endless theater of pretend people having pretend reactions to manufactured scenarios and piles of lonely outraged people clicking their approval and spreading this sentiment, to the detriment of reasonable discourse or creativity or usefulness. All our worst minds and natures are wrapped up in news media and social media, especially Twitter and TikTok and tumblr. She recognizes the necessity of creativity and producing art for flourishing. Experience itself is not a meaningful end or purpose, it must feed something deeper in us. “Unless we treasure something beyond our own bare experience, we cannot distinguish gazing at a mighty river from gazing at the TV channels changing one to the other, over and over again.” One who dwells at the surface of things is a mere spectator of spectacle. She takes us through the corruption of learning by the love of money or social success, and by politics. “When we attempt to produce just outcomes from the top down we shortcut the communion of the reader with the author, and so suppress the egalitarian community of learning… Worse, the longing for justice is reduced to a set of rules for the use of language or for which opinions can be expressed. The correct justice-promoting words become tools for gatekeepers, protecting a hierarchy in the end not obviously different from the one that prompted the revolution. Social justice becomes not only trivialized, but also emptied of content, used for purposes counter to its professed aims.” It is the emptiness of political speech and activist language games that have sucked dry any thoughtful project for justice. In her broader discussion of how knowledge is often treated as the learning and recitation of the correct opinions, she reflects on this practice within her own institutions, the church and the university. In universities, she argues, much of what is called education in the contemporary humanities is the cultivation of the correct opinions. The education supported by progressive activists, for example, seeks social and political results instead of the cultivation of free, thoughtful human beings. And the conservative mirror image of progressive activism, promotion of the correct opinions about free markets or economic liberty, also with aims for political results. Politics is in many cases a means of social advancement, and the recitation of learned platitudes aids this. Hitz calls this “opinionization”, “the reduction of thinking and perception to simple slogans or prefabricated positions, a reduction motivated by fear, competition, and laziness.” Those participating in this ritual show they belong to a tribe by parroting approved phrases and words. She offers what I think are compelling counterpoints to the diversity of opinion, often championed today in response to the rising illiberalism of progressives. As important as the diversity of opinion can be in certain areas, she argues, I think rightly, that opinions are often superficial and devoid of real inquiry. To engage in meaningful intellectual activity requires challenging opinions, having a stronger and more defensible basis for believing what we do. We often engage in debates with the intent to only further affirm what we believe rather than engaging in dialectic to have discussions that get at the fundamental substance of ideas and work out what is true. As Harlan Ellison said, “You don’t have a right to your opinion. You have a right to your informed opinion.” In true learning, we are not merely throwing around competing opinions. We develop discipline and seriousness, and discover why most opinions are without merit. Again and again she aims to convince the reader that the goals of intellectual life should be as separate from spectacle as possible. I think she succeeds in this. She contrasts the differences made in society by people like trash collectors who aren’t brought onto TV for their tireless and consistent efforts, and those who are glamorized and celebrated for making what amount to be much less significant or impactful differences, but that are flashy and attention grabbing. Often our notions of “making a difference” are superficial and disconnected from real human need. The ultimate use of the “useless” intellectual life is the self transformation into a reflective person, connected deeply with life and meaning and one’s relation to others, I would argue not only human but transcending species. It informs the way one thinks and operates and behaves day to day, in some ways small in other ways big and immediately impactful. The virtue of seriousness, as she puts it, requires our dedication to what is important and what is meaningful, an appreciation for the deeper substance and significance behind seemingly mundane ideas or observations or events, not that which is merely self-serving or fleeting, and provides the clarity to act in ways that promote the flourishing we want to ultimately understand. The more we read and learn and study and immerse ourselves in learning for its own sake the less self-congratulatory we may become, as our awareness opens up to the complexity of other lives and experiences and problems and ideas, the less tribal and pompous, the less vapid our interactions with others, the less self-involved we become. Paradoxically, the more we read and the more we experience through other eyes and ages, the less special we feel about our own erudition, and we become attuned to the obscure ways in which knowledge matters and is shared, recognizing it even in those who are inarticulate, uneducated, or as alien to us as possible. It may make us more sensitive to the forms of emptiness that reside within us and destroy any sense of smug superiority that we were once tempted to feel, while also filling some of that emptiness and changing its character. We learn to examine our own motives for what we do, as we try to untangle the truth from what we tell ourselves is the truth of our actions. The intellect, when not subjugated to lesser motivations and desires, provides an authentic “guide to life with its own integrity and independence.” We reflect on the sources of our thoughts, submit ourselves to challenges to alway become more clear-minded, more connected to what we learn and think about. We can seek to get to the bottom of reality and life and understand where meaning comes from. The exercise of the love of learning “uncovers a human being who is not reducible to his or her economic, social, or political contributions.” The intellectual life involves reaching out past the surface, questioning appearances, striving for what is not evident. “A human being is more than an instrument of personal or public benefit.” ...more |
Notes are private!
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1
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Jun 10, 2023
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Jun 18, 2023
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Jun 10, 2023
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Paperback
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| 0615771572
| 9780615771571
| 0615771572
| 3.34
| 279
| 1757
| Feb 24, 2013
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liked it
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David Hume’s essay on taste is a work that I think ought to be more widely appreciated. His position is that despite taste being a subjective matter,
David Hume’s essay on taste is a work that I think ought to be more widely appreciated. His position is that despite taste being a subjective matter, sensitive to the age and the culture and the experiences and preferences of a people, there may be some objectivity to art and its quality based on widely agreed upon norms that cross cultures and ages. The principles of taste, argues Hume, are universal, yet few are qualified to give judgment or establish their own sentiment on these standards of beauty. “Though men of delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be distinguished in society by the soundness of their understanding, and the superiority of their faculties above the rest of mankind.” To be a discerning judge of art one has to be exposed to a lot of it, and mere exposure is not sufficient, one should spend a lot of time with it, give over their full attention to it, revisit it, because first impressions are often rushed, impatient. Most exposure to art, whether it’s writing or music or painting, tends to be shallow and non-contemplative, with only a fraction of one’s attention given. This isn’t conducive to a serious appreciation and love for art, and certainly not for an understanding of the art. Yet, those whose minds and tastes are scrambled by this attention deficit will still consider their opinions to carry weight. Goodreads is designed around this idea, and its social media component provides a sense of validation for shallow hot takes instead of patient reflection. A fuller assessment of art takes serious time and devotion to art more broadly but also to each particular piece. You don’t glance at a painting, you don’t speed read your way through a book, you don’t listen to music in the background. Your ability to fully appreciate and understand what you have encountered is proportional to the time and attention you have given over to it. If certain qualities are deemed good and important in art, and a person insensitive to these finer qualities claims some such piece is poor, then a person more attuned to what is good might direct their eye or ear toward these certain qualities that had escaped the cynical critic, showing him that in fact the art is better than he had first supposed. I’m particularly open to this line of reasoning, since I used to spend way too much time arguing that certain books are a lot better than some people gave them credit for. I’ve spent over 20 years doing the same for music, so it’s hard to not see in Hume’s words some semblance of a personal sense of elitism. When you recognize the peerless beauty and glory and wonder of some piece of art and it seems to be met by others with indifference or active repulsion, it’s hard not to conclude they have missed something important. Sometimes it’s obvious that they have, and a prolonged argument can draw this out and you feel a sense of victory. They are either poor readers, or they listened to the music in the background instead of with their full attention, like some sort of backwards casual consumer. Sometimes it’s a matter of an attentive and focused listener or reader just having a difference of opinion, still capable of tuning into the finer qualities. Feelings of self-aggrandizement and personal genius aside, there are good reasons to encourage a heightened sensitivity to, and awareness of, the finer details in writing, painting, music, whatever art one is experiencing. The fun thing about this essay is that it validates a sense of snobbery, if done correctly, while presenting cases for why one must immerse themselves in the art to truly have a taste for it. It encourages everyone to rise to the level of elitist, of snob, and to cultivate better taste. If we are to recognize that objective thinking is important, though, then we should accept that our own sense of elite taste might not be as perfect as we think. By his reasoning, one must put themselves in the position of the intended audience, not reject the prejudices or ideas of the culture or the age in which the art was made. This is sound advice to appreciating art. One’s own prejudice or those of their age and place blinds them to true appreciation and understanding of art. But Hume acknowledges that certain things change over time, or across cultures, and things like comedy or moral standards or religious beliefs or expectations of the artist change. This makes it impossible for some audiences to find beauty and perfection in the depiction of an unrelatable hero, a comedic scene that is funny for reasons alien to the contemporary culture, or an appeal to religious beliefs that aren’t held by the audience. “It is well known that in all questions submitted to the understanding, prejudice is destructive of sound judgment and perverts all operations of the intellectual faculties. It is no less contrary to good taste: nor has it less influence to corrupt our sentiment of beauty. It belongs to good sense to check its influence in both cases; and in this respect, … reason, if not an essential part of taste, is at least requisite to the operations of this latter faculty. In all the nobler productions of genius, there is a mutual relation and correspondence of parts; nor can either of the beauties or blemishes be perceived by him whose thought is not capacious enough to comprehend all those parts, and compare them with each other, in order to perceive the consistence and uniformity of the whole.” A person who is too close to the author or artist, who cannot distance themselves from him in order to absorb their art, will not correctly experience it and take it in. Limited imagination is a hindrance to grasping the depth and aesthetic and effects of good art. “… the same excellence of faculties which contributes to the improvement of reason, the same clearness of conception, the same exactness of distinction, the same vivacity of apprehension, are essential to the operations of true taste, and are its infallible concomitants. It seldom or never happens that a man of sense, who has experience in any art, cannot judge of its beauty; and it is no less rare to meet with a man who has a just taste without a sound understanding.” “When the critic has no delicacy, he judges without any distinction, and is only affected by the grosser and more palpable qualities of the object: the finer touches pass unnoticed and disregarded. Where he is not aided by practice his verdict is attended with confusion and hesitation. Where no comparison has been employed, the most frivolous beauties, such as rather merit the name of defects, are the object of his admiration. Where he lies under the influence of prejudice, all his natural sentiments are perverted. Where good sense is wanting, he is not qualified to discern the beauties of design and reasoning, which are the highest and most excellent. Under some or other of these imperfections the generality of men labor; and hence a true judge in the finer arts is observed even during the most polished ages to be so rare a character.” Hume argues that not all have equal taste, and the qualities which one must possess in order to have this virtue of superior taste - be free of prejudice, have a delicate imagination. Everyone will suppose themselves to be described this way, and will agree these are important characteristics to possess when evaluating art, but whether one truly possesses these traits is a matter of argument and deeper examination. True genius, he argues, is timeless and its appeal will endure through the ages even if it does not appeal to popular sentiment or what is in vogue in its own time. While philosophies may go into and out of fashion, and lesser art may steal the popular attention for a time, true genius in epics and poetry and sculpture and painting will always prevail, and will always be the standard against which other genius and brilliance are measured. “…though prejudices may prevail for a time, they never unite in celebrating any rival to the true genius, but yield at last to the force of nature and just sentiment.” But he acknowledges a certain diversity of judgments is unavoidable, with no side in the disagreement being obviously superior to the other. Still, he argues we may be able to reconcile contrary sentiments by a universal standard. Our peculiarities and sensitivities to certain things, our preferences for one style or quality above another, our overlooking a dozen flaws in the presence of one paramount form of sublimity or beauty or grandeur that we tend to prefer, these are to be expected in everyone. The essay is a bold endeavor with ideas I find compelling and important, eloquently written and artistically composed. But Hume doesn’t spend much time fleshing his ideas out, doesn’t attempt much rigor in arguing for his perspective, and although he makes a strong case with a few excellent examples of timeless art that will remain dominant through many ages to come, it would have been helpful for him to have spent some time explaining what sorts of qualities really set the great art apart from the rest. With too little time given to this, the essay is open-ended, giving any reader a sense that they too belong to this elite class of Master Tastemen. I am of course guilty of this. We get the impression Hume had some specific pieces of art in mind, and some high-minded qualities that should be the fundamental qualities upon which all art is to be judged, but he only shows us the tip of the iceberg. It gets one thinking seriously about the objective metrics by which we should judge art, but leaves us wishing for a more complete exploration of these metrics. Still, he is right that not all taste is equal, and to have good or meaningful taste, one has to spend time with the art they are judging. This doesn’t mean going to school for it, because this can hinder one’s judgment by producing indoctrination instead of enabling informed contemplation free from the prejudices Hume points to as detracting from our ability to appreciate art. ...more |
Notes are private!
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not set
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Apr 06, 2024
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May 18, 2023
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| 0141192224
| 9780141192222
| 0141192224
| 4.12
| 420
| Dec 06, 2012
| Feb 26, 2013
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really liked it
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A straight line from Socrates to Stoicism seems to trace directly through the Cynics, as the connecting piece of the puzzle. Antisthenes was said to h
A straight line from Socrates to Stoicism seems to trace directly through the Cynics, as the connecting piece of the puzzle. Antisthenes was said to have studied under Socrates and learned the powers of reason, virtue, and fortitude. Some say Antisthenes was the first Cynic philosopher, others say his student Diogenes was. Regardless, we know that the later Stoicism owes much to the Cynics, and so here we have something I had long been looking for: the link between Socrates and Stoic philosophy. Given this heritage, it didn’t surprise me that Cynicism appears to be a very admirable school of philosophy, as worthy a model of thought and behavior today as it was over two millennia ago. Virtue is, to the Cynic, the highest good. To be happy requires only virtuousness and Socratic fortitude. Other Cynic themes and values include freedom of speech, self-sufficiency, physical training, endurance and self-control, and deriding tuphos, the preoccupation with luxury and social standing. Diogenes embodied all that came to be associated with the Cynic philosophy. A man impoverished of material goods but rich in resilience, capacity for hardship, a piercing intellect, and no concern for how he was perceived by the masses but instead for how best to live and be. He taught others to do nothing thoughtlessly or irrationally, to question everything, particularly those things which the masses seem to be in unanimous agreement upon without having questioned. Like all true philosophers, he embodied everything that he taught, and put into practice every principle of which he spoke. Diogenes trampled pretense under foot in favor of living simply, naturally, in poverty and with few possessions, those carried on the person. In Diogenes’s case these were his staff, his cloak, his nap sack. These items, with his messy hair and beard, became iconic as the outfit of the Cynic philosophers. For centuries after, those wishing to walk the path of Cynicism more so in appearance than in spirit, donned this basic apparel. The book is also a big part history, with a long introduction explaining the Cynic themes and the main Cynic philosophers. Each chapter offers the writings or teachings of different Cynic thinkers, including Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates, Bion, Onesicritus, Demetrius, Dio Chrysostom, Teles, and a few who were not of this school, like Lucian, or the magnificent Stoic Epictetus, and the Emperor Julian, who wrote on the Cynics and their philosophy. These non-Cynic writings come many years after the Cynics were at their prime, and these men look back on the Cynics of earlier ages, drawing unflattering contrasts between those in the rags of Cynics in their own time and those of the past. Lucian provides a dialogue illustrating the basic values of Cynicism, and a writing praising the brilliance and wit of the philosopher Demonax. Julian writes on whether or not mythology has any place in philosophy, and if so, what purpose it might as serve. Epictetus explains how one ought to be if they wish to pursue the Cynic lifestyle, informing us that to do it right is to do it the way it was originally done, not as it is done in his contemporary Rome. The tenets of the Cynic philosophy were established by Anthisthenes and were put into practice by Diogenes. It requires one becoming indifferent to pleasure and pain, subordinating passion to reason. To not be governed by conventional ideas about good or bad, nor moved by popular opinion, and never influenced by the mob, nor harboring a weakness for praise and applause or craving public notice, using reason to seek the truth in all matters. The Cynic challenges convention, not to be contrarian or to pick pointless fights, but to pursue what is best and what is in line with well-being, happiness, mental and physical robustness, to get others thinking about their own lives and questioning their own assumed values. The principle of “deface the currency”, something Antisthenes was said to have done in his youth, symbolized much of what the Cynics stood for. Do not accept the sacredness imparted upon man made objects and ideas, reject materialism and become free from the control that wealth and possessions have over oneself. Alter customs and received opinions to fall in line with the truth rather than what society imagines is important. The Cynics lived this through their philosophy, a school of thought like Stoicism that was meaningless if practiced only on paper and not throughout one’s existence of striving for improvement. The Cynic did not fear death nor the judgment of others, or pain, or hunger. Diogenes and the other Cynics recognized the analogy between philosophy and physical fitness, in one being intended for the perfection of the physical body and one being intended for the perfection of the mind and the spirit. Cynicism, at least in its early days, placed importance on being physically fit and taking care of one’s body just as well as one’s mind. Diogenes often compared himself and his trade (philosophy) with things traditionally thought more valuable to society, and believed his services to be most needed in places where vice and moral corruption were rampant. By this reasoning, he figured he should spend a lot of time educating kings and the wealthy and powerful, who perhaps stood to learn the most from his teachings. And he often spoke about how even with his self-imposed poverty and lack of possessions or shelter, he was wealthier and better off than any king, happier and with fewer worries and with a healthier perspective on life. The public masturbation of Diogenes and the self-immolation of Peregrinus are by now points of attention or amusement when looking back on the Cynic philosophy. Diogenes did this to show his contempt for laws he found insensible and restrictive, and likely also to show that satisfying his human urges were completely within his control alone. Peregrinus did this, as Lucian says, through a very un-Cynic-like chasing of spectators and awe, but also, apparently, to demonstrate how fearless a Cynic can be in the face of death and suffering. The book is a contemplative and very well-composed collection of Cynic thinkers. It would be hard to put together a more representative work on the philosophy, its teachings, and its lasting relevance. Its historical content offers context and elaboration on the philosophy’s development and evolution, and many informative notes that give more background to the writings. ...more |
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Rarely do passion and principled rationality come together in such a measured combination to create as persuasive a work as Common Sense. This landmar
Rarely do passion and principled rationality come together in such a measured combination to create as persuasive a work as Common Sense. This landmark pamphlet is not only of major historical, political, and philosophical relevance, but almost 250 years after it was unleashed it serves as an example of how refined, compact, and persuasive writing can be powerful if the right mind and pen are behind it. What passes for popular “revolutionary” and “anti-oppression” social-political non-fiction in contemporary American society is usually a poorly reasoned embarrassment. That embarrassment is magnified when comparing it to a work like this, which transcends politics and parties and ideologies (Paine wishes for the extinction of the names Whig and Tory) and that argues on the merits of ideas, pitting the competing ideas against one another, reasoning carefully and with a keen awareness of all the moving parts that complicate the issue. It’s impressive how well Paine marries robust and thoroughly argued principles with a lively, conversational tone that spends just enough time on each point to have an impact. Even if one knows nothing of American history, the reader can feel the urgency in Paine’s writing. He provides the broad scope context and gives a survey of the atrocities committed by England, offers a hopeful vision for America, unpacks the invalidity of the monarchy with logic that the most loyal subjects of the king were unable to refute, and forwards his case for the immediate declaration of independence from English rule. He builds a vision of government from first principles, and shows how the English constitution has failed. He addresses the arguments of his contemporaries who wished for reconciliation with England instead of independence, and lays out his case for the need of independence and self-rule, with an entirely different system of government. As all great thinkers and persuasive writers do, must do, Paine addresses counter-arguments and critics of his ideas. In his Appendix, released with, I believe, the second edition of Common Sense, Paine remarks on the King’s Speech, which coincided with the release of the pamphlet. This speech, he remarks, demonstrates the king’s savagery and aggression, and unfitness to rule a continent thousands of miles away. Paine calls the time of his writing the ideal time to fight for independence, as there is enough expertise remaining from their last war, still enough generals and military might to carry forward into battle, and now, unlike then, their numbers are greater. He reasons that if they wait too long, although their numbers will be greater, their military expertise will have vanished along with all they had learned in recent skirmishes. Waiting too long might make liberty harder to achieve. He addresses the testimony of American Quakers, who have written in support of staying under English rule, in favor of pacifism. Paine shares their want for peace, but presents the reader with a compelling case for why this is not, and has not been, possible under the arm of Britain. He calls the Quakers partial ministers of their own acknowledged principles, publishing their cries for peace and non-violence in America, but shying away from making the same calls directly to Britain, who has been ravaging America with violence for some time. If they truly want peace and an end to violence, Paine argues this fight for independence is the only way. We learn about Thomas Paine in school and are taught the gist of his writing, but it’s great to finally read this one and see what a well-written, strongly argued show of intellect it was. ...more |
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| Apr 16, 2018
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These essays are unlike anything else. They’re a glimpse into the workings of transcendentalism, into the mind of its most noteworthy poet-advocate. E
These essays are unlike anything else. They’re a glimpse into the workings of transcendentalism, into the mind of its most noteworthy poet-advocate. Emerson has a mystical, romantic, esoteric way of writing about all manner of things. I appreciate many of the sentiments he expresses, his celebration of individualism, self-reliance, solitude, mental or “spiritual” fortitude, his embrace of nature, of poetry and philosophy and art and a connection to history, to reality, and to things beneath the mundane, unseen to the eye, his joy for intellectualism and tranquility and the unnamable qualities of life that he has somehow given names and descriptions to, as well as his criticism of conformity and the forces and opinions and motives of society. I’m confused by his delivery. At times I wonder if he means everything he says, or if he on occasion says things just because he’s in a strong flow, carried away by his own momentum. Given his love for the things mentioned, and his almost metaphysical disposition as a poet, it may be no surprise he finds math cold, science lifeless, facts untrustworthy, empiricism worthless. His writing style reflects this aversion to reason and logic. It is all from the gut and a state of trancelike riffing, rarely a carefully worded, straight forward organization of thoughts. Since he does not bother to persuade, but only to express, I can only read along and differ in opinion here and there, while nodding along and pausing occasionally to reflect on the moments of wonder, on his lyrical might. What he lacks in persuasion and reason he makes up for with hardy, feeling, romantic, poetic, insightful, and reflective musings. Many good thoughts and ideas abound. He can appear disorganized and lost in a stream of consciousness instead of focused, but maybe it was only me who was lost in his current. We get a lot of strong and beautiful passages full of sage wisdom and sound thinking, sometimes profound observations, on top of passages that do nothing to convince the reader to share his perspective, but still suffused with awe. Like Nietzsche, he does not reason so much as he intuits. I think I see where Nietzsche gets it from. Emerson also reminds me of Spinoza, in his vague allusions to a god that seems to be synonymous with nature or the universe, but somehow still personified. And as I reached the end of the book and began to detect some hints of ancient Chinese thinking, he brought Mencius into the fold, as fitting a philosopher for him to refer to as any. He urges his reader to see the glimmers of genius that have shone in others in the past, in great thinkers and writers, like Homer, Dante, Milton, Shakespeare, and to see them also in ourselves. He encourages one to see themselves as an active participant in the world and to see history and experience and friendship as part of the vastness of existence and the self. Emerson writes a manifesto against conformity to society, to live one’s life even around others as though they were steeped in solitude and able to live according to their own opinions and values. Ones who are seeking amusement or escape in world travel instead of self realization and growth, he supposes, will find neither. His observations on the “improvements” in society being no improvement for man are astute. For every gain on one side it recedes on the other, losing old instincts while acquiring new art, becoming weak while becoming civilized, becoming ignorant of the universe around him while inundated with new tools and luxuries. This collection overflows with dense substance to go over again and again, to unwrap and consider. It isn’t always compelling, sometimes it seems as though he rambles a bit too long, though not without some grand cavalcade of ideation, but when it’s good it’s very good. ...more |
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I can’t say I’ve ever had any interest in anarchism as a political philosophy, but I’ve been curious if any political philosopher has taken it serious
I can’t say I’ve ever had any interest in anarchism as a political philosophy, but I’ve been curious if any political philosopher has taken it seriously enough to write about. It’s not a subject I would have sought out, but when coming across a small book on it at a used bookstore it seemed like my question had been answered. Despite its title, In Defense of Anarchism is not a book about anarchism. Only its last four pages give any discussion of anarchism as a political philosophy, as a theoretical, Utopian model grounded in real instead of fantasy political ideas. It is a rather brief and nuanced, but unconvincing discussion. Most of the book looks at a more interesting problem: the author’s search for political harmony between individual moral autonomy and the legitimate authority of the state. He lays out his conceptions of authority and autonomy and shows how complete personal autonomy is not compatible with submission to the complete authority of state power. It is difficult to realize what legitimate authority might look like and under what circumstances we can call authority legitimate. And once we recognize such an authority, one cannot submit to it without sacrificing their own autonomy, which Wolff holds as the supreme importance. “The defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule. The primary obligation of man is autonomy, the refusal to be ruled.” He observes many of the obstacles we might encounter in realizing both this authority and in a perfectly rational autonomy. So how do we resolve this conflict? He moves straight to what he calls the only feasible solution for such a problem and centers his study around democracy. He discusses unanimous direct democracy, which requires impossibly restrictive conditions that make it hardly applicable to any real society. Only if all its members are in strong agreement about most of the matters of importance can this model work. Then he looks at representative democracy, with all its well-known strengths and its well-discussed weaknesses, such as the forfeiture of any direct say in political matters, giving up autonomy to a representative who was likely elected before many issues of importance were known, and so who can never fairly represent anyone they are expected to. He visits over and over again the question of how we may be asked to obey laws which we had no say in, and reflects on the reality of modern politics and legislation, in which no voter can be expected to be informed enough to participate at a meaningful level with representatives. His outlook is not as bleak as it may sound, though. Wolff proposes an idea for instant direct democracy, in which citizens have attachments to their TV sets (written in 1970, so today this would probably be tied to cell phone) that allow them to vote directly and immediately on the issues they care about. While this could have chaotic consequences at first, he argues that over time it will level out, folks will recognize their immediate impact through voting, and may increase citizen involvement in political matters. It doesn’t solve the problem of people voting impulsively and without careful consideration, but he hopes this sort of thing will be mitigated over time. He then discusses majoritarian democracy, borrowing from Plato, Locke, and Rousseau and a few others to get into its complexity. He takes a lot from the Social Contract to examine how this model might work, and comes away unconvinced, I think rightly so. He picks apart some of Rousseau’s flawed conclusions, tracing them to what he believes are simple confusions. He points to errors in how decisions on important issues would manifest, creating an irrational and inconsistent body of ideas that do not reflect the desires of rational citizens. Despite seeing majoritarian democracy as the only legitimate way in which the citizenry rule themselves, Wolff claims the citizenry does not truly remain free and self-ruled while submitting to the majority. The majority, he probably rightly posits, is more often wrong than right. Right answers are usually only adopted by the minority early on. So after finding all forms of democracy inadequate to fulfill the goal of total individual autonomy, and providing good if imperfect arguments in support, Wolff admits he is at a loss for a solution. “If autonomy and authority are genuinely incompatible, only two courses are open to us. Either we must embrace philosophical anarchism and treat all governments as non-legitimate bodies whose commands must be judged and evaluated in each instance before they are obeyed; or else, we must give up as quixotic the pursuit of autonomy in the political realm and submit ourselves to whatever form of government appears most just and be efficient at the moment.” He chooses not to follow the latter course, because he supposes it would have us swearing allegiance to benevolent dictatorships or majoritarian tyrannical democracies. In his view, we cannot give up moral autonomy. I agree, but I haven’t been convinced that he has explored all possibilities, or with enough care. He closes by offering his Utopian Glimpse of a World Without States. Instead of providing a strongly reasoned thesis based on most of what he has already discussed, he outlines a rough idea of how common problems in an anarchistic world (economy, defense, traffic safety, city reconstruction or social organization more generally) might be overcome. He admits that he has not solved anything and that his vision is incomplete, and there is more to be figured out. This is him laying the groundwork for what I assume was a longer and more complete book. Still, he offers a sane and rational analysis of some basic problems in political philosophy. ...more |
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Mencius carries on and extends the philosophical work of Confucius, conveying this philosophy in much the same way Confucius did: through dialogue wit
Mencius carries on and extends the philosophical work of Confucius, conveying this philosophy in much the same way Confucius did: through dialogue with students and rulers and other philosophers. This work of Mencius is divided into seven ‘books’, or chapters, each in two parts. There doesn’t seem to be a common theme to the sections, and many statements or phrases are repeated across these chapters. In addition to these conversations between Mencius and other individuals, frequent references are made to the Odes, the Book of History, and the Analects of Confucius. The book and the Confucian philosophy are certainly products of their time. Much of the philosophy seems designed around the needs of the people in ancient China, and this can be seen in many of the dialogues and examples which refer to customs and social institutions which no longer exist. And almost every page is filled with reference to multiple ancient emperors or commanders or figures of importance who readers like myself will have no familiarity with. This is kind of cool, because this lends historical veracity to many of the stories Mencius tells, and the examples he uses to make his points are many times situated in real historical events, not only hypothetical scenarios. Despite the obvious practicality of these teachings, they are not stuck in the past and relevant only to a specific time and place. Many of these ideas can be generalized and applied to anyone, anywhere. The philosophy here is not very different from what one reads in Confucius. Mencius encourages the cultivation of good character, virtue, benevolence, a disciplined pursuit of ambition, integrity, trueness to oneself, minimization of the desires, a harmonious existence that is pleasing to the world one inhabits, and he offers various discussions on the duties of children to their parents, of the youth to elders, of rulers to their people, how best to govern, how best to teach, how to follow the Way and to develop rightness in oneself, the improvement of one’s moral character, and understanding human nature for the greater good of all. Mencius’s arguments are not always logical, and an essay in one of the appendices analyzes his argumentation-by-analogy method, which is not necessarily an effective or convincing method, but it is one that illustrates his philosophy clearly. The essay is, however, very good. And so are the essays that comprise the other appendices and the introduction, discussing Mencius’s philosophy in an accessible way, his life, and the ancient history of China as Mencius understood it. ...more |
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| 4.30
| 162,762
| -400
| Oct 15, 2008
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Daodejing — Esoteric poetry, metaphysical and dreamlike and ambiguous. Maybe best described by a word that keeps appearing in this translation: abstru
Daodejing — Esoteric poetry, metaphysical and dreamlike and ambiguous. Maybe best described by a word that keeps appearing in this translation: abstruse. The suggestions of scholars that these fragments may be incomplete and are all that is left of a more complete version, passed down through the centuries, or that these were enigmas written down to get students thinking on a subject which would then be expounded on later by a teacher who makes sense of these statements, seems the most believable hypothesis. It’s hard to know what to make of this or get out of this, yet it is enjoyable to read and contemplate. From a poetry angle, it sounds kind of nice and has a certain flow to it, although I’m sure this is greatly changed by translation. From other angles, it takes some unraveling to make much sense of it. The translation must have been a difficult process. The notes point out multiple instances where the translated words or even the grammar could have gone one of a few different ways, and each was a viable path, but each would produce quite a different meaning. Even ancient Chinese scholars apparently did not know which way was the intended interpretation, or if the multiple interpretations were perhaps intentional. This lends the translated book even more ambiguity than it probably already has in Chinese. It proceeds by strange internal logic that is sometimes musical and haunting and confounding, builds ideas out of folkloric style verses or colorful contradictions or contrasts or paradoxes or imagery that seems intuitive but sometimes vague, or plays with language as an art form, which is not unusual since this is poetry, personifies the unliving or immaterial, and surprisingly still presents a coherent idea or a passage of serene calm from time to time in the form of an aphorism or axiom or proverb. Ideas here are cryptic and can be hard to make sense of, but if treated as meditations and attention is given to the editor’s notes, they materialize into something thoughtful. There are recurring moments of good wisdom and insight in these teachings — avoidance of excess and luxury, obtaining vitality from emptiness, cultivating self-knowledge instead of self-aggrandizement, finding balance, unlearning oneself into silence, not imposing on the world, maintaining control by not acting, ruling so unobtrusively that none are aware of you, understanding the Way in terms of many metaphors and natural behaviors, as a mother, as a universe, as the world, as water, as a road, and modeling oneself after the Sage, a sort of monk-like person who embodies all the teachings of the Daodejing. I noticed some similarities to Confucius, particularly in characterizing the Way, although both seem to characterize it differently, and even to Sun Tzu, like the theme of trying to resolve conflict or hostility without violence, or to embrace passivity in certain circumstances. It does not seem like this is intended as a full treatment of a philosophy but a book of poetic mind puzzles or riddles to get one thinking in some specific direction, or in unfamiliar ways, to eventually lead one to The Way via an instructor’s guidance. Those instructors and their original, maybe more complete, manuscripts are gone and this is what remains. I think its greatest value is the historic and cultural insight it provides. ...more |
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| 3.81
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| Jun 21, 1984
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did not like it
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There are worse ways to spend a Sunday than reading Jean-Francois Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, but none involve reading. Reading this cemented
There are worse ways to spend a Sunday than reading Jean-Francois Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition, but none involve reading. Reading this cemented in my mind the importance of what Epictetus said about philosophy, which is that it is purposeless without applicability to one’s life, actions, or way of understanding and processing the world. I’m paraphrasing. Given this starting point, which I think is defensible, I can’t see any value in Lyotard’s contribution to philosophy, here. One should know their subject before writing on it. I took notes while reading this, which ended up being too long to post into a review. I'm too impatient right now to turn these fragments into a proper review, so for now, here are some of my thought fragments: The book is barely more coherent than the intro, but still written poorly. Lyotard rambles about his misunderstandings of science and knowledge. Discusses who owns and controls knowledge, the commercialization of knowledge, how this may affect power and relationships. He often uses obscure terms that do not give his sentences more strength, just vagueness, confusion, usually devoid of meaning. Concerned with legitimacy of knowledge. Seems as though he is confused about what science or knowledge is. Plenty of obtuse statements everywhere, which actually become more obtuse and less meaningful the more you look at them. An example: Tries to discuss difference between knowledge of science and knowledge of ethics and politics, and says, “both stem from the same perspective, the same choice, the choice called the Occident.” This is a statement completely devoid of meaning at every level. It is never revisited, like many of his obscure statements on each page. I cannot list all the meaningless statements he makes, which he tries to pass off as substantial. Discusses Wittgenstein’s language games, language as an agonistic game. Wants to use agonism as a foundational principle in understanding social relations in terms of communication and language games, never justifies doing so. This reads more like bad beat poetry than serious philosophy. Talks about statements as ‘moves’ guided by rules in language games. This is no more sensible or coherent or useful than when Wittgenstein introduced these concepts over 40 years earlier. After reading Wittgenstein I was skeptical that his language games provided any value to philosophy or understanding, and doubted they could be applied constructively. This appears to be how they were implemented: build poor models of human interaction and understanding to try to examine our discourse and sharing of knowledge. Uses Cashinahua storyteller as example of narrative following pragmatics of transmission, how authority is granted by listening to narrative. Ironically, lacking self awareness, when talking about the odd transmission style of this narrative, Lyotard says: “it is a strange brand of knowledge, you may say, that does not even make itself understood to the young men to whom it is addressed.” Why, yes it is, Mr. Lyotard. What an astute observation. Goes on to make some amusing but not useful observations on how narratives are relayed. In trying to parse what Lyotard is saying, it becomes clear he is not saying much that isn’t self evident or that is insightful. Ideas may deserve some examination and analysis, like the relationships of narrator, narratee, and hero of the story, as well as authority and legitimacy, but he does not analyze and does not reflect on this in a way that leads to anything resembling clarity, or shows that thinking about it at this level reveals anything enlightening. Often uses phrases and words that give the illusion of depth, but upon looking more closely and carefully, show the emptiness behind most of his statements. He doesn't seem to know the meaning of many words he uses. Every page is replete with examples of this. His framework for narratives is already shaky but becomes more so when trying to apply it to scientific knowledge. Using Copernicus and path of planets as an example of pragmatics of scientific knowledge he tries to break down the roles of speaker, listener, and the referent, and the roles or rules regulating each. Because language game rules are different in scientific and narrative knowledge we cannot know what is valid in either by applying standards of the other. OK. And? It's not clear that this is true in the first place, and no argument is presented for it. Second to last paragraph of chapter 7 intentionally or unintentionally describes Lyotard’s own manner of writing about knowledge. Then describes how scientific knowledge looks dismissively at narrative knowledge and states that this is related to cultural imperialism since the dawn of western civilization, as if western civilization invented imperialism. He says western imperialism has its own distinct tenor: it is governed by the demand for legitimation. This is not true. Legitimation has been a feature of most conquering cultures and nations for all of history, east or west. Mayan, Aztec, Mongolian, Chinese, Greek, Roman, various Muslim, etc... Lyotard not only has a bad grasp of scientific thought, but apparently of history as well. Offers anecdote about scientists trying to explain their discoveries as epics when they are non-epic (by now the 50th time he has used words erroneously and without trying to explain what he means with these terms, since he is clearly using them incorrectly), but does not cite a single example of this occurrence. Says the state spends a lot of money to pass science off as epic, so the public will give the consent the decision makers need. At this point it is beginning to sound like a conspiracy theory. Lyotard is hoping to show that there are big incompatibilities or differences between scientific and narrative knowledge and faults the blending of the two in science popularization. But his entire dichotomy is artificial, concocted by him apparently, and without justification. So after erecting this needlessly false separation of these kinds of thinking without justifying why they should be seen as wholly distinct, he uses this assumption of difference and incompatibility to criticize the moments where they appear to blend. Not even clear he is criticizing because his thoughts are never clear. This is the sort of writing one would expect from someone who isn’t sure what they are trying to say. More inane statements devoid of meaning, like after referring to the allegory of the cave from Plato: “Knowledge is thus founded on the narrative of its own martyrdom.” No matter how long you look at this statement or think about this statement and no matter how much context you have from this book, it is utterly meaningless word garbage. I have lost count of the times he’s done this. Lyotard says this: “scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true knowledge without resorting to narrative knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all.” This is not true. Science is not conscious and does not assert that narrative knowledge is not knowledge. As mentioned, this distinction between the two is something Lyotard has made up and is now trying to posit as a law of human understanding while he tries to construct a fallacy that doesn’t exist, based on a dichotomy that doesn’t exist. He then says it presupposes its own validity which is begging the question. This entire mess of word salad is an artificial problem Lyotard has invented from his ignorance of basic scientific thought and his obsession with narratives. He isn’t smart enough to see he has invented his own dumb problem that he thinks is an actual problem. No one who does science sees this as a problem because they aren’t operating by the made up rules Lyotard imagines they are. He hasn’t bothered to do his research, and this is after his diatribe about how he sees research and teaching as being related in the scientific form of knowledge. So, Lyotard, since you apparently see your own form of knowledge separate from scientific, then it must fall under narrative. And since you are attempting to teach, to narrate, to those who read your work, and since you have clearly not done your research on the very topic you are writing, you must not believe that the same standard must be applied in narrative knowledge that must be applied in scientific knowledge. That is, those who are doing what you are doing don’t have to actually know what they’re talking about. This fits in well with his theory. The narrative form of knowledge is not concerned with truth, but with justice. So he seems to envision his own kind of knowledge sharing not as an attempt at elucidating some truth, but suggesting some form of justice. Talks about how the problem with scientific legitimation is such that truth is only defined by the rules of science which are determined as good only by consensus of experts. This is a gross misunderstanding of basic science. Has he read any science book in his entire life? This isn’t how scientific truth works. Repeats this same wrong assumption in the last few pages. Discussion of opened and closed door, look at the outlandish stream of consciousness dribble that he lets fly. Every sentence is a meaningless jumble of words that transitions into a new sentence that does not follow from the one before it, until he gets to some questionable conclusion that has nothing to do with anything he’s talking about, regarding the legitimacy of the discourse of science. It is this: “Word mess of no meaning therefore word puddle of confused legitimacy, which takes us to inane rambling, so this is a critique of scientific discourse, which I cannot define.” Continues his misunderstanding about what consensus of experts can really do, how the language of science works. Repeats his confusion about proofs, stating that proofs need to be proven, as though there must be some new language to validate the proofs to those who cannot understand them. This is a thing scientists have done for a long time, since before he wrote this book. He asks what scientific observation is. Mere sense is not sufficient for an observation. He pretends not to know this, or he really is deeply ignorant and out of his element. He acknowledges technology used for this end but frames it as another language game and loses his focus and his point. Tries to show that this technological dependence then leads to greater importance on money, no money - no proof, so then only the rich can get the tools to generate the proof, and somehow through magic he equates wealth with truth, claiming truth is then decided by the wealthy. In reality it only means those with the funding are given the resources to find the truth, not that they get to decide what truth is, or that their claims of truth are then immune to scrutiny and legitimization. Remarks on private companies funding research are not wrong but the details are not entirely accurate. Pure research institutes do receive less funding because their research is not commercial. What Lyotard neglects is fundamental: none of this knowledge is itself commercial or sensitive to commercial interests or wealth or technology. The knowledge is separate from all of these, it is only enabled by these. This does not affect the nature or character of this knowledge, it affects how the knowledge might be employed by those who have it or see its value. He is misunderstanding huge things. And he portrays the boundaries between different scientific disciplines as being far more defined and strict than they ever have been. In his view, all scientific knowledge is now produced in an effort to augment power. His simply states this, he does not back it up. It is not even validated by his many prior pages of almost schizophrenic diatribes around things he doesn’t understand. He shows his disdain toward the notion of proof, which is fitting, as he seems to subscribe to no standard for the truth of his own sentiments. He presents no examples, not even anecdotes, no ideas of what he could be speaking of. Instead he is operating in pure abstraction divorced from reality. Ironic then that he is so fueled up about examining the knowledge of science. He seems to let most of this hinge on his earlier insistence that we look at science as a language game and as these games as agonistic. There was no valid reason for him making these assertions pages ago, so a reader would be left wondering why he did so. It is now, only based upon these unfounded assertions, that he is able to attempt to color his present diagnosis as being based on any sound rationale. We can see what he has done: it is what I call reverse philosophizing. This is like reverse engineering, when you see the final thing you want to build, and you learn how to build it by taking it apart and working backwards. He instead begins with a desired conclusion, and works backward from that to see how he can get there. Then, once he has seemingly achieved this, he presents it in a forward manner and pretends to have undertaken an honest process of following the reasoning to the reasonable conclusion. Motivated reasoning. A sign of this kind of thinking is the questionable and unqualified starting point, such as stating that science is an agonistic language game completely separated from the rest of human understanding, with some sort of disdain for every other knowledge except itself. That he assumes this at all should have one questioning his thinking. He has reached the conclusion that science is not about knowledge but about power by starting from faulty premises like the agonistic language games heuristic, and bouncing along aimless trajectories unconnected to every segment that came before, arriving at something that none of these trajectories could logically lead to. Over and over again we see Lyotard's method of argument is to start from a political position treated as an axiom, and to use that vantage point to color his "philosophy". This is backwards. Throughout the book is this thread of political discontentment about relationships between the system and the individuals who make it up, about a controlling shadow entity (the university, the state, the system, the corporation, science, capitalism, games) and its use of its human subjects for the furtherance of its own ends. It ties into this questions of legitimacy of decisions made for or by the collective. This is never expanded on or explained, never discussed in detail, it remains as a present but obscure thread that he constantly tugs on when he needs to make a point that his normal routine is unable to. Where does all of this leave us? What should we make of Lyotard’s book? Lyotard himself, long after publishing it, came to see it much like I see it now: Not very good, ignorant of science, filled with fabrications, reading like a parody. It is intellectually empty. This can only inspire bad, sloppy, useless thinking. ...more |
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really liked it
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This book is intended as a companion text to James Rachels’ book The Elements of Moral Philosophy. Even though I read that book a few years ago and th
This book is intended as a companion text to James Rachels’ book The Elements of Moral Philosophy. Even though I read that book a few years ago and therefore missed out on what must have been an enlightening experience of reading the two together, I still got a lot out of this book, because the two clearly can stand alone as substantial surveys and introductions to moral philosophy. The Right Thing to Do is a high quality summary of morally sound thinking and living, both as a survey of contemporary moral issues and the constituents of sound argument, and as a collection of some very significant essays, excerpts, and letters on ethics and moral philosophy. There are 36 of these essays and excerpts, by philosophers and scholars as diverse as Peter Singer, Martin Luther King Jr, Immanuel Kant, Aristotle, Bertrand Russell, John Stuart Mill, Robert Nozick, Don Marquis, David Luban, Alastair Norcross, John Rawls, Mylan Engel Jr., Judith Jarvis Thomson, Friedrich Nietzsche, of course James Rachels, and dozens of others, representing a pretty thorough sampling of some of the most important topics in the subject, like abortion, animal rights, sex, war, terrorism and torture, drugs, race, the death penalty, euthanasia, and some theoretical topics, like virtue, justice, and the subjectivity of values. It should be noted that despite these few theoretical essays, most of the content here focuses on applied or practical ethics, not pontification about useless academic problems, but important applications with real and direct and immediate effects. All in all, this collection is a thoughtful and thought provoking assortment of mostly sophisticated work that challenges intuitions, argues for consistent and reasoned principles and applications, presents strong arguments for rational ideas on morality and ethics, many providing good examples and thought experiments to allow readers to more carefully follow the reasoning laid out, and does a lot to clear up messy thinking on topics that, without a little discipline and focus, can become muddled and incoherent even for those trying to take them seriously. Not all the essays are great, thought. Rachels is trying to offer competing views on some topics, like abortion, animal rights, the death penalty, and euthanasia. This should be commended. And for the most part these competing views fill out the space well. Even when reading some of these essays that I disagreed with on the bottom line, I found most to be remarkably clear minded in many ways, with numerous good points and good thinking. Some stood out as rather poor, however, like “Do Animals Have Rights?” by Tibor Machan, which is supposed to be a contrary argument to the excellent essays by Peter Singer and Alastair Norcross on animal rights. This essay is surprisingly bad in its logic and its assumptions, attempting to argue that animals should have no right to life because they are not capable of making some of the same choices humans make, or living the same kinds of lives humans live. The argument becomes, since animals are not human, they should not have any right to life. The poorness of this line of reasoning need not be danced around: it is a faulty argument that assumes human exceptionalism at its core, ignores many of the most fundamental elements that make moral philosophy, well, philosophically valid for study, and posits animal slavery and death as a necessity without supporting arguments other than “animal death and slavery are useful to us, therefore they are good and necessary.” The kinds of conclusions one can arrive at with this very same logic would justify just about any atrocity one can imagine. Good philosophers explore where their assumptions come from and what sorts of other conclusions can be drawn by these assumptions. This philosopher abstained from doing this throughout his entire essay. It also didn’t help that the essay relied on flawed arguments that Peter Singer had already dismantled decades earlier. The author didn’t know his subject. I suspect this was the best essay from this position one could hope to find. That one aside, and Nietzsche’s useless but entertaining inclusion aside, almost every other essay was worthwhile, thoughtful, deeply rational and clear and well argued, and provided serious philosophical value, while some were just exceedingly excellent, robust, virtually invincible, and enlightening, like Singer’s three essays, MLK’s, Luban’s, Norcross’, and most of the writings on drugs, sex, and war. The essays casting scrutiny on marriage and monogamy were smart and brought forth some excellent and rarely discussed points of consideration, the essays on drug use and rape and racism and abortion likewise had a plethora of competing insights and critical arguments that could serve as fuel for very interesting conversations, even if none of your friends or acquaintances are literate, patient, or thoughtful enough to have those conversations. The value in moral philosophy is the same as the rest of philosophy: not telling you what to think, but helping one learn how to think consistently, principled, logically, supported by strong argument and a deep understanding of the relevant information, about a wide variety of topics that are generally more complex and nuanced than our ordinary conversations make room for. I found many essays refreshingly bold and analytical, showcasing some top notch thinking on tricky issues. Each essay has an introduction written by James Rachels or his son and fellow philosopher, Stuart Rachels. The only thing missing, in my opinion, is some additional reflection on the essays, some analysis of the argument and ideas. However, much of this sort of thing was included in James Rachels’ book The Elements of Moral Philosophy. This book is definitely an important text for those interested in better understanding ethics and moral philosophy, in how to think about these subjects, and in how to implement these things meaningfully in one’s time on this planet. ...more |
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Spinoza’s Ethics is a book that requires a great level of attention and meditation. As a work of philosophy, it is probably the book that has given ri
Spinoza’s Ethics is a book that requires a great level of attention and meditation. As a work of philosophy, it is probably the book that has given rise to the most conflicting thoughts in my mind, leaving me somewhat puzzled as to what to make of it as a whole. I doubt I’ll be able to convey my thoughts fully or as clearly as I would like. In the end I came away impressed and excited by it, but along the way I ran into a number of hurdles. What Spinoza set out to do is nothing short of incredible, using a geometric demonstration borrowed from Euclid to lay out his metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and ethics. This is an admirable feat, even if it does not always succeed in rigorously or thoroughly supporting his arguments or his ideas, because this is a useful and intelligent way to frame philosophical ideas such that they stand up to scrutiny and are based firmly on foundational principles that came before. Each of the five chapters is presented as a list of axioms, definitions, and then propositions, which are supplemented by demonstrations, explanations, corollaries, scholia, and postulates. Although this makes the work a labor to get through and sometimes requires more effort to understand, as well as making it a little bit less engaging than it could otherwise be, it ultimately makes it a stronger and more serious work that is sustained by its logical coherence. So any faults that I ran into or perceived in the work were somewhat smoothed away by my appreciation for this excellent approach that should, with a few modifications, be followed by serious philosophers wishing to undertake equally ambitious work. And I will point out that if he hadn’t put in place this robust framework for building his philosophy, I might not have nitpicked certain parts as hard as I have, because I would find them easier to overlook. So in a way, this better approach to philosophy that is definitely the right way to do things has opened up Spinoza’s philosophy to a deeper level of scrutiny that might not otherwise make sense. For example, in Aristotle’s Ethics, despite him making some of the same baseless assumptions or conclusions that I thought Spinoza did, I found them less worthy of scrutiny because his method was not as strictly geared toward cohesion and consistency, and his later arguments would not come to depend on those conclusions. Unfortunately this method did not always lead to strong results or brilliant arguments, and particularly in chapter 1, “Of God”, I found it hard to follow almost all of his reasoning. Only after very slowly reading and rereading this chapter did I come away thinking I understood Spinoza’s view of God, which is not the God of Christianity or any religion, but a sort of dispassionate entity that is not separate from Nature but that is in some strange way synonymous with Nature. I don’t know if it was a translation issue or an age issue, but Spinoza’s model of God made little sense here, and as he relied on this picture of God throughout the rest of the book, I found it more and more puzzling the more I thought about it. An example of this is when Spinoza argues that God must exist, and refers to earlier propositions or definitions or axioms he has put forward in order to prove this. After following this thread of references backward, and we must follow it all the way back because none of the prior references really seem to satisfy the argument, we land back at his very vaguely and unclearly worded definition on page 1 that defines a substance as that which is in itself and conceived through itself, whose concept does not require its conception in any other thing in order to be formed. If this wording seems incoherent, then you see what I mean. Much of chapter 1 is unfortunately like this. But once you stop missing the forest for the trees and digest the full picture of what Spinoza is trying to say, you come away realizing he seems to equate God with the universe or with nature, despite strangely referring to god with the pronoun “he” and referring to him as a thinking entity. This is hard to rationalize, and despite some of the high points in this chapter, like his discussions of appetites and desires and our perceived enslavement to certain impulses, as well as the unique-for-the-time observation that man is not separate from nature and is controlled by the same factors as animals, I never felt Spinoza did a good job convincing me that nature should be thought of in this personified, godlike way, or that attributing certain things to this God-Universe entity made a lot of sense. I still don’t quite understand why Spinoza thought it was important to have a “God” in his philosophy if he is going to make it akin to nature or the universe, or why he wanted to personify this entity or give it consciousness. However, after chapter 1 things get a lot better. Chapter two, which is on the nature and origin of the mind, still is replete with what I took to be bad arguments and some nonsensical dependencies on ideas from chapter one, but it starts to move away from this incoherent framing and into a slightly more coherent vision of the mind, adequate and inadequate thoughts, the power of the mind and its faculties for understanding. His observations on the will and our mistaking our inability to see the causes of our actions for free will are ahead of his time. It is the third chapter, of the nature and origins of the affects, that things really started to take hold and I could see in Spinoza sparks of brilliance, piercing insight, and the very power of mind which he advocates. Here he lays out, in very rational and clear, logical detail the effects of the affects on the human mind. By affects he means the various emotions, states of mind, reactions and actions one engages in. He has an incredibly useful and cogent way of explaining these things and in developing, from low level principles, a smart framework for understanding them. He argues that reason is in line with human nature, which is not something I agree with and not something I think he effectively demonstrated. In chapter four he continues this topic and explains human bondage to the affects, and in the last chapter he goes into how we may free ourselves of these forms of enslavement through the power and firmness of mind, strength of character, and real understanding. My confusion may be due to what I found to be a recurring issue in the book, in which his use of words is often at odds with how we understand these words today. I can’t tell if this is due to translation or not. To be fair, Spinoza is careful to point out that his usage of words is based on how he understands them, and so this is not a big problem, simply a problem of syntax. My issue is that much of his philosophy is based on how he understands these words, which is quite different than how I understand them. Words like reason, confidence, virtue, substance, and many others are used in a way here that doesn’t resonate with my understanding, so I find it confusing. Virtue, for example, he defines as stemming from seeking our own advantage, and reason he defines as following our nature as it aligns with our knowledge of God, and steering our life into the direction of self-preservation. It could be that these words were translated poorly, but many of the words he frequently uses and which our knowledge of his philosophy is based on are not the right words, or not our current understanding of what these words mean. Many of Spinoza’s descriptions of the affects seem acute, spot on, extremely insightful and of clear mind, such that I know we have a common understanding of these words. And his treatment of the deeper and more complex things tied to these are often equally acute. But when he says virtue or reason or God or nature, it is not clear to me that he is talking about these things. Other points of contention I had with Spinoza was his insensible dismissal of “unmanly compassion”, which he never provides an argument for, and from which he arrives at some very questionable and non-rigorous conclusions, like excluding “the lower animals” (all non humans) from our ethical considerations. Today there is no serious or worthwhile ethical view that holds this position, and of course that was a common position to hold in the 17th century. But so much of Spinoza’s work here seems designed to think critically, freely, and to be independent of the prejudices and shortsightedness of his day, which makes this unexplained and unaddressed shortsightedness all the harder to accept, especially in light of his usual attempts at carefully justifying any position he takes. Why he thought that this position did not require further comment or serious justification, and yet he went to great lengths to justify and build up much less significant views, makes no sense to me. And yet, despite all the criticisms I have leveled at this work, it should be noted that many good things can and should be said. I have pointed to some of them. Others include his examinations of freedom, and how the power of mind and of reason are man’s only real tools in understanding our world, making sense of the difficult aspects of reality and experience. Our powers of reason, when fully engaged, allow us to control our passions, to restrain and moderate the affects such that external causes cannot have more power over us than they should. He is very much in line with the Stoics in this regard. He vanquishes the misconceptions forwarded by superstition, and points out that, contrary to reason, superstition says that it is good things that bring sadness, and evil that brings joy. “He who is led by fear and does good only to avoid evil is not governed by reason.” His notion of God is one quite different from religion, so although it could look on the surface like he is guilty of superstitious assertions, he is extremely careful to avoid any and to make clear his case against the God of monotheistic faiths. Spinoza argues effectively that the highest satisfaction of mind stems from the right principle of living. Despite some of his format being tricky to navigate, once we stop focusing so much on each tree we can see the forest for what it is, which many times seems like a remarkably poignant and deeply reflective examination of reality and what it means to live an ethical and meaningful existence. Many of the points he repeats and expands on are quite profound, and become more so the more we think about them, such as his examinations of the multitude of the affects and the power of mind, and also that it is good what leads to greater understanding and bad which prevents understanding. As simple a statement as this might seem, visiting it often and reflecting on it and looking further into it reveals a wealth of truth. Likewise, he has many wise things to say about weakness of mind, susceptibility to the affects, temptations, the inability to regulate and control one’s actions or feelings, and dozens of other substantial ideas that warrant serious thought and reflection. To paraphrase one of his statements toward the end of the book: The poor man whose mind is weak, when he is also greedy, will not stop talking about the misuse of money and the vices of the rich. In doing so he distresses himself and shows others he cannot bear calmly his own poverty or the wealth of others, just as a man poorly received by a lover thinks of nothing but the inconstancy and deceptiveness of women. In all, Spinoza’s Ethics is arguably a profound work full of introspection and a cogent, logical formulation of a very compelling philosophy that no one can do justice in a review. My problems with it derive mostly from my own confusion in his treatment of some of its central topics, and disagreements with small sections of his ideas. Overall it’s a massive, important, fascinating, serious and thoughtful work that should be studied by anyone who cares about ethics or thinking deeply about philosophy. One of its major strengths is its format and delivery, but oddly enough, that is also what made me more critical of certain aspects of the content, because I could see where certain ideas seemed to break down or not hold, at least in my understanding of them. Despite my critiques or disagreements, I think this is the best way to do philosophy. ...more |
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| May 01, 1987
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Shamanism is an incredibly fascinating thing to me. It’s an ancient, cross-cultural phenomenon that blends mysticism, mythology, mental transcendence
Shamanism is an incredibly fascinating thing to me. It’s an ancient, cross-cultural phenomenon that blends mysticism, mythology, mental transcendence and altered states of consciousness, giving its practitioners what they believe to be special powers of seeing, healing, knowing, traveling, and depending on the culture, many other gifts. What’s surprising is the number of similarities in the form of shamanism across all the cultures in which it appears, as though the basic elements of it are culturally agnostic. The fun thing about that is that it makes me want to think, “then it must all be real!” Realistically, there’s probably a very big and interesting reason for this huge body of similarities, but that reason isn’t discussed here. This book compiles 20 essays from more than 20 authors (mostly academics, anthropologists, psychologists, philosophers, religious studies professors and historians, and a few cultural researchers and practitioners) discussing all the facets of shamanism from all over the world, including the many Asian variants, the Native American variants, South American shamanism, European shamanism, Hawaiian shamanism, Australian Aboriginal shamanism, and even Jewish shamanism. It’s broken up into five sections, with the essays in these sections broadly touching on similar themes, but all largely different, offering a full view of this rich and interesting subject. These five sections are organized as follows: the shaman’s alternate reality — in depth looks at the shamanic mythology and world views; shamanic states of consciousness — essays about the shamanic voyage through dreams and other states of consciousness, how they are achieved, what benefits shamans and academics believe they offer; shamanic traditions —shamanism in unexpected places, belief structures and myths that guide shaman thought; shamanism and the perennial philosophy — essays discussing shaman philosophy, belief, identity, its relationship to other mystic and theological ideas; shamanism in a changing world — reflections on modern, personal benefits people try to derive from shamanistic concepts. The essays span a wide range of quality and interest. None were bad, but a few were so-so. Many are fantastic and full of neat concepts, thoughtful insights and perspectives, and some stimulating ideas and discussions. The man who seems like the most well regarded researcher of shamanism in the world, judging by the fact that about 17 or 18 of these 20 essays directly reference his work and his name, Mircea Eliade, has an incredibly interesting essay included here about shaman cosmology and mythology. It’s remarkably educational, even if it’s a bit dry. Some of the essays are outstandingly adventurous and entertaining voyages of insights into esoteric ideas that are a joy to think about and turn over in the head, like the mental worlds of shamanism, the transcendence, the mythic powers, the rituals, the states of consciousness and what they do there, even the terminology used evokes primordial fountains of intrigue and antediluvian mystery. Given the subject, and the abundance of anthropologists contributing, it’s not surprising that some of the authors tend to abandon rational thinking in favor of a more setting-appropriate frame of mind, when talking about shamanism, even from an academic perspective. It’s fitting to try to look at shamanism on its own terms without trying to frame it in modern scientific, medical, or logical terms. While I think these framings are valuable to a fully objective understanding of the phenomena associated with shamanism, I don’t think that’s anyone’s intent here. Some of the contributors play a bit loose with rational thinking even outside of the context of talking about ancient disciplines and practices, going so far as to make wacky statements about all of reality being an entirely subjective thing we invent, which is thrown out there awkwardly and unconvincingly, as a sort of nod to mystic rituals and dream worlds being as legitimate means of healing as modern medicine. And while that may not be entirely true, the sentiment that is often relayed here is that there is more to healing than the physical aspect, which is certainly true, and there may be something to be said for the kind of effects shamans have. Still, even the essays that get a bit wonky are highly enjoyable. The reports of healings and seemingly magical occurrences are fun, even if not corroborated or entirely objective accounts. The book covers many topics relating to shamanism, which is a much more expansive world than I knew. I haven’t even touched on the majority of the subject matter because there’s so much here, and it’s all interesting. I can’t think of anything related to the subject that wasn’t addressed here, but my ignorance on the subject is huge. The only unanswered question I have is one that wasn’t really relevant to these essays, which is the one I alluded to in my first paragraph: how did these belief systems develop all over the world, over thousands of miles of separation and eons of different lifestyles and culture and circumstances, to form what at least in some aspects is a consistently uniform system of ritual and belief? The fun thing about this question is that even though it is never really answered in these essays, nor asked, after reading enough about shamanism one can’t help but put together in their mind the “obvious”answer that is most in line with the shamanic belief system. I won’t give that answer away, even though it’s a fun thing to ponder on. Overall a really enjoyable read that treaded into the mythical, ritualistic, and philosophical characteristics of shamanism, the aspects I find most interesting. For a reader seeking a purely anthropological treatment, this may be disappointing but with a few acceptable bits. For a reader wanting a scientific and rational analysis, this will also be a disappointment. For someone drawn to neat ideas and cultures, and who finds excitement in the fantastical, this set of essays should be a great read. ...more |
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The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals is a major piece of work, and its influence on moral philosophy cannot be overstated. I say this not becaus
The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals is a major piece of work, and its influence on moral philosophy cannot be overstated. I say this not because I’ve heard this, but because I can now see just how foundational this work is to any serious study of ethics and morality. The book is not Kant’s complete thesis on moral thought, nor his final word, but as its title suggests, it builds the foundations, often generalized and abstract, upon which moral philosophy can be understood and thought about rationally. The version I have just finished was translated by H.J Paton, who also provides an excellent preface and a 40 page analysis of Kant’s arguments, aligning directly with each chapter, section, and page. I found this to be not only enlightening and very useful, but given Kant’s sometimes obscure and drawn out manner of writing, vital to my full appreciation of his effort. Without the translator’s analysis and occasional clarification I wouldn’t have gotten quite as much out of this, though it would still have been an impressive and admirable feat. This is where Kant introduces the categorical imperative, and establishes a thorough framework for it, and takes us neck deep into the weeds of the principles of morality without regard for interest, developing the first, to my knowledge, foundation for rationality as the basis for understanding morality. Autonomy of the will is necessary, in Kant’s view and I think in any coherent philosophy on the subject, for moral understanding. And a key concept for explaining autonomy of the will is freedom, which is here considered a necessary presupposition of all action and thinking. Every rational agent must suppose his will to be free. Without the will, no act can have moral weight. ‘Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of alien influences.’ According to Kant, our interests are not relevant when evaluating morality, nor do our intended results from our actions weigh into the calculation. He goes to great lengths to validate these statements, and while I did not come away entirely convinced, lending partially due to my familiarity with Peter Singer’s more recent work regarding the equal consideration of interests, which I think is one of the most irrefutable principles in moral and ethical thinking, I was still amazed by the depth and rigor with which Kant approaches the problem of morality in an honest and rational way. He excels at rational thought and compelling, coherent, logically consistent arguments that, for the most part, are difficult to refute. So much of what Kant puts to paper here is remarkable in quality and its lasting influence. Often Kant will generalize and use abstraction to discuss his ideas, which works because these are principles that remain largely self consistent and cogent. But his lack of examples can make his point harder to digest. The few examples he does offer are not always the best or the most illustrative of his ideas, and he acknowledges that examples are not useful for explaining such principles. Sometimes I agreed, sometimes I wished for good examples. It has to be said, though, that this is intended as the groundwork upon which moral and ethical principles should be built, not a guide to what actions are moral or immoral. The consistency with which Kant tackles the implications and assumptions that surround some of his ideas is refreshing, and set a firm example for what should be expected of all serious scholars in any subject, but that remains largely unheeded and carelessly neglected in most of today’s public conversations. He explains how moral law bids us to develop our talents as fully and completely as we can, and why this is the case. He explores the categorical imperative and how it can exist at all. He takes us into related imperatives, like the formula of universal law, formula of the law of nature, formula of the end in itself, the formula of autonomy, and the formula of the kingdom of ends. He reiterates the foundations upon which imperatives can be built. He puts many pages into anticipating and resolving apparent contradictions that may arise from the principles or ideas he is advancing. He finishes the work with a whirlwind examination of what cannot be explained, and what questions or problems or fundamentals cannot be elucidated further, and pushes into examining the limits of moral inquiry itself. Not everything Kant puts forward is something I agree with, like his insistence on interests being of no importance, although I agree with some of his rationale for this, particularly since behaving in pure self interest cannot be a useful mode of ethical conduct. I appreciate his understanding of the limits of the largely artificial ‘is-ought’ conundrum, and he rightly asserts that an ‘if’ reduces this conundrum to nothing, but also, maybe not convincingly, urges us to believe that even without the ‘if’ certain is-ought statements can be made that are beyond question. I don’t entirely buy the notion that morality is only concerned with rational agents, because our treatment of non-human animals is every bit as important for serious ethical behavior as our treatment of each other. But I do agree that, obviously, morality can only be expected in rational agents. I agree with his conclusions that morality does not derive from religion, but I disagree with his apparent conclusion that it leads to religion. I also disagree with some of his statements made later in the book that suggest certain elements of moral philosophy, at the most fundamental, cannot be known or understood in our world as we know it, and that the only way to learn more is to see into the world beyond what we see—presumably something religious or supernatural. But he is right that there is a limit to what we can know and to what we can assert or explain, and that there comes a point when we cannot go into any more elementary explanations or reasons, and certain things must be accepted as basic fundamentals. We just disagree where these lines are drawn. This is a useless observation at this point. Generally, Kant’s philosophy is full of nuance and requires careful attention to really grasp it. I hope I’ve grasped it correctly. Given the age of this work, and especially its length, it is incredible how good it is, how much of it stands up to serious scrutiny and even remains more enlightening than most modern common thinking on the subject. Over two hundred years after his death, Kant still outclasses and out-thinks many prominent modern intellectuals discussing this subject, and has provided useful and interesting frameworks for others to further develop an objective and serious understanding of morality. It’s also an excellent basis for personally studying and considering ethics and morality, and if taken in full can help one think about the topic more objectively and rationally, as a creature of imperfect reason striving to be better. ...more |
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This is quite a book. It's hard to know exactly what to make of it. Right away I felt it was obvious Ludwig Wittgenstein was a bright guy. And after f
This is quite a book. It's hard to know exactly what to make of it. Right away I felt it was obvious Ludwig Wittgenstein was a bright guy. And after finishing it I still feel this way. This is the only work of his I've read, so my opinion on the man is informed fully by The Blue and Brown Books. These books explore philosophy in a way I've never seen it explored, but that seem important given the nature of philosophy and the basic problems of understanding anything we can claim to understand. Wittgenstein covers the philosophy of language, language games, the philosophy of mind, and I don't know how to classify the rest. But it's all fascinating, rigorous and comprehensive. He's looking at how we communicate, what we mean when we use certain expressions, how we should think about knowledge, the different forms of understanding, our sensations of pain and what we mean when we talk about it, how we make sense of the information we see when it takes on different forms (color, shape, how we interpret scribbles as random and senseless or as representing certain images or ideas or words), and much more. It's a dense study, with a lot to talk about. The Blue book and the Brown book were considered preliminary studies for his work that later culminated in the Philosophical Investigations. That is a work I haven't read. However, the Blue and Brown Books, as they are, feel incomplete. This is a remarkable work in many ways, with a wealth of penetrating thought, but it at times feels like stream of consciousness, despite evidently having taken quite a bit of work and organization to put together. These books are based on lectures Wittgenstein gave to a handful of students, and so they are not as polished or coherent as they could be. A few times, especially early on in the Blue Book, Wittgenstein says he's going to come back to a point or a topic to develop it further, and he never does. The footnotes even point out that he never returns to this thread. And other times he repeats himself, covering ideas he's already developed, although in such cases he might come at it from a slightly different angle. Both books end up feeling really smart, but really unorganized and poorly explained. It's not clear exactly what sort of use one is expected to get out of this. That's ultimately where it falls down: Wittgenstein is clearly an intelligent, serious philosopher. But he isn't competent at communicating his philosophy in a way that makes it attractive, or that connects it to ideas that we would find benefiting from the philosophy. He seems to leave that as an exercise for the reader. And as a reader, I came away with many ideas of how his form of thinking could be applied to our understanding of, or interaction with, the world around us, but it wasn't always a sensible application to make or a useful one. I ultimately couldn't figure out the "why" behind much of Wittgenstein's philosophy, and he doesn't attempt to dive into it. As I said, it is very incomplete. Since these books comprise his 'preliminary studies' that led to what I assume is a fuller work, it's no surprise they feel incomplete. The ideas here are developed abstractly, theoretically, applied to basic examples for illustration, but without their author having a purpose for them. Maybe that purpose becomes clear in the Philosophical Investigations. The Brown book introduces many dozens of thought experiments about language, thoughts, impressions, knowledge, and interpretations, which he calls Language Games. But they're still thought experiments, just directed at philosophical questions and investigations. In his discussions of how we identify a leaf based on our understanding of what a leaf looks like, informed by having seen a bunch of different kinds of leaves, it got me thinking that Wittgenstein's work in philosophy could be seen as foundational to artificial intelligence, in a way. He discusses these concepts again, later on, regarding pencils, and how we would identify a pencil, and what features an object would require for us to classify it as one. Same with the leaf: If you've seen a thousand different kinds of leaves, how does your mind decide that object 1001 is also a leaf? What commonality is it identifying? Shape? Color? This is the sort of question we have to ask in image analysis and artificial intelligence, and then we have to answer it. These concepts are expanded in discussing pictures that are entirely different except for one blotch of color. If we had to draw the similarity between these images, what would we draw? How would we define the similarity? Or if we look at dark blue and light blue, if we instead used different words for these colors, would we still say they have anything in common, and that the commonality is the color blue? He uses music and mathematics as examples throughout the work, such as asking what it means for someone to be able to know the next few notes in a melody, or how we could explain numbers to a tribe that are higher than those the tribe has ever counted to. Or how could we describe music without whistling it and without evoking some kind of common understanding? He points out the misconceptions about music being defined by its ability to make us feel certain emotions, as thought the feeling of those emotions is the purpose and the defining trait of music, something exclusive to music -- which is not true. Despite making these acute observations nearly a century ago, the associated misconceptions persist. Implications of these various explorations turn out to be nearly infinite, and you can find yourself getting lost down these paths of thought. These are simple examples of the sorts of studies Wittgenstein is taking us into. Many of them become much more involved, more complex and interesting, such as how we interpret the differences in drawn facial expressions, and what makes us agree the expressions are different even if the drawings themselves have barely any differences, or vice versa, with two drawn faces having significantly different orientations of lines and scribbles but the expressions appearing generally identical, or the games one can play with language or thought, and what we mean when we use certain phrases or words to communicate sensations, experiences, ideas. He's probing concepts in ways I don't think they had ever been probed before, and a lot of times it's really captivating even if sloppy and frustratingly obtuse. In addition to artificial intelligence, it seems obvious Wittgenstein’s philosophy has a place in the study of linguistics and neuroscience, and it would be interesting to see how this work has been integrated or expanded upon (or rejected) by these fields. It wasn't always clear to me what Wittgenstein was getting at with his nonstop barrage of ideas, even though they were clear to follow. I found that the introduction to this collection actually provided a lot of clarity that Wittgenstein himself was unable to provide, and so these were invaluable 16 pages that absolutely should be read for anyone hoping to make sense of the work as a whole. And as a whole, this body of work seems to me to have some analogues or applications to scientific thinking, in the strictest sense. This is where I see its value. I don't mean simply in application to scientific problems, but in application to any philosophical or intellectual problem, enabling one to think more like a scientist or a rigorous philosopher in the process. On the surface many of the questions and language games and thought experiments and philosophy of mind Wittgenstein explores might seem frivolous or pedantic or useless, and the tireless way in which he keeps going, and going, and driving the point home and making piercing insight after piercing insight into the non-obvious questions can seem exhausting to someone not interested in this level of interrogation. I found it compelling and fascinating, for the most part, even when I was finding it a little bit useless. Sometimes he would introduce ideas that I wasn't quite sure I understood the point of, but as I continued reading I would make projections based on the idea, and come up with thought experiments or examples of my own, which a few paragraphs or pages later Wittgenstein would then explicitly discuss. This led me to believe that I wasn't lost or missing anything, and that sometimes my boredom with the discussion was instead based on not seeing any value in it. This wasn't always the case, because many times (as in the application to artificial intelligence or to scientific thinking) I saw some immediate and practical value in the philosophy, as well as general intellectual value. But there were many times that he rode an idea into the dust without really making its purpose known. Even when I could come up with a purpose, it was evident the idea would need a lot more development before it became applicable to anything. In the end, this is a nifty book, densely packed with profoundly thought provoking material from one of the most legendary philosophers of the last century. It doesn't always read well, it doesn't always seem salient, it's surprisingly messy, but for the abundance of fundamental insight it provides, the voyages of thought it forces you to take, and the thoughtful extrapolations it will let you make, it is undeniably important and good for serious cognitive development. I might like to reread it again in a few years, maybe if I ever read the Philosophical Investigations. ...more |
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it was amazing
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This tome of Epictetus’ contributions to philosophy is outstanding. All his main works are here: the four books of his Discourses; fragments from othe
This tome of Epictetus’ contributions to philosophy is outstanding. All his main works are here: the four books of his Discourses; fragments from other works that seem to have been lost to time; and the Enchiridion, a short work that summarizes some of the main points of his philosophy. Once you’ve read the Discourses you won’t find any surprises in the rest, but the fragments are interesting for their historical relevance, and the Enchiridion is a nicely condensed delivery of his ideas that can serve as a quick 30 minute review. The Discourses give one a full picture of the ideas, but the whole collection should be read for the complete treatment of Epictetus's thought. Epictetus seems to me like the bridge between Socrates and Stoicism, even though the connection may be more complicated or more direct than I realize. But from what I can tell, Epictetus embodies the best of both, and integrates Socrates’ teachings and wisdom and logical approach into the framework and ethics of Stoicism. These texts, particularly the Discourses, are exemplary of the mindful mastery of life and the self that characterizes Stoicism, but with an added depth and high-mindedness one would expect to be exhibited by not only a lecturer of it, but a practitioner of it. The book is not a layman’s guide to pop-philosophy, or a soft introduction to fun ideas, or a self-help guide, but is a series of deep examinations and lectures intended for the philosopher and serious student of philosophy looking to completely overhaul who and what they are in order to achieve the supremacy of philosophical existence. What this means is putting principles into practice, embodying the philosophy instead of merely theorizing and speculating and thinking about it. And what else is philosophy good for if not for direct application, strengthening our reasoning and ways of thinking, and giving us the tools to live a thoughtful, reflective life upon the plateau of invincibility? In that spirit, the book is a demonstration of how to think, how to act, how to live as a mindful philosopher, offering no patience for those who simply want to be called a philosopher without truly being one. Epictetus observes how useless philosophy is if we do not practice it and live it, and he shows us in detail many of the ways this should be done in the Stoic tradition. He is disparaging, and I think rightfully so, of those who only want to talk about philosophy but not apply it to their lives and actions. These people are not philosophers, in Epictetus’ eyes. He seems to have anticipated a large swath of the most well known nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers, whose work, despite its constant discussion, provides little if any intellectual application. This can make his philosophy, and Stoicism in general, difficult for some to stomach, because it is a philosophy that demands application, it demands an immense change in how one approaches life outwardly and inwardly, and it does not reward you for merely talking about it. In a sense, Epictetus provides a new definition of philosophy, one which might exclude a large body of the philosophy that came in the following couple thousand years, because this definition requires philosophy to be something one can (and must, if the philosophy has any merit) put into practice. The writing is almost conversational, cordial, engaging and eloquent but also careful and precise. It has the satisfying care and nuance of an academic text, but with the enjoyability of an energetic lecture. He discusses hundreds of ideas and principles that are crucial to the development of the mind, and all of them with clarity and elaboration and fleshed out thinking. When he proposes an idea, he often anticipates how it might sound to the audience and he offers a counterpoint the attentive reader would think to offer. He then offers his reply, then perhaps another hypothetical counterpoint, then another response until he reaches the core idea. Each chapter in each book discusses a certain theme, and sometimes these themes or ideas, at least those which serve as the foundations of the philosophy, are repeated later, introduced or examined in a new way, and this repetition drives them into the mind, solidifying them, making clear their value. These ideas are not discussed dogmatically but rationally, with points and counterpoints, discussions of alternate schools of thought or popular ideas, and explicit, reasoned argument as to why the ideas he teaches are superior. The standard themes of stoicism are here, but they are expounded on with attention to all their facets, and supplemented with a lot that is beyond the scope of stoicism. Epictetus covers so much it is hard to know what to touch on in a review. He reflects on human nature and the mind and the self as things that, like physical strength, need to be correctly exercised and trained in order to make progress. Progress itself he has a profound understanding of, and the need for the individual to envision what it is they want to be, and to be that and act like they are that and to think in that way and to devote themselves fully to achieving that, to give everything. He explains the importance of sacrificing the things that are unimportant, which is just about everything, in order to truly attain freedom and achieve peace, contentment, excellence, what today we might call self—actualization. He presents carefully thought-out arguments for all of his ideas, showing them to us from multiple angles and challenging preconceptions until we see their flaws. If we only zoom in on a few chapters or segments, for example, we can catch a glimpse of what is here. We see the fundamental importance of our impressions, and how almost everything we experience can be thought of as nothing more than these impressions, which only we have the power to control. Our well-being itself is a product of only internals, and we should associate no great weight to externals, or to anything outside our control. Freedom is directly related to our impressions by our enslavement to materials, desires, even our attachment to other people. We see the faculties we are provided to face existence, but that, like a muscle, are weak and undeveloped until we repeatedly and tirelessly train them and strengthen them, like fortitude or courage. Epictetus shows a thinking reader that we alone are responsible for our emotions and our actions, and that external forces do not hold the power over us we are conditioned to think they do. He shows you the control you can develop over yourself, which runs deeper than one expects. This alone is a frightening realization for some modern readers, and something entire generations or personality types are primed to oppose and deny. To their misfortune. We see a deep-dive on philosophy itself and how one should approach it if they are serious about it, how we should interact with ideas and opinions, and explore the source of disagreements in an objective manner. We learn of the importance of reason, rational thinking, self-discipline, mastery of the emotions, and knowledge of ourselves and our current limitations so that we might improve. These are some of the basics of stoicism and they may sound mundane by now to anyone who has casually studied the philosophy, but they are truly magnificent, and Epictetus gives them such a terrific treatment and offers such enlightening illustrations of them that they feel new, like some form of hidden esoteric knowledge. This is only scratching the surface. Epictetus goes full power into exploring our contradictions, rational thinking, our psychology, selfishness, ethics, character, self expression, the veracity of our opinions based on our aptitude, progress, competition, goals, social relations, fear and anxiety and happiness, the art of the argument, religious thought, determining what is good or bad and how we might value things or think about experiences. The philosophy he shares is one of strong internal cohesion, consistency, and careful, principled understanding. He leads by example, arguing that, as Socrates said, an unexamined life is a wasted life. He puts into practice everything he professes, and expects anyone serious about thinking, about ideas and knowledge and mastery of the self, to do the same. This collection of his work is a prime example of the power that philosophy can give the individual, which is the power over oneself, which is probably the only power that one can hope to attain. Unsurprisingly, most philosophical contributions over the past few centuries pale in comparison to the work of Epictetus and Stoicism in general. ...more |
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it was amazing
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There are occasions where I am so impressed by a book that the only words I can write about it are emphatic, uncritical praise. John Stuart Mill’s On
There are occasions where I am so impressed by a book that the only words I can write about it are emphatic, uncritical praise. John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty has been such a book. If I took more time away from it before writing this review it might be a better review, but it wouldn’t capture my immediate awe. I think the awe is important, so here it is. On Liberty is a marvel of moral, intellectual, and political philosophy regarding the rights and liberties of the individual, of the state, of society, and of the responsibilities of each toward each other and themselves. It is a study of what freedoms ought to be extended to men and women and how, what limits if any ought to be implemented, and backs up all of it with some of the most profoundly insightful, comprehensive, exploratory, and nuanced reason and discussion I have seen in philosophy of any age. Though his book is not long, each word is perfectly chosen so as to maximize the density of substance and content. Books much longer have rarely, if ever, demonstrated such an extensive grasp of the fundamental problems and questions of human flourishing. Owing to his rigorous scholarly training starting at a young age, with the study of Greek, Latin, history, the classics, “mental philosophy”, his lifetime of mental cultivation after the model of Jeremy Bentham’s Utilitarianism, his living abroad, his conversations with philosophers, daily drills of lectures and recitations, all forced upon him by his father wanting him to be, it seems, nothing short of a philosopher-king, Mill was not only a mind far above and beyond his own time, he is above and beyond our own time. Unusual for his time and for ours, his biographers point out that he was highly receptive to the influence of other minds, due to a curious and inquiring intellect. He acknowledged a diverse range of influences over his own thinking and always maintained the importance of constant learning, regularly re-evaluating one’s beliefs and ideas in order to improve upon them, and to refrain from over-confidence in any conviction. As he aged he grew disenchanted with Bentham’s ideas and his father’s intellectual direction, such as his sole reliance on reason, or never allowing for feeling or sentiment in any affairs of life. He explored his own path. He realized happiness cannot be directly sought as an end, but is a product of purposeful conduct, and the cultivation of feelings is vital for a well-balanced personality. Mill saw defects in his own character as a result of some of his upbringing, wholly intellectual, and turned to music and art and poetry, and after meeting his wife, who would become the biggest influence on his thinking, set his own course in mental and moral and personal development. Her skepticism kept him from extremism in his own opinions. The fruits of his lifelong cultivation are here in this book. Mill was a philosopher whose competently thought out and clear understanding of problems that still evade our civilization’s grasp is something we as a collective will probably not catch up to in some time. However, many of his most well known ideas have been widely appreciated, championed, and applied. Plenty have been critiqued, although I find many of these critiques to be ironic, in that they criticize him for not being doctrinaire, while the critic has rigidly subscribed to an orthodoxy they are upset Mill has rejected. In almost every case I do not think a more adept philosophy has been developed since the time of his writing. He possessed such peerless insight into such a wide variety of problems that are with us still that it seems the scholars of the last two centuries have struggled to catch up. He praises the social value of individuality, diversity of individual taste, the importance of social ethics. He discusses the tyranny of the majority, recognizing not only the tyranny of the state: “But reflecting persons perceived that when society is itself the tyrant—society collectively, over the separate individuals who compose it—its means of tyrannizing are not restricted to the acts which it may do by the hands of its political functionaries. Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong mandates instead of right, or any mandates at all in things with which it ought not to meddle, it practises a social tyranny more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself. Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.” He extols the virtue of free speech and the importance of diverse opinions and thought, heretical speech and thought, and presents thorough arguments in defense of these principles: “…the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is that it is robbing the human race, posterity as well as the existing generation—those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error.” When a heretical idea is suppressed it may give comfort to the majority: “But the price paid for this sort of intellectual pacification, is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage of the human mind. A state of things in which a large portion of the most active and inquiring intellects find it advisable to keep the genuine principles and grounds of their convictions within their own breasts, and attempt, in what they address to the public, to fit as much as they can of their own conclusions to premises which they have internally renounced, cannot send forth the open, fearless characters, and logical, consistent intellects who once adorned the thinking world. The sort of men who can be looked for under it, are either mere conformers to commonplace, or time-servers for truth whose arguments on all great subjects are meant for their hearers, and are not those which have convinced themselves.” Mill writes about our fallibility, the necessity of being open to being wrong, and the ways in which we might more securely develop a robust knowledge: “In the case of any person whose judgment is really deserving of confidence, how has it become so? Because he has kept his mind open to criticism of his opinions and conduct. Because it has been his practice to listen to all that could be said against him; to profit by as much of it as was just, and expound to himself, and upon occasion to others, the fallacy of what was fallacious. Because he has felt, that the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind. No wise man ever acquired his wisdom in any mode but this; nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become wise in any other manner. The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so far from causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the only stable foundation for a just reliance on it: for, being cognizant of all that can, at least obviously, be said against him, and having taken up his position against all gainsayers knowing that he has sought for objections and difficulties, instead of avoiding them, and has shut out no light which can be thrown upon the subject from any quarter--he has a right to think his judgment better than that of any person, or any multitude, who have not gone through a similar process.” “But it is not the minds of heretics that are deteriorated most, by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end in the orthodox conclusions. The greatest harm done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of heresy. Who can compute what the world loses in the multitude of promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare not follow out any bold, vigorous, independent train of thought, lest it should land them in something which would admit of being considered irreligious or immoral? Among them we may occasionally see some man of deep conscientiousness, and subtile and refined understanding, who spends a life in sophisticating with an intellect which he cannot silence, and exhausts the resources of ingenuity in attempting to reconcile the promptings of his conscience and reason with orthodoxy, which yet he does not, perhaps, to the end succeed in doing. No one can be a great thinker who does not recognize, that as a thinker it is his first duty to follow his intellect to whatever conclusions it may lead. Truth gains more even by the errors of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by the true opinions of those who only hold them because they do not suffer themselves to think. Not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. On the contrary, it is as much, and even more indispensable, to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of. There have been, and may again be, great individual thinkers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. But there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intellectually active people. Where any people has made a temporary approach to such a character, it has been because the dread of heterodox speculation was for a time suspended. Where there is a tacit convention that principles are not to be disputed; where the discussion of the greatest questions which can occupy humanity is considered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high scale of mental activity which has made some periods of history so remarkable. Never when controversy avoided the subjects which are large and important enough to kindle enthusiasm, was the mind of a people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse given which raised even persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the dignity of thinking beings.” He looks at tribalism and the absurdity of thinking single parties have sufficient answers to any important problems. This may be even truer today than it was in his own time. He recognizes that even in progress some great portion of the truth may be lost or distorted, and that a comprehensive understanding will require the allowance of ideas deemed heretical to popular opinion: “…Popular opinions, on subjects not palpable to sense, are often true, but seldom or never the whole truth. They are a part of the truth; sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, but exaggerated, distorted, and disjoined from the truths by which they ought to be accompanied and limited. Heretical opinions, on the other hand, are generally some of these suppressed and neglected truths, bursting the bonds which kept them down, and either seeking reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion, or fronting it as enemies, and setting themselves up, with similar exclusiveness, as the whole truth. The latter case is hitherto the most frequent, as, in the human mind, one-sidedness has always been the rule, and many-sidedness the exception. Hence, even in revolutions of opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises. Even progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutes one partial and incomplete truth for another; improvement consisting chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, more adapted to the needs of the time, than that which it displaces. Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even when resting on a true foundation; every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth may be blended. No sober judge of human affairs will feel bound to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we should otherwise have overlooked, overlook some of those which we see. Rather, he will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided asserters too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole.” “In politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessary elements of a healthy state of political life; until the one or the other shall have so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party equally of order and of progress, knowing and distinguishing what is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away. Each of these modes of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other; but it is in a great measure the opposition of the other that keeps each within the limits of reason and sanity.” Mill claims that is only the cultivation of individuality that produces well-developed human beings, and rightly observed that no state, no society, no collective can be great without first having its members be great. It will always be limited by the quality of the people who comprise it, and so the individual development and flourishing of each person is of paramount importance. To this end, he argues for people being free to live how they wish, in accordance with their natures, so long as it isn’t to the detriment of any other living creatures. Humans are different in so many ways that to expect the same patterns of life and thought to be suitable for all is too restrictive. He lauds eccentricity and genius and nonconformity to the masses, pleads for the freest scope possible to uncustomary things in order to see which things should become customary. He is always aware that something better might lie ahead, better ideas, better men and women, better conduct, better systems of government or thought or behavior, and encourages the openness of society to this, for us to always be open to it and to be exploring and learning and developing. He does not throw out these thoughts and leave them for others to figure out, he opens up each topic to dig into how they should work, with practical examples and cases, yet generalizable to so many modern and timeless circumstances. His is a supreme philosophy of life and intellect and morality and of a person’s function and place in society. He argues for the cultivation of our higher natures, to cultivate ourselves to be better for ourselves and others, to think for ourselves and engage meaningfully with the world and with ideas instead of following the path set for us: “He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. He must use observation to see, reasoning and judgment to foresee, activity to gather materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided, firmness and self-control to hold to his deliberate decision” Mill advocates challenging all sacred ideas and beliefs, allowing the criticism of even that which he holds sacred. He discusses the limitations of religion, but also the liberating force it has provided, its guidance, and its incompleteness for a full moral system. He discusses the despotism of custom and its hindrance to progress, argues for toleration, develops fundamental principles of moral and intellectual conduct, freedom of expression, and provides explicit cases to illustrate almost every principle he sets down. He anticipates lengthy, detailed counterarguments to his own proposals, realistic ones that someone would actually level, not strawmen or poorly served beliefs. He patiently responds to these counterarguments and strengthens his case with incredible clearness of mind, depth of understanding of the nature of men, and with honest consideration given to the minutiae of each idea. Toward the book’s end he explores how these principles should be applied, giving broad yet detailed examples and nuanced look at specifics. He regards education as of paramount importance, as the parents’ responsibility to ensure for their children. He advocates not a rigid and conformist State education to sculpt one into a common shape, but a diverse education to make children capable, adept, understanding participants in society, making society itself better. He wants to avoid letting the state have improper influence over opinion, or total control of all human endeavors, which he fears will result in stagnation and regression. I have barely scratched the surface of Mill’s magnum opus. It took me a long time to read because I read it slowly, re-read many pages, wrote down endless quotes of capital brilliance. I have not touched on most of his comprehensive arguments or the ways in which he considers all sides to an idea and responds to them in satisfactory ways. His is a philosophy that not only in its content but in its character sets a high standard for intellectual work going forward. This is one of the rare works of genius that will become a personal favorite and a work against which many others will be compared. I can see why so many of the greatest thinkers since Mill, public figures and obscure alike, have been profoundly affected by his work. His is work that virtually everyone is familiar with at the surface, but there is far more under the surface than I was expecting. Practically every page of On Liberty is a greater dose of intelligent reflection and analysis than what is available in our current public discourse about anything. ...more |
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| 9780141043852
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| 3.62
| 1,044
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| Sep 22, 2009
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really liked it
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On Solitude is a collection of 13 of Michel De Montaigne’s essays (and is also the the title of the first essay in the collection) on topics such as s
On Solitude is a collection of 13 of Michel De Montaigne’s essays (and is also the the title of the first essay in the collection) on topics such as solitude, anger, sadness, death, books, consciousness, the imagination, and plenty else. Although he wrote many more essays than what is included in this volume, this short collection spans a wide array of ideas, offering unique and contemplative insight into many dimensions of human existence. His work makes constant reference to Roman and Greek thinkers of the past, and historical figures who illustrate the motivations behind many of his thoughts. Montaigne’s writings on each subject he touches are thoughtful and concise, while still offering a lot of subjective depth and reflection. This is one of the rare philosophical texts that wastes no space or time with far reaching generalities, or abstractions that solidify the argument or point. Although that kind of thing is necessary in an exhaustive or comprehensive text, particularly one attempting to introduce compelling new ideas that should replace old ones, these essays benefit from their lack of diversion and abundance of focus. This is not pure philosophy, but introspective and opinionated writings built from a strong foundation of philosophy. Because it is not pure philosophy or academic work, a reader could argue that Montaigne doesn’t always provide the most compelling reasoning to support his views, or that his arguments don’t often look like arguments. This is sometimes true, but it should be said again that this is a work of personal reflections rooted in philosophy, not a detailed manifesto. These essays are some of the earliest examples of serious psychological insight I am aware of, long before psychology was a proper science. Think of his work as you might think of a book review. It is subjective, and it is based largely on the insights from the writer, with personal thoughts tossed in here and there, but it still must be based on some amount of fact, of an interpretation of the same core, unchanging material. With book reviews, one can begin to decipher how thoughtful and competent the writer is, and how firm their understanding of the material was, based on what they write. So too can a reader determine how deeply connected to the intricacies of human life was Montaigne by reading his essays, even if one finds his opinions contradicting their own. The book offered plenty to ponder, with wonderfully articulated insights on topics few seem to contemplate seriously. It was a consistent work of high quality thought and ideas, and a welcome detour from the mindlessness of current times, which, as I write this, are crippled by the plague. COVID-19. Michel de Montaigne joins the growing list of old, dead writers who, all faults and shortcomings aside, leaves me disappointed in the mundane trivialities that seem to characterize most living public figures and thinkers and writers. Humanity seems to make great strides in science, technology, and medicine such that looking back even five years can make us feel highly accomplished. The same doesn’t appear to be true in other areas. Right now everyone in a first world country carries more advanced technology in their pockets than all of the combined computer tech that made it to the moon only half a century ago, and has greater resources at their immediate disposal than just about all the combined physically written literature that existed in the world just a few years ago. We’ve seen great strides in this area. And yet, what can we say of the depth or patience or insight or awareness or adeptness or intellect or clarity of thought in people today? Has it moved even an inch from where it was half a millennium ago? It doesn’t seem so. Aside from slowly shifting zeitgeists slowly leading to improved moral understanding, we seem to have seen zero improvement in the Human aspect of humanity since even the days of Aristotle or Socrates. History is full of thinkers, writers, philosophers, even notable statesmen or public figures, who, centuries after their deaths, stand as elite titans over today’s supposed equivalents. In the 400+ years since Montaigne’s lifetime, we can still count on most of the human race being far behind where he was. I will always be puzzled by our collective lack of progress, and by what appears to often times be many steps backward. At least we’ll still be making fancier cell phones though, right? ...more |
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Apr 11, 2020
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Mass Market Paperback
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| 1604501510
| 9781604501513
| 1604501510
| 3.85
| 2,416
| Nov 23, 1644
| Mar 14, 2008
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liked it
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John Milton's defense of free speech is the oldest defense of free speech I am aware of. That doesn't mean it's the first, since my knowledge about th
John Milton's defense of free speech is the oldest defense of free speech I am aware of. That doesn't mean it's the first, since my knowledge about the history of this subject is not that deep; I'm more concerned with the basic principles of free speech and how they should be applied. While Areopagitica may not be the most comprehensive defense of this fundamental right, it is laudable for its precision and its prose and its solid logic which stands the test of time, prevailing against centuries of fickle moral and intellectual fashions. Milton introduces some of the pillars of freedom of thought in these pages, explaining the importance of protecting not only an author's right to produce offensive, challenging, ideologically divergent, and even heretical material, but the publisher's right to publish it, and the public's right to have access to it and to read it. Many of the arguments he puts forward are arguments we are readily familiar with in the 21st century, and they continue to stand as some of the most flawless and reasonable arguments in support of one of the most critical human rights in a civilized world. Despite the long list of anti-free speech governments and movements that have come into and out of being since Milton's delivery of this speech, including Nazis and communists and religious zealots and politically correct zealots, the importance of free speech has never waned or been overstated. Even now, in an era in which every individual in a first world country believes that free speech protects *their* thoughts and *their* speech, the general principle of free speech as protection for all is not as highly regarded as one might expect. We see it frequently in campuses all over the United States, with dogmatic devotees of the current moral trends using whatever means they can muster to prevent heretics from being heard. We see it in a US leader who remarks, maybe jokingly or maybe seriously, that journalists should be silenced if they can't report the right things. And we even see it in journalists themselves, as they take up the torch of activism and political zealotry to use their own free speech protections to call for the removal of free speech protections from those who speak heresies against their beliefs. While the specifics of many of Milton's statements may be dated and are certainly unfashionable now (constant appeals to God and religious power), the principles and truth of what he says are not dated. Whether it's fashionable today is of no consequence, since truth is always unfashionable. Contrary to what one might expect of someone arguing from the vantage point of religious belief, Milton says that even "evil" and heretical and "wrong" things must be published and read, for one's virtue is not admirable if it has not been tested and challenged by exposure to difficult ideas, and one who has not learned about evil and dangerous things cannot be well prepared to resist them when the time comes. Remove the religious aspect from this reasoning and you are left with absolutely sound, applicable logic and undefeated truth that remains the most poignant defense of freedom of thought and expression ever written: If you are not familiar with the counterpoints to your ideas, or knowledgeable about views that diverge from your own, you will not be equipped to defend your ideas against others, you will not be capable of a debate or dialogue with anyone who does not hold your very same assumptions, and you cannot claim that your views are valid if you can do none of these. Freedom of speech removes the obstacles that might prevent you from gaining this familiarity and knowledge, paves a way for information to be freely and fairly shared, and ultimately will allow anyone to sharpen their understanding of complex issues. Censorship is the dismantling of this vital system of idea exchange. If an idea strikes you as so abominable that you find censorship seducing, it should occur to you that you're likely ill-prepared to refute that idea on level ground, and so you want this ground tilted in your favor. Like a weakling destined to face a muscular opponent in the ring, the weakling has two choices: train and devote himself to bettering his abilities so that he can face off against the opponent and have a chance of winning, or get on his knees and pray that someone rigs the fight against his opponent by bounding his hands behind his back and putting a blindfold on him. The former option is free speech, the latter is censorship. Although these indestructible principles were laid down at least 3 and a half centuries ago, and have never been successfully refuted in speech or in writing, there are continuously born legions of individuals so dim and dull that they grow into adults who rally against this truth and fight for the spectre of authoritarianism and control, always under the guise of some ever-changing trendy moral purpose. Milton's prose is poetic, though sometimes a bit burdensome to wade through given the seriousness of the subject. He stays focused on the subject well enough, but every now and then seems to trail off into some high-minded thought and whimsical branch that sometimes is enlightening, sometimes is distracting, sometimes is confusing, and sometimes manages to return us full circle back to the topic with renewed zest and clarity. Although this is a short read, it is one that demands constant attention (as all reading does, but ...) with possibly a lot of re-reading and slowing down. ...more |
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Aug 06, 2019
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Philip of Macedon
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