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Wiser: Getting Beyond Groupthink to Make Groups Smarter
Why are group decisions so hard? Since the beginning of human history, people have made decisions in groups―first in families and villages, and now as part of companies, governments, school boards, religious organizations, or any one of countless other groups. And having more than one person to help decide is good because the group benefits from the collective knowledge of all of its members, and this results in better decisions. Right? Back to reality. We’ve all been involved in group decisions―and they’re hard. And they often turn out badly. Why? Many blame bad decisions on “groupthink” without a clear idea of what that term really means. Now, Nudge coauthor Cass Sunstein and leading decision-making scholar Reid Hastie shed light on the specifics of why and how group decisions go wrong―and offer tactics and lessons to help leaders avoid the pitfalls and reach better outcomes. In the first part of the book, they explain in clear and fascinating detail the distinct problems groups run into:
272 pages, Hardcover
First published December 2, 2014
About the author
Cass R. Sunstein
146 books662 followersCass R. Sunstein is an American legal scholar, particularly in the fields of constitutional law, administrative law, environmental law, and law and behavioral economics, who currently is the Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Obama administration. For 27 years, Sunstein taught at the University of Chicago Law School, where he continues to teach as the Harry Kalven Visiting Professor. Sunstein is currently Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where he is on leave while working in the Obama administration.
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 55 reviews
March 17, 2019
Authors Cass Sunstein and Reid Hastie examine many of the problems that beset groups and how to best address them for optimal group performance.
Written in a style that is more academic than approachable, Wiser uses the findings of multiple researchers to come to its conclusions. This book may be useful to managers who are desiring to set up a group at their own place of employment and want to start on the best foot.
"Do groups usually correct individual mistakes? Our simple answer is that they do not. ... We also ask a second question: Can groups correct individual mistakes? Our simple answer is that they can. We aim to explain how." pg 2
I picked this book up because, frankly, I wanted to know why anybody would utilize groups in a work setting. Every one that I have ever sat on has been either a disaster or inefficient. I was hoping Wiser would help me see the appeal that group-thinking seems to have for some.
And it did. But it also opened up my eyes to the myriad reasons why my experiences had been so bad. I had just assumed groups didn't work. As it turns out, things are more complicated than that.
"The basic lesson is that people pay a lot of attention to what other group members say and do — and that they do not end up converging on the truth. In fact, they often ignore their own beliefs and say that they believe what other people believe." pg 28
There can also be problems with authority figures in a group setting: "If the group contains one or more people who are known to be authorities or who otherwise command a lot of respect, then other group members are likely to silence themselves out of deference to the perceived or real authority." pg 35.
I've seen that happen multiple times. The whole purpose of the group is thrown off. It has often frustrated me, leading me to think we may as well have saved our meeting time and had the boss issue a directive.
Groups also have to keep in mind the idea of "cascades" or ideas taking a hold early in the process and then taking over the rest of the group's time: "For their part, many groups end up with a feeling of inevitability, thinking that they were bound to converge on what ultimately became their shared view. Beware of that feeling too, because it is often an illusion. The group's conclusion might well be an accident of who spoke first..." pg 60
Groups can polarize themselves, driving their members to extremes they wouldn't otherwise reach without members that think like them. To combat this, leaders should make sure groups are diverse.
In a perfect world, groups are equivalent to their best members, aggregate all of the information each individual brings to the table, utilizes experts properly and creates an almost mystical "synergy" where, as the authors say, "the whole is more than the sum of its parts."
The trick is getting the group to work like that. As I said, I've never seen it. This book brings me hope that perhaps one day I will.
The failures of groups often have disastrous consequences — not just for group members, but for all those who are affected by those failures. The good news is that decades of empirical work, alongside recent innovations, offer a toolbox of practical safeguards, correctives, and enhancements. With a few identifiable steps, groups can get a lot wiser." pg 214
Written in a style that is more academic than approachable, Wiser uses the findings of multiple researchers to come to its conclusions. This book may be useful to managers who are desiring to set up a group at their own place of employment and want to start on the best foot.
"Do groups usually correct individual mistakes? Our simple answer is that they do not. ... We also ask a second question: Can groups correct individual mistakes? Our simple answer is that they can. We aim to explain how." pg 2
I picked this book up because, frankly, I wanted to know why anybody would utilize groups in a work setting. Every one that I have ever sat on has been either a disaster or inefficient. I was hoping Wiser would help me see the appeal that group-thinking seems to have for some.
And it did. But it also opened up my eyes to the myriad reasons why my experiences had been so bad. I had just assumed groups didn't work. As it turns out, things are more complicated than that.
"The basic lesson is that people pay a lot of attention to what other group members say and do — and that they do not end up converging on the truth. In fact, they often ignore their own beliefs and say that they believe what other people believe." pg 28
There can also be problems with authority figures in a group setting: "If the group contains one or more people who are known to be authorities or who otherwise command a lot of respect, then other group members are likely to silence themselves out of deference to the perceived or real authority." pg 35.
I've seen that happen multiple times. The whole purpose of the group is thrown off. It has often frustrated me, leading me to think we may as well have saved our meeting time and had the boss issue a directive.
Groups also have to keep in mind the idea of "cascades" or ideas taking a hold early in the process and then taking over the rest of the group's time: "For their part, many groups end up with a feeling of inevitability, thinking that they were bound to converge on what ultimately became their shared view. Beware of that feeling too, because it is often an illusion. The group's conclusion might well be an accident of who spoke first..." pg 60
Groups can polarize themselves, driving their members to extremes they wouldn't otherwise reach without members that think like them. To combat this, leaders should make sure groups are diverse.
In a perfect world, groups are equivalent to their best members, aggregate all of the information each individual brings to the table, utilizes experts properly and creates an almost mystical "synergy" where, as the authors say, "the whole is more than the sum of its parts."
The trick is getting the group to work like that. As I said, I've never seen it. This book brings me hope that perhaps one day I will.
The failures of groups often have disastrous consequences — not just for group members, but for all those who are affected by those failures. The good news is that decades of empirical work, alongside recent innovations, offer a toolbox of practical safeguards, correctives, and enhancements. With a few identifiable steps, groups can get a lot wiser." pg 214
July 14, 2021
Sunstein and Hastie seem to be the right people to discuss how to make groups smarter. Both are professors who have also had practical experience and Sunstein had a top West Wing job in the Obama Administration.
The book spends a good deal of its length breaking down the various ways in which groups fail because of ‘groupthink.’ Here are some of the challenges:
“(Groups) amplify, rather than weaken, reliance on the representativeness heuristic.
“They show more unrealistic overconfidence than do individual group members.
“They are even more vulnerable to framing effects than are individuals.”
“If a company is marketing a product that is selling poorly, it may continue on its misguided course simply because of group dynamics. So too with a nation whose economic policy or approach to foreign affairs is hurting its citizens”
Though smarter people generally make smarter decisions, and smarter groups the same, the authors believe that successful group decisions are more determined by whether or not the members of the team “mesh.” If your team isn’t really a “team,” it is unlikely to succeed. That is where this book took me after 200 pages.
Other conclusions include: “Leaders and create a culture that does not punish, and even rewards, the expression of dissident views.” And, “Wise leaders embrace a particular idea of what it means to be a team player: not to agree with the majority’s current view, but to add valuable information.”
I guess most of this needed saying but I didn’t stumble over any “eureka” moments, and I came away a bit disappointed. Then I thought about the USA’s 2020 response to the growing Covid-19 pandemic and it was obvious what that leadership lacked. This book, written in 2015, correctly diagnosed why America’s response was slow and misfocused.
A grudging 3.5*
The book spends a good deal of its length breaking down the various ways in which groups fail because of ‘groupthink.’ Here are some of the challenges:
“(Groups) amplify, rather than weaken, reliance on the representativeness heuristic.
“They show more unrealistic overconfidence than do individual group members.
“They are even more vulnerable to framing effects than are individuals.”
“If a company is marketing a product that is selling poorly, it may continue on its misguided course simply because of group dynamics. So too with a nation whose economic policy or approach to foreign affairs is hurting its citizens”
Though smarter people generally make smarter decisions, and smarter groups the same, the authors believe that successful group decisions are more determined by whether or not the members of the team “mesh.” If your team isn’t really a “team,” it is unlikely to succeed. That is where this book took me after 200 pages.
Other conclusions include: “Leaders and create a culture that does not punish, and even rewards, the expression of dissident views.” And, “Wise leaders embrace a particular idea of what it means to be a team player: not to agree with the majority’s current view, but to add valuable information.”
I guess most of this needed saying but I didn’t stumble over any “eureka” moments, and I came away a bit disappointed. Then I thought about the USA’s 2020 response to the growing Covid-19 pandemic and it was obvious what that leadership lacked. This book, written in 2015, correctly diagnosed why America’s response was slow and misfocused.
A grudging 3.5*
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October 21, 2018I read like 80% of this and skimmed the other 20% so I'm marking it as "read" ahaha.
It was pretty enjoyable for school reading! I especially liked the part about organizations' over-reliance on the Myers-Briggs test... Also how groups whose members all think similarly, fall into relative consensus, and see another group as opposing them, have a high tendency towards increased polarization... This felt incredibly relevant towards American politics.
On the other hand, while this book claims to offer ways to "get beyond Groupthink," I found the strategies offered mostly weren't that useful, unless you run like a massive business or are the president or something. But even just being aware of all the problematic group tendencies can be very useful, I guess.
Anyway now I'm off to write a paper on Groupthink, bye!
It was pretty enjoyable for school reading! I especially liked the part about organizations' over-reliance on the Myers-Briggs test... Also how groups whose members all think similarly, fall into relative consensus, and see another group as opposing them, have a high tendency towards increased polarization... This felt incredibly relevant towards American politics.
On the other hand, while this book claims to offer ways to "get beyond Groupthink," I found the strategies offered mostly weren't that useful, unless you run like a massive business or are the president or something. But even just being aware of all the problematic group tendencies can be very useful, I guess.
Anyway now I'm off to write a paper on Groupthink, bye!
March 21, 2017
Wow, what a fascinating book. The influence and relationship between individuals and groups described in this book completely messed me up. The research that has been done on individual bias influencing group decisions, the impact of deliberation and cascading thought... there are so many fascinating concepts that surround this study on groupthink!
February 16, 2015
No clear point. Although there are good insights on behavioral science and organizational development, it only provides a theoretical account on why teams succeed and how why fail.
July 8, 2018
According to conventional wisdom, two heads are better than one. In other words, group decisions should be better than decisions made by individuals since there are more people pondering them. Not so, contend Reid Hastie and Cass Sunstein, who cite evidence that committees and boards can be more error-prone than individuals. The authors explain why, and offer ways to improve group decision-making.
The evidence, write Hastie and Sunstein, indicate that groups commonly succumb to groupthink, where members get on board with the prevailing views in the group in a “group-level cascade.” Therefore they fail to critically examine proposals. Instead of having everyone actively participate in decision-making, groups are often dominated by a few members who have disproportionate influence. When various members don’t bring up contradictory information, the group is deprived of relevant evidence that might make for a more successful decision.
A notorious example in history was John F. Kennedy’s cabinet giving the green light to the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. Various cabinet members harbored serious doubts about the policy, but did not express their view at the time, assuming that everyone else was in favor. Thus JFK was deprived of valuable information that might have prevented the debacle.
All human beings have certain biases -- such as optimism bias, loss aversion, and self-serving bias -- but groups tend to amplify those biases, and that leads to inaccurate decisions. It happens because group decisions increase confidence and decrease disagreement. Group deliberation makes people more unified even in their private views; thus groups are polarizing in moving members toward one viewpoint that they did not all start with.
Committees are more likely to make solid decisions when three factors are present. Members have accurate social perception in reading people’s emotions; when most members of the group actually participate instead of a few; and when there are a significant number of women in the group.
There are ways to improve group decision-making. One way is for the chairman to elicit information that people have, by making sure younger or newer members are encouraged to talk and that diverse perspectives are welcomed. Since a leader taking a strong advocacy position will inhibit discussion, good leaders should be slow to take positions and should not do most of the talking. The chairman should recognize the value of anxious people who are cautious about what could go wrong, as opposed to happy talk people telling the leader what he wants to hear.
Groups need to redefine what it means to be a team player: Those who are most valuable to the team are individuals who contribute something that the others are missing, such as critical scrutiny. Hastie and Sunstein make a convincing case that a better group culture means more successful groups. ###
The evidence, write Hastie and Sunstein, indicate that groups commonly succumb to groupthink, where members get on board with the prevailing views in the group in a “group-level cascade.” Therefore they fail to critically examine proposals. Instead of having everyone actively participate in decision-making, groups are often dominated by a few members who have disproportionate influence. When various members don’t bring up contradictory information, the group is deprived of relevant evidence that might make for a more successful decision.
A notorious example in history was John F. Kennedy’s cabinet giving the green light to the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion. Various cabinet members harbored serious doubts about the policy, but did not express their view at the time, assuming that everyone else was in favor. Thus JFK was deprived of valuable information that might have prevented the debacle.
All human beings have certain biases -- such as optimism bias, loss aversion, and self-serving bias -- but groups tend to amplify those biases, and that leads to inaccurate decisions. It happens because group decisions increase confidence and decrease disagreement. Group deliberation makes people more unified even in their private views; thus groups are polarizing in moving members toward one viewpoint that they did not all start with.
Committees are more likely to make solid decisions when three factors are present. Members have accurate social perception in reading people’s emotions; when most members of the group actually participate instead of a few; and when there are a significant number of women in the group.
There are ways to improve group decision-making. One way is for the chairman to elicit information that people have, by making sure younger or newer members are encouraged to talk and that diverse perspectives are welcomed. Since a leader taking a strong advocacy position will inhibit discussion, good leaders should be slow to take positions and should not do most of the talking. The chairman should recognize the value of anxious people who are cautious about what could go wrong, as opposed to happy talk people telling the leader what he wants to hear.
Groups need to redefine what it means to be a team player: Those who are most valuable to the team are individuals who contribute something that the others are missing, such as critical scrutiny. Hastie and Sunstein make a convincing case that a better group culture means more successful groups. ###
January 29, 2015
When do groups make wise decisions? When do they may foolish decisions? What methods can help groups make wiser decisions? Cass Sunstein and Reid Hastie explore these questions in this helpful book. Part one examines several systemic mechanisms that cause groups to fail. Part two describes approaches that help groups avoid these errors.
During deliberations, group pressures may cause members to agree on a falsehood rather than the truth. Incorrect information may cascade through the group and preempt sharing of important contradictory information known to individuals in the group. Similarly, social pressure to agree with the forming consensus may become more powerful than incentives to share individually held information that is different and important. As a result groups can amplify rather than correct errors, incorrect information that gets early support from the group can cascade through the group, groups can reinforce biases held by individual members and concentrate these views to form a group polarization, and groups can focus only on shared information—what everybody already knows —and suppress expression of unshared information. Despite the value of teamwork, a confident, cohesive, but error-prone group is nothing to celebrate. Group deliberation can produce both great confidence and grave error. As a result, groups are even more likely than individuals to escalate their commitment to a course of action that is failing.
The authors make an important distinction between statistical groups—those whose members are acting independently—and deliberating groups—where each member is influencing others in the group. Because statistical groups are not prone to cascades and group polarization, they often make wiser decisions than deliberating groups. Misfits make deliberating groups uncomfortable, but wise groups take steps to protect these skeptics.
Fortunately, part two of the book provides specific techniques for structuring group decisions to increase the likelihood of a wise outcome.
Group leaders must make clear that hearing the truth is more important than an appearance of group unity. Surfacing bad news, minority opinions, contrary information, difficult questions, and inconvenient truths are all essential to wise decision making. “Wise leaders embrace a particular idea of what it means to be a team player: not to agree with the majority’s current view, but to add valuable information.” Unrealistic optimism early in the deliberations suppresses contrary but essential information; the time for optimism is after the decision has been made.
The authors describe eight approaches to leading wiser groups: 1) inquisitive and self-silencing leaders, 2) encouraging critical thinking while discouraging happy talk, 3) rewarding group success over individual contribution, 4) assigning distinct roles to individuals in the group, 5) changing perspective, 6) requiring devil’s advocates 7) forming red teams that are responsible for challenging or even defeating the group, and 8) the Delphi method.
When seeking a solution, it is important to separate the divergent thinking stages—identifying alternatives and potential solutions—from the convergent stages where the final solution is selected from among several alternatives. These tasks require very different thinking styles and work best when focused on separately.
Cost-benefit analysis and reliance on data provide valuable checks on both individual and group errors. Choose experts based on their proven ability to make winning bets on the future, rather than their popularity, charm, and storytelling skills. Combine the forecasts of several experts whenever possible. Carefully designed tournaments and prediction markets can be particularly effective in obtaining a wise outcome from many of participants.
Finally, a combination of traits called “Factor-C” reliably predicts team players who can come to a wise decision. These people rely on their high general IQ, exceptional emotional intelligence, and feminine sensitivities to bring forward the best in the groups they are part of.
The arguments throughout the book are well reasoned and clearly presented, relevant evidence supports and illustrates each claim, the book is well written and a pleasure to read. Practicing these group skills can help us bring wisdom to life. Certainly our democracy, business teams, organizations, and other groups can benefit from the observations and advice in this book.
During deliberations, group pressures may cause members to agree on a falsehood rather than the truth. Incorrect information may cascade through the group and preempt sharing of important contradictory information known to individuals in the group. Similarly, social pressure to agree with the forming consensus may become more powerful than incentives to share individually held information that is different and important. As a result groups can amplify rather than correct errors, incorrect information that gets early support from the group can cascade through the group, groups can reinforce biases held by individual members and concentrate these views to form a group polarization, and groups can focus only on shared information—what everybody already knows —and suppress expression of unshared information. Despite the value of teamwork, a confident, cohesive, but error-prone group is nothing to celebrate. Group deliberation can produce both great confidence and grave error. As a result, groups are even more likely than individuals to escalate their commitment to a course of action that is failing.
The authors make an important distinction between statistical groups—those whose members are acting independently—and deliberating groups—where each member is influencing others in the group. Because statistical groups are not prone to cascades and group polarization, they often make wiser decisions than deliberating groups. Misfits make deliberating groups uncomfortable, but wise groups take steps to protect these skeptics.
Fortunately, part two of the book provides specific techniques for structuring group decisions to increase the likelihood of a wise outcome.
Group leaders must make clear that hearing the truth is more important than an appearance of group unity. Surfacing bad news, minority opinions, contrary information, difficult questions, and inconvenient truths are all essential to wise decision making. “Wise leaders embrace a particular idea of what it means to be a team player: not to agree with the majority’s current view, but to add valuable information.” Unrealistic optimism early in the deliberations suppresses contrary but essential information; the time for optimism is after the decision has been made.
The authors describe eight approaches to leading wiser groups: 1) inquisitive and self-silencing leaders, 2) encouraging critical thinking while discouraging happy talk, 3) rewarding group success over individual contribution, 4) assigning distinct roles to individuals in the group, 5) changing perspective, 6) requiring devil’s advocates 7) forming red teams that are responsible for challenging or even defeating the group, and 8) the Delphi method.
When seeking a solution, it is important to separate the divergent thinking stages—identifying alternatives and potential solutions—from the convergent stages where the final solution is selected from among several alternatives. These tasks require very different thinking styles and work best when focused on separately.
Cost-benefit analysis and reliance on data provide valuable checks on both individual and group errors. Choose experts based on their proven ability to make winning bets on the future, rather than their popularity, charm, and storytelling skills. Combine the forecasts of several experts whenever possible. Carefully designed tournaments and prediction markets can be particularly effective in obtaining a wise outcome from many of participants.
Finally, a combination of traits called “Factor-C” reliably predicts team players who can come to a wise decision. These people rely on their high general IQ, exceptional emotional intelligence, and feminine sensitivities to bring forward the best in the groups they are part of.
The arguments throughout the book are well reasoned and clearly presented, relevant evidence supports and illustrates each claim, the book is well written and a pleasure to read. Practicing these group skills can help us bring wisdom to life. Certainly our democracy, business teams, organizations, and other groups can benefit from the observations and advice in this book.
June 3, 2015
كتابٌ في فهم أثر المداولات الجماعية للأفكار، وهل في الإجتماع حكمةٌ وعصمة أم غواية وتطرّف.
يجعل الكاتب كتابه في قسمين الأوّل يتحدّث فيه عن أثر النقاش الجماعي لفكرةٍ ما على الفكرة وعلى الفرد. ويبيّن المهالك الكامنة في ذلك. ويشرح الأسباب وراء ذلك، ومردّها إلى أثر وضغط الجماعة على الفرد، وأثر المعلومة الضمنية التي يحسبها الفرد.
بينما يمضي في القسم الثاني في اقتراح أساليب عملية للتحايل على هذا التأثير فيما يخدم الشركات والمؤسسات في اجتماعاتها. (وهو النصف الأقلّ أهمية).
يعتمد الكاتب أسلوب النقاط في بسطه لأفكاره، ممّا يعطي الكتاب سلاسة وسهولة في العرض.
أفكار الكتاب بحدّ ذاتها محدودة معدودة، و تفيد هذه الأفكار في فهم آلية عمل الجماعات الأيدولوجية والتجمّعات الفكرية بغضّ النظر عن مسمياتها، ومنطلقاتها.
يجعل الكاتب كتابه في قسمين الأوّل يتحدّث فيه عن أثر النقاش الجماعي لفكرةٍ ما على الفكرة وعلى الفرد. ويبيّن المهالك الكامنة في ذلك. ويشرح الأسباب وراء ذلك، ومردّها إلى أثر وضغط الجماعة على الفرد، وأثر المعلومة الضمنية التي يحسبها الفرد.
بينما يمضي في القسم الثاني في اقتراح أساليب عملية للتحايل على هذا التأثير فيما يخدم الشركات والمؤسسات في اجتماعاتها. (وهو النصف الأقلّ أهمية).
يعتمد الكاتب أسلوب النقاط في بسطه لأفكاره، ممّا يعطي الكتاب سلاسة وسهولة في العرض.
أفكار الكتاب بحدّ ذاتها محدودة معدودة، و تفيد هذه الأفكار في فهم آلية عمل الجماعات الأيدولوجية والتجمّعات الفكرية بغضّ النظر عن مسمياتها، ومنطلقاتها.
July 23, 2017
A book with very interesting content (hence my number of stars is possibly a bit harsh) but it reads like someone's scribbled notes or like someone didn't actually have the time to think about how it reads as a book.
The book would have been better (where better = more actionable), in my opinion, had they spent more time attempting to teach people how to categorise problems and then think about how to get the best out of people (+ how many people and what type of people) in that scenario. I can see why they didn't go that way (that is a much harder book to write) but I would have found it more useful that way!
The book would have been better (where better = more actionable), in my opinion, had they spent more time attempting to teach people how to categorise problems and then think about how to get the best out of people (+ how many people and what type of people) in that scenario. I can see why they didn't go that way (that is a much harder book to write) but I would have found it more useful that way!
January 22, 2015
Way too theoretical and boring.
February 18, 2015
Painfully dull. Some good ideas however regarding group decisions and bias. Perhaps best read as a peer reviewed journal article.
September 16, 2016
I found this book to be very well written and to the point with plenty of references. However, I was looking for a book about group dynamics and this helped fill what I was looking for.
November 18, 2014
This will be in the March-April Issue of Global Business and Organizational Excellence.
September 23, 2020
This is a technical, somewhat academic study of how we humans think in groups. You should not find it hard to read though if the topic interests you.
We like to think of ourselves as free willing, independent creatures - while ready to believe that other people are simply following the crowd. Sunstein's interest here is mostly focussed on whether groups or individuals have better problem solving or analytic capability, and how to optimise groupthink to iron out poor judgement.
You will find less analysis on why and how groupthink results in mistakes like global warming alarmism, or religious beliefs etc.
If you are new yo Sunstein, I'd recommend to start with his book 'Nudge'.
We like to think of ourselves as free willing, independent creatures - while ready to believe that other people are simply following the crowd. Sunstein's interest here is mostly focussed on whether groups or individuals have better problem solving or analytic capability, and how to optimise groupthink to iron out poor judgement.
You will find less analysis on why and how groupthink results in mistakes like global warming alarmism, or religious beliefs etc.
If you are new yo Sunstein, I'd recommend to start with his book 'Nudge'.
January 10, 2022
Recommend this book as an add on to the book "The Wisdom of Crowds". "The Wisdom of Crowds" does a good job of setting a framework for the kinds of decisions which benefit from group discussion and which don't. The second half of this book does a good job of suggesting mechanisms for gathering information either from subject matter experts where discussion might lead to a worse rather than better outcome or where biases might prevent the free exchange of important information (which sadly is a situation which is more common than one might think/like).
February 14, 2018
Concise and with references, a good summary of the becoming-very-hip "behavioral science" stuff but thematically focused on group decisions. The primary focus is on evaluating whether groups can correct the mistakes of individuals within the group (surprise: we're not so good at that). Quick read, split into two parts: first, all the mistakes we make and how we make them, followed by practical advise to combat the various forces that drive us in the direction of making horrible mistakes.
February 28, 2020
The book both gave me more depth on things with which I had some familiarity (prediction markets, crowdsourcing) as well as exposing me to new ideas (most of the first part about why groups fail). I need to go back through and take notes, and importantly, later review those notes so that I can begin to identify when I think I see a group falling victim to some things that might lead to failure.
June 7, 2018
This was a book I read for a college course. Despite the class nature of the book, I enjoyed Sunstein's thoughts on group think and how that changes our communication and our overall effectiveness as a group. Interesting read.
February 8, 2020
Readable summation of research on positive and negative group dynamics. Reads more like an Atlantic article expanded to 200 pages rather than a book. But the pitfalls and recommendations are sound - if many of the 'examples' are less so.
February 10, 2022
Good analysis of the issues of group thinking and practical strategy to avoid its pitfall. Change the order of speaking, encourage info share, introduce expert, and maybe a devil speaker to always point out the negative
November 2, 2023
In social psychology, group polarization refers to the tendency for a group to make decisions that are more extreme than the initial inclination of its members.
Hidden profiles occur when some information is shared among group members and other pieces of information remain unshared.
Hidden profiles occur when some information is shared among group members and other pieces of information remain unshared.
December 26, 2017
Learn, Learn & Learn!
July 22, 2018
Great layperson summary of groups that work and how to make them more successful.
December 29, 2019
Group dynamics
Lots of interesting threads to think through & explore further in how to build & promote group effectiveness. Hope there is a sequel.
Lots of interesting threads to think through & explore further in how to build & promote group effectiveness. Hope there is a sequel.
August 10, 2021
Great insight, but a little dry at times
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May 26, 2022Group work has become something we can't escape, so we might as well learn how to do it right. Sunstein and Hastie take the reader through what makes group work challenging and how to make it better.
March 5, 2015
The concept of Wiser is excellent: take all the recent behavioural research on how people make decisions (popularised in Thinking, Fast and Slow, Predictably Irrational, Scarcity, Nudge, etc.), and see how it applies to groups, rather than individuals.
Is there, for example, an equivalent of Daniel Kahneman's "System 2"—where slower thinking can help avoid instinctive mistakes—for group decisions?
The short answer: Unfortunately not.
The longer answer: Left to their own devices, groups will naturally tend to actually amplify these sorts of "System 1" mistakes, unless they are well prepared with good systems and tactics for self-correcting.
In the first half of the book (How Groups Fail) Sunstein and Hastie do a good job of digging into why this is, showing, for example, how everyone acting completely rationally on their own terms can (and often does) lead to an irrational group outcome. The arguments get a little dense and dry at times, but there were sufficient "Aha!" moments for me to have heavily recommended this book to many people I work with.
The second half of the book (How Groups Succeed) was much more disappointing. This isn't because (as with many such books) the authors are simply good at identifying the problems, but don't really know how to fix them. Indeed the diagnoses in the first half had often included short notes on ways to counter to the problems. However, I had expected the second half to gather these together, organise and structure them, and expand on the ideas. Instead it provides a single "Eight Ways to Reduce Failures" chapter that pulls together a few of the bigger ideas, in a way that is certainly useful, though missing lots of the earlier, almost throwaway, suggestions. But then it follows it up with generally dry and overlong examinations of the mathematics behind the "Wisdom of Crowds", and ways to better use experts, tournaments, prediction markets, and public comments that seem like the belong to a different book entirely.
★★★☆, but rounded up because there's so much great stuff lurking within, that it's worth digging through to get to it—at least until someone writes the more accessible, Gladwell-esque, story-driven version.
Is there, for example, an equivalent of Daniel Kahneman's "System 2"—where slower thinking can help avoid instinctive mistakes—for group decisions?
The short answer: Unfortunately not.
The longer answer: Left to their own devices, groups will naturally tend to actually amplify these sorts of "System 1" mistakes, unless they are well prepared with good systems and tactics for self-correcting.
In the first half of the book (How Groups Fail) Sunstein and Hastie do a good job of digging into why this is, showing, for example, how everyone acting completely rationally on their own terms can (and often does) lead to an irrational group outcome. The arguments get a little dense and dry at times, but there were sufficient "Aha!" moments for me to have heavily recommended this book to many people I work with.
The second half of the book (How Groups Succeed) was much more disappointing. This isn't because (as with many such books) the authors are simply good at identifying the problems, but don't really know how to fix them. Indeed the diagnoses in the first half had often included short notes on ways to counter to the problems. However, I had expected the second half to gather these together, organise and structure them, and expand on the ideas. Instead it provides a single "Eight Ways to Reduce Failures" chapter that pulls together a few of the bigger ideas, in a way that is certainly useful, though missing lots of the earlier, almost throwaway, suggestions. But then it follows it up with generally dry and overlong examinations of the mathematics behind the "Wisdom of Crowds", and ways to better use experts, tournaments, prediction markets, and public comments that seem like the belong to a different book entirely.
★★★☆, but rounded up because there's so much great stuff lurking within, that it's worth digging through to get to it—at least until someone writes the more accessible, Gladwell-esque, story-driven version.
November 9, 2015
De schrijvers van Nudge hebben een nieuw boek geschreven, dit keer over het slimmer maken van groepen. Cass Sunstein is een aantal jaar ervaring in de regering van Obama rijker en combineert inzichten en anecdotes uit die tijd met populaire navertellingen van wetenschappelijke artikelen. Het is voor een groot deel Kahnemann-voor-groepen.
Statistische groepen scoren beter dan éénlingen bij het schatten van het aantal knikkers in een glas. Maar zodra groepen met elkaar gaan samenwerken ontstaan er rare dingen. Ze worden minder slim dan individuën, als ze op de hoogte zijn van elkaars inschattingen. Als de eerste twee leden van een groep kiezen voor A, wordt het veel moeilijker om uiteindelijk uit te komen op B, omdat lid drie zich aanpast aan de keuze van één en twee. Groepen versterken individuele polarisatie: als de gemiddelde mening een beetje tégen is, wordt de groep na overleg veel méér tégen. Informatie die bekend is bij alle leden van de groep speelt een grotere rol dan informatie die maar bij één lid aanwezig is, ook al is dat relevantere informatie. Groepen hebben terughoudende leiders nodig, die niet als eerste het woord voeren.
In het tweede deel staan technieken om deze negatieve groepseffecten te voorkomen. Daar zit waardevol advies tussen, met wat mij betreft als meest belangrijke dat groepen zich bewust zijn van bovenstaande mechanismen. Wat minder geslaagd is, is dat de schrijvers de wijsheid van groepen en experts binnen de groepen ook willen gebruiken voor prognoses. Een voorspelling doen over groei of krimp van een bepaalde trend is heel iets anders dan het inschatten van het aantal knikkers in een glas. De toekomst is inherent onkenbaar en toevallig, ook al neem je de gemiddelde prognose van allerlei experts. Het beoordelen van experts op basis van de mate waarin hun voorspellingen zijn uitgekomen lijkt me al helemaal heilloos; de ‘performance’ van een expert is niet gelegen in voorspellingen doen die toevallig uitkomen, maar in goed begrijpen hoe de situatie nu is en hoe deze zich zou kunnen ontwikkelen.
Als je Kahnemann nog niet gelezen hebt, doe dat eerst. Daarna is dit een goede toevoeging!
Statistische groepen scoren beter dan éénlingen bij het schatten van het aantal knikkers in een glas. Maar zodra groepen met elkaar gaan samenwerken ontstaan er rare dingen. Ze worden minder slim dan individuën, als ze op de hoogte zijn van elkaars inschattingen. Als de eerste twee leden van een groep kiezen voor A, wordt het veel moeilijker om uiteindelijk uit te komen op B, omdat lid drie zich aanpast aan de keuze van één en twee. Groepen versterken individuele polarisatie: als de gemiddelde mening een beetje tégen is, wordt de groep na overleg veel méér tégen. Informatie die bekend is bij alle leden van de groep speelt een grotere rol dan informatie die maar bij één lid aanwezig is, ook al is dat relevantere informatie. Groepen hebben terughoudende leiders nodig, die niet als eerste het woord voeren.
In het tweede deel staan technieken om deze negatieve groepseffecten te voorkomen. Daar zit waardevol advies tussen, met wat mij betreft als meest belangrijke dat groepen zich bewust zijn van bovenstaande mechanismen. Wat minder geslaagd is, is dat de schrijvers de wijsheid van groepen en experts binnen de groepen ook willen gebruiken voor prognoses. Een voorspelling doen over groei of krimp van een bepaalde trend is heel iets anders dan het inschatten van het aantal knikkers in een glas. De toekomst is inherent onkenbaar en toevallig, ook al neem je de gemiddelde prognose van allerlei experts. Het beoordelen van experts op basis van de mate waarin hun voorspellingen zijn uitgekomen lijkt me al helemaal heilloos; de ‘performance’ van een expert is niet gelegen in voorspellingen doen die toevallig uitkomen, maar in goed begrijpen hoe de situatie nu is en hoe deze zich zou kunnen ontwikkelen.
Als je Kahnemann nog niet gelezen hebt, doe dat eerst. Daarna is dit een goede toevoeging!
March 7, 2016
Good academic read on what makes group performance effective or ineffective. Pushing past halo effect and social pressures to hide useful information may protect from amplifying and cascading errors, and polarization.
Delphi method (initial anonymity) has its usefulness in attaining honest feedback when accompanied with reasons for their views. Eventually, you still have to deliberate and try to come up with the best solution.
Finding group members who prefer to work in teams improves the effectiveness of the group. Though it is important to have diversity and a mixture of personalities, some personalities are better than others.
Personality testing has not proven to predict behavior with much validity. The fundamental attribution error of Myers-Briggs makes it a poor tool for selection, placement, and counseling of employees.
Last but not least, the importance of MIT's Center for Collective Intelligence's Factor C cannot be overstated. The higher the EQ average of the members of the group, the better the group performs. The higher the unevenness of participation, the worse the performance.
CONCLUSION
For identifiable reasons, groups often perform poorly. In some cases, groups do not merely fail to correct the errors of their members; they actually amplify those errors.
Wise groups and their leaders are constantly alert to these risks and attempt to change people’s incentives. They do not ask for happy talk. Smart leaders are anxious. They help to elicit information by silencing themselves and by allowing other group members to talk, even if those members have low status. If a group’s members are asked to adopt certain roles (formally or informally), information is far less likely to get lost.
Wise leaders embrace a particular idea of what it means to be a team player: not to necessarily agree with the majority’s current view, but to add valuable information. Leaders create a culture that does not punish, and even rewards, the expression of dissident views. They do so to protect not the dissident, but to ensure what is best for the group.
Delphi method (initial anonymity) has its usefulness in attaining honest feedback when accompanied with reasons for their views. Eventually, you still have to deliberate and try to come up with the best solution.
Finding group members who prefer to work in teams improves the effectiveness of the group. Though it is important to have diversity and a mixture of personalities, some personalities are better than others.
Personality testing has not proven to predict behavior with much validity. The fundamental attribution error of Myers-Briggs makes it a poor tool for selection, placement, and counseling of employees.
Last but not least, the importance of MIT's Center for Collective Intelligence's Factor C cannot be overstated. The higher the EQ average of the members of the group, the better the group performs. The higher the unevenness of participation, the worse the performance.
CONCLUSION
For identifiable reasons, groups often perform poorly. In some cases, groups do not merely fail to correct the errors of their members; they actually amplify those errors.
Wise groups and their leaders are constantly alert to these risks and attempt to change people’s incentives. They do not ask for happy talk. Smart leaders are anxious. They help to elicit information by silencing themselves and by allowing other group members to talk, even if those members have low status. If a group’s members are asked to adopt certain roles (formally or informally), information is far less likely to get lost.
Wise leaders embrace a particular idea of what it means to be a team player: not to necessarily agree with the majority’s current view, but to add valuable information. Leaders create a culture that does not punish, and even rewards, the expression of dissident views. They do so to protect not the dissident, but to ensure what is best for the group.
January 22, 2015
The main idea
How can we ensure we can make better group decisions? Drawing on the latest business and social science research the authors provide concrete ways in which organizations can improve their group decision making processes.
Interesting tidbit
One of the co-authors, Cass Sunstein, in addition to being a prolific author and public intellectual was also Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
What you really need to know
Group decisions sometimes work...and sometimes don't. The problem is when they don't! In this book the authors offer a range of concrete mechanisms - drawing from organizations as different as the CIA and Google - to help organizations make better collective decision making.
The general overview
Groups sometimes make worse decisions than any individual member of the group would have made. the authors provide four reasons for why this is the case. They are:
• When the group amplifies rather than corrects the individual errors of its members
• When the group members follow the leader instead of revealing their own opinions and knowledge
• When the group tends to become more extreme as a result of internal discussions
• When group members concentrate on shared information and ignore critical information that only one or a few people have.
the authors then go on to suggest a number of ways in which these types of 'failure' can be overcome - including:
• the importance of separating the process of generating possible solutions from the process of selecting a preferred solution,
• ways in which combining information from multiple group members can result in statistically better decisions,
• the role of experts, and
• the use of tournaments and prediction markets.
A useful resource for any manager and a fun read as well!
How can we ensure we can make better group decisions? Drawing on the latest business and social science research the authors provide concrete ways in which organizations can improve their group decision making processes.
Interesting tidbit
One of the co-authors, Cass Sunstein, in addition to being a prolific author and public intellectual was also Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
What you really need to know
Group decisions sometimes work...and sometimes don't. The problem is when they don't! In this book the authors offer a range of concrete mechanisms - drawing from organizations as different as the CIA and Google - to help organizations make better collective decision making.
The general overview
Groups sometimes make worse decisions than any individual member of the group would have made. the authors provide four reasons for why this is the case. They are:
• When the group amplifies rather than corrects the individual errors of its members
• When the group members follow the leader instead of revealing their own opinions and knowledge
• When the group tends to become more extreme as a result of internal discussions
• When group members concentrate on shared information and ignore critical information that only one or a few people have.
the authors then go on to suggest a number of ways in which these types of 'failure' can be overcome - including:
• the importance of separating the process of generating possible solutions from the process of selecting a preferred solution,
• ways in which combining information from multiple group members can result in statistically better decisions,
• the role of experts, and
• the use of tournaments and prediction markets.
A useful resource for any manager and a fun read as well!
Displaying 1 - 30 of 55 reviews