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Spinoza: Practical Philosophy
A concise and illuminating book about the Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza , one of the early thinkers of the Enlightenment and modern biblical criticism . Spinoza's theoretical philosophy is one of the most radical attempts to construct a pure ontology with a single infinite substance. This book, which presents Spinoza's main ideas in dictionary form, has as its subject the opposition between ethics and morality, and the link between ethical and ontological propositions. His ethics is an ethology, rather than a moral science. Attention has been drawn to Spinoza by deep ecologists such as Arne Naess, the Norwegian philosopher and this reading of Spinoza by Gilles Deleuze lends itself to a radical ecological ethic. As Robert Hurley says in his introduction, “Deleuze opens us to the idea that the elements of the different individuals we compose may be nonhuman within us. One wonders, finally, whether Man might be defined as a territory, a set of boundaries, a limit on existence." Gilles Deleuze, known for his inquiries into desire, language, politics and power, finds a kinship between Spinoza and Nietzsche. He writes, "Spinoza did not believe in hope or even in courage; he believed only in joy and in vision . . . he more than any other gave me the feeling of a gust of air from behind each time I read him, of a witch's broom that he makes one mount." Gilles Deleuze was a professor of philosophy at the University of Paris at Vincennes. Robert Hurley is the translator of Michel Foucault's History of Sexuality .
130 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1970
About the author
Gilles Deleuze
269 books2,271 followersDeleuze is a key figure in poststructuralist French philosophy. Considering himself an empiricist and a vitalist, his body of work, which rests upon concepts such as multiplicity, constructivism, difference and desire, stands at a substantial remove from the main traditions of 20th century Continental thought. His thought locates him as an influential figure in present-day considerations of society, creativity and subjectivity. Notably, within his metaphysics he favored a Spinozian concept of a plane of immanence with everything a mode of one substance, and thus on the same level of existence. He argued, then, that there is no good and evil, but rather only relationships which are beneficial or harmful to the particular individuals. This ethics influences his approach to society and politics, especially as he was so politically active in struggles for rights and freedoms. Later in his career he wrote some of the more infamous texts of the period, in particular, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. These texts are collaborative works with the radical psychoanalyst Félix Guattari, and they exhibit Deleuze’s social and political commitment.
Gilles Deleuze began his career with a number of idiosyncratic yet rigorous historical studies of figures outside of the Continental tradition in vogue at the time. His first book, Empirisism and Subjectivity, is a study of Hume, interpreted by Deleuze to be a radical subjectivist. Deleuze became known for writing about other philosophers with new insights and different readings, interested as he was in liberating philosophical history from the hegemony of one perspective. He wrote on Spinoza, Nietzche, Kant, Leibniz and others, including literary authors and works, cinema, and art. Deleuze claimed that he did not write “about” art, literature, or cinema, but, rather, undertook philosophical “encounters” that led him to new concepts. As a constructivist, he was adamant that philosophers are creators, and that each reading of philosophy, or each philosophical encounter, ought to inspire new concepts. Additionally, according to Deleuze and his concepts of difference, there is no identity, and in repetition, nothing is ever the same. Rather, there is only difference: copies are something new, everything is constantly changing, and reality is a becoming, not a being.
He often collaborated with philosophers and artists as Félix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Guy Hocquenghem, René Schérer, Carmelo Bene, François Châtelet, Olivier Revault d'Allonnes, Jean-François Lyotard, Georges Lapassade, Kateb Yacine and many others.
Gilles Deleuze began his career with a number of idiosyncratic yet rigorous historical studies of figures outside of the Continental tradition in vogue at the time. His first book, Empirisism and Subjectivity, is a study of Hume, interpreted by Deleuze to be a radical subjectivist. Deleuze became known for writing about other philosophers with new insights and different readings, interested as he was in liberating philosophical history from the hegemony of one perspective. He wrote on Spinoza, Nietzche, Kant, Leibniz and others, including literary authors and works, cinema, and art. Deleuze claimed that he did not write “about” art, literature, or cinema, but, rather, undertook philosophical “encounters” that led him to new concepts. As a constructivist, he was adamant that philosophers are creators, and that each reading of philosophy, or each philosophical encounter, ought to inspire new concepts. Additionally, according to Deleuze and his concepts of difference, there is no identity, and in repetition, nothing is ever the same. Rather, there is only difference: copies are something new, everything is constantly changing, and reality is a becoming, not a being.
He often collaborated with philosophers and artists as Félix Guattari, Michel Foucault, Guy Hocquenghem, René Schérer, Carmelo Bene, François Châtelet, Olivier Revault d'Allonnes, Jean-François Lyotard, Georges Lapassade, Kateb Yacine and many others.
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November 2, 2019lmao what if god is just nature. haha only joking... unless?
February 18, 2008
chapter two is changing my mode of living, specifically how I organize my relations to (and of) joy and sadness in order to increase of decrease my power to act and think. Spinoza works to produce or better, propose , a philosophy that is not grounded in cartesian subjectivity and individualism, but instead derived from the material, affective, and realtional experiences of situated bodies. This book is an open door and a relief, at once.
and my conceptual paradigm (from morals to ethics).
and my conceptual paradigm (from morals to ethics).
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February 6, 2021This book is a huge undertaking. Not because it is necessarily more challenging than Deleuze's other works, nor indeed Spinoza's, but because when read in conjunction with or parallel to The Ethics, the two books form a near infinite maze or puzzle, one in which we may find ourselves chasing down seemingly endless trails and avenues of propositions, definitions, scholia, corollaries and notions. The middle passage of Practical Philosophy, in particular, which is itself a sort of dictionary of the Ethics, a maze of a maze, is a pursuit that seems to span the universe itself. Now, I put a lot of energy into reading The Ethics, and I got a lot out of it; moreover, I felt that I gained quite a good handle on its implications. What this book does a fantastic job of, however, is taking us down strange, surprising, yet ultimately quite clear paths through Spinoza's thought. Deleuze manages to nudge us in certain directions, along certain lines, many of which may have been uncharted, unexplored by us.
Deleuze has a deep love of Spinoza, the type of love - Spinoza might say - pertaining to a pure bond of friendship; the type of love that would course through all of those who lived in Spinoza's vision of 'the state of reason'. Indeed, it is precisely this same love that is found in Nietzsche's letter from mid-1881: "I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and what a precursor! . . . In summa: my lonesomeness, which, as on very high mountains, often made it hard for me to breathe and make my blood rush out, is now at least a twosomeness." The love that may cause any of us to realize suddenly that they are Spinozist; a pure love, that we feel and experience upon being caught in the middle of Spinoza.
Deleuze characterises Spinoza as a liberator and a demystifier. The Spinozan ethics is not at all a morality; whereas morality sets itself up as a system of transcendent truths, based on the idea of god as either a commanding tyrant or a legislature working to a set of standards that are somehow above himself (theological contradiction of omnipotence), The Ethics is rather an ethology. It is an immanent system grounded in affective capacities. Everything, when one lives in this manner, can be thought of as a food or a poison: does that which I am encountering decompose my relation (weakening my state, preoccupying my energy with reaction) or does it enter into composition with me (having a common internal relation whereby the bodies in question combine to form a stronger whole or body or Individual)? In this light, the Spinozist becomes an experimenter: we do not know in advance the affects that we are capable of, our thresholds, what bodies may empower us and in what combination; we must have the prudence of men of the line, the quiet consideration and childlike wonder of all great experimenters.
It is interesting to me to note upon how I have come across a number of sources who describe Spinoza's theory of mind, or, more precisely, of consciousness, as somewhat incomplete or lacking; they suggest that it almost requires some other concept to fill it out. But this is precisely where Deleuze comes in with his notion of the Spinozan unconscious. For Deleuze, following the famous parallelism, Spinoza discovers "an unconscious of thought just as profound as the unknown of the body". "We do not know what a body can do": for all of the parts of the body we are unaware of, there is simultaneously, or rather, in parallel, an idea of that part in the attribute of thought (and within our mind, as the idea of our body), of which we are likewise unaware. Indeed, it is precisely the ideas of these parts, which constitute our mind but of which we are unaware, that comprise the unconscious of the mind.
(As an aside, it's interesting that when neurotics and critics parse through the work of Deleuze & Guattari, trying to identify and portion off who out of the couple did what, they often comment upon how Guattari was already formulating the machinic unconscious before meeting Deleuze, thereby ignoring the fact that Deleuze was also conceptualising a very similar notion of the unconscious through Spinoza, and, worse still, completely missing the incredibly beautiful fact that both of them were in actuality already travelling down such similar and resonant lines.)
The section of The Ethics which most directly pertains to Spinoza's notion of consciousness is roughly IIP12-24, and, suffice to say, things get fairly complex in there. We know, fairly clearly, from the famous 'parallelism' proposition of IIP7S (and as also explicated by Spinoza in IIIP2S) that to each body in extension there is a parallel idea; the idea represents its object (epistemological parallelism). Furthermore, by the time we get to IIP13 we know that the object corresponding to the idea that we call the human mind is the human body and nothing else. So far so good. Where things start to get complicated is in the tension between IIP12 and IIP19 & IIP24: according to the former, anything that happens in the body must necessarily be perceived by the mind, whereas the latter state, firstly, that the human mind does not know the human body itself, except through ideas of its affections, and secondly, that the human mind does not have adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body. How are we to reconcile this apparent tension? Well, Deleuze tells us that "we have to distinguish the idea that we are (the mind as the idea of the body) from the ideas that we have. The idea that we are is in God . . . Therefore we do not have this idea immediately. The only ideas we have under the natural conditions of our perception are the ideas that represent what happens to our body" (original italics) (cf. Idea). Also in p.19: "We are in a condition such that we only take in "what happens" to our body, "what happens" to our mind." We take the body as a model for experimentation in order that we may in parallel discover the powers of our mind alongside.
Any review of Practical Philosophy would be amiss if it did not mention Deleuze's exploration of the common notions in Spinoza. For Deleuze, the common notions take on a central significance in The Ethics: "The common notions are an Art, the art of the Ethics itself." It's quite remarkable really, because when I started reading Practical Philosophy I could barely recall this Spinozist concept; not that their movement and idea was foreign to me, nor that the content of the concept was alien, but I had barely realised the extent to which Spinoza had defined and articulated some of these ideas. You see, despite the fact that, as Deleuze shows, the common notions are the key to the second kind of knowledge, and that they also embody the passage to the third kind of knowledge, Spinoza actually only mentions them rather fleetingly, in IIP38 & IIP39. Nevertheless, they answer an incredibly important question: "how do we manage to form adequate ideas, and in what order, given that the natural conditions of our perception condemn us to have only inadequate ideas?" The answer is in the common notions. You see, when something affects us with joy, that is, when something enters into composition with us, strengthens and empowers us, this can only be due to a certain common relation within both bodies. There is a certain relation common to both bodies that allows the two to compose each other into a stronger body; there is an agreement. If we put a flat object on a flat table, they enter into a composition with each other, they agree with each other, due to a certain shared relation. If, on the other hand, we put a spherical object onto a flat table, we can say that that common relation which allowed the two bodies to enter into composition with one another is now missing; hence, the bodies will seek to expel each other; the sphere will roll off the table.
On p.75 Deleuze refers to how the inadequate idea misses "the concatenation of ideas." When I first came across this word I was overjoyed: it perfectly sums up the process of reason that leads us to the formation of common notions. Concatenation = The action of linking things together in a series; a series of interconnected things. I later discovered, by chance, that in fact many translations of The Ethics entirely substitute this word for the word 'connection' which is used in my copy. It seems strange to me, therefore, that Spinoza spends so little time fleshing out these notions. However, Deleuze clues us that it is not until the beginning of book V that Spinoza actually elucidates upon how we can attain these notions.
Deleuze has a deep love of Spinoza, the type of love - Spinoza might say - pertaining to a pure bond of friendship; the type of love that would course through all of those who lived in Spinoza's vision of 'the state of reason'. Indeed, it is precisely this same love that is found in Nietzsche's letter from mid-1881: "I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and what a precursor! . . . In summa: my lonesomeness, which, as on very high mountains, often made it hard for me to breathe and make my blood rush out, is now at least a twosomeness." The love that may cause any of us to realize suddenly that they are Spinozist; a pure love, that we feel and experience upon being caught in the middle of Spinoza.
Deleuze characterises Spinoza as a liberator and a demystifier. The Spinozan ethics is not at all a morality; whereas morality sets itself up as a system of transcendent truths, based on the idea of god as either a commanding tyrant or a legislature working to a set of standards that are somehow above himself (theological contradiction of omnipotence), The Ethics is rather an ethology. It is an immanent system grounded in affective capacities. Everything, when one lives in this manner, can be thought of as a food or a poison: does that which I am encountering decompose my relation (weakening my state, preoccupying my energy with reaction) or does it enter into composition with me (having a common internal relation whereby the bodies in question combine to form a stronger whole or body or Individual)? In this light, the Spinozist becomes an experimenter: we do not know in advance the affects that we are capable of, our thresholds, what bodies may empower us and in what combination; we must have the prudence of men of the line, the quiet consideration and childlike wonder of all great experimenters.
It is interesting to me to note upon how I have come across a number of sources who describe Spinoza's theory of mind, or, more precisely, of consciousness, as somewhat incomplete or lacking; they suggest that it almost requires some other concept to fill it out. But this is precisely where Deleuze comes in with his notion of the Spinozan unconscious. For Deleuze, following the famous parallelism, Spinoza discovers "an unconscious of thought just as profound as the unknown of the body". "We do not know what a body can do": for all of the parts of the body we are unaware of, there is simultaneously, or rather, in parallel, an idea of that part in the attribute of thought (and within our mind, as the idea of our body), of which we are likewise unaware. Indeed, it is precisely the ideas of these parts, which constitute our mind but of which we are unaware, that comprise the unconscious of the mind.
(As an aside, it's interesting that when neurotics and critics parse through the work of Deleuze & Guattari, trying to identify and portion off who out of the couple did what, they often comment upon how Guattari was already formulating the machinic unconscious before meeting Deleuze, thereby ignoring the fact that Deleuze was also conceptualising a very similar notion of the unconscious through Spinoza, and, worse still, completely missing the incredibly beautiful fact that both of them were in actuality already travelling down such similar and resonant lines.)
The section of The Ethics which most directly pertains to Spinoza's notion of consciousness is roughly IIP12-24, and, suffice to say, things get fairly complex in there. We know, fairly clearly, from the famous 'parallelism' proposition of IIP7S (and as also explicated by Spinoza in IIIP2S) that to each body in extension there is a parallel idea; the idea represents its object (epistemological parallelism). Furthermore, by the time we get to IIP13 we know that the object corresponding to the idea that we call the human mind is the human body and nothing else. So far so good. Where things start to get complicated is in the tension between IIP12 and IIP19 & IIP24: according to the former, anything that happens in the body must necessarily be perceived by the mind, whereas the latter state, firstly, that the human mind does not know the human body itself, except through ideas of its affections, and secondly, that the human mind does not have adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body. How are we to reconcile this apparent tension? Well, Deleuze tells us that "we have to distinguish the idea that we are (the mind as the idea of the body) from the ideas that we have. The idea that we are is in God . . . Therefore we do not have this idea immediately. The only ideas we have under the natural conditions of our perception are the ideas that represent what happens to our body" (original italics) (cf. Idea). Also in p.19: "We are in a condition such that we only take in "what happens" to our body, "what happens" to our mind." We take the body as a model for experimentation in order that we may in parallel discover the powers of our mind alongside.
Any review of Practical Philosophy would be amiss if it did not mention Deleuze's exploration of the common notions in Spinoza. For Deleuze, the common notions take on a central significance in The Ethics: "The common notions are an Art, the art of the Ethics itself." It's quite remarkable really, because when I started reading Practical Philosophy I could barely recall this Spinozist concept; not that their movement and idea was foreign to me, nor that the content of the concept was alien, but I had barely realised the extent to which Spinoza had defined and articulated some of these ideas. You see, despite the fact that, as Deleuze shows, the common notions are the key to the second kind of knowledge, and that they also embody the passage to the third kind of knowledge, Spinoza actually only mentions them rather fleetingly, in IIP38 & IIP39. Nevertheless, they answer an incredibly important question: "how do we manage to form adequate ideas, and in what order, given that the natural conditions of our perception condemn us to have only inadequate ideas?" The answer is in the common notions. You see, when something affects us with joy, that is, when something enters into composition with us, strengthens and empowers us, this can only be due to a certain common relation within both bodies. There is a certain relation common to both bodies that allows the two to compose each other into a stronger body; there is an agreement. If we put a flat object on a flat table, they enter into a composition with each other, they agree with each other, due to a certain shared relation. If, on the other hand, we put a spherical object onto a flat table, we can say that that common relation which allowed the two bodies to enter into composition with one another is now missing; hence, the bodies will seek to expel each other; the sphere will roll off the table.
On p.75 Deleuze refers to how the inadequate idea misses "the concatenation of ideas." When I first came across this word I was overjoyed: it perfectly sums up the process of reason that leads us to the formation of common notions. Concatenation = The action of linking things together in a series; a series of interconnected things. I later discovered, by chance, that in fact many translations of The Ethics entirely substitute this word for the word 'connection' which is used in my copy. It seems strange to me, therefore, that Spinoza spends so little time fleshing out these notions. However, Deleuze clues us that it is not until the beginning of book V that Spinoza actually elucidates upon how we can attain these notions.
September 14, 2007
This book is the easiest way to approach Spinoza that I'm aware of.
I've noticed that Spinoza is repeatedly referenced as a major influence by my favorite philosphers. This book expertly conveys the subtle joy and peace that comes from viewing the world through a Spinozist lense.
Oh, did I mention that it's short too?
I've noticed that Spinoza is repeatedly referenced as a major influence by my favorite philosphers. This book expertly conveys the subtle joy and peace that comes from viewing the world through a Spinozist lense.
Oh, did I mention that it's short too?
August 1, 2022
‘In his whole way of living and thinking, Spinoza projects an image of the positive, affirmative life, which stands in opposition to the semblances men are content with. Not only are they content with semblances of life, they feel a hatred of life, they are ashamed of it; a humanity bent on self-destruction, multiplying the cults of death, always busy running life into the ground, mutilating it, killing it outright or by degrees, overlaying it or suffocating it with laws, properties, duties - this is what Spinoza diagnoses in this world, this betrayal of the universe and mankind.’
Deleuze’s approach in all his books about other philosophers is as follows: to imagine himself ‘ass-fucking’ other philosophers and producing ‘offspring that are recognisably both [his] and the other’s’ (paraphrased). Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (S:PP) is a book that begins with the name ‘Nietzsche’. So, we can imagine it as a kind of threesome between Deleuze, Spinoza and Nietzsche, and via some strange m-preg antics Deleuze gives birth to pretty beautiful offspring.
S:PP is a book about two things: ontology (the study of what is out there in the world, of reality) and ethics. But you see, and here’s the catch, Deleuze in S:PP derives his ethics from his ontology. An ‘ethology’. I’ll only go briefly into Deleuze’s ontology here, I’ll focus on his ethics, as this is only a brief overview of the book and his ontology is… somewhat complicated to explain quickly.
Deleuze distinguishes between morality, which is transcendent, and ethics, which is immanent. Transcendent meaning above, outside, superimposed onto the world, and immanent meaning pervading, infusing, being present in the world. Deleuze argues that transcendent concepts (i.e. God, identity, etc.) are essentially repressive to life, for the most part: they remove us from what’s in front of us. They are symptoms of our alienation from the world. Morality is a transcendental idea: the idea of a kind of plan imposed from above on us, acting as a kind of system of law demanding our obedience, with Good referring to obedience and Evil to disobedience. Morality is the concept of a system of law.
On the other hand, ethics is a ‘voyage in immanence’. Instead of being a top-down plan, ethics is a diagram of encounters. Ethics is concerned with how we experience the world and ourselves, with how we act and how we live. Ethics is not a system of law with pretensions of objective values, or even values at all. Ethics is our practise of life.
Deleuze rejects morality and embraces Spinozist ethics. Deleuze’s ethics consists in maximising joy and minimising sad passions. Joy occurs when my body comes into contact with something that joins with me to create something greater. Joy consists in composition between me and something else, in short, in good relations. The sad passions - sadness itself, hatred, aversion, mockery, fear, despair, pity, indignation, envy, humility, anger, regret, vengeance, cruelty, etc.. - occur when my body comes into contact with something poisonous to it, something it does not agree with, something that in short decomposes me. The sad passions decompose my relations in negative ways, make me withdraw from the world.
Joy increases my power, and sadness decreases my power. Sad passions occur when I am most alienated, mystified, most separated from power, and the sad passions make me act in ways harmful to others - ways that are symptomatic of the pathetic life I must live to act in such ways.
What is so important here, is that myself, as an I, as a subject, is not the focus of Deleuze’s ethics. The ethics here is an ethics of intensities, an ethics of increasing power. Power here is not to be understood as domineering (a sad passion!), but as a creative force, as the ability to exert oneself in the world. Power is the capacity of acting. Deleuze’s ethics is based on speeds, accelerations, unformed elements, nonsubjectified values. They are not based on anything relating to me as an identity at all.
(I mean, let’s think for a moment: why should our ethics be based around the subject, the self? Consciousness is only the small part of thought we are aware of, yet we exalt it as some special thing above the rest of thought. Similarly, we are aware of very little of our bodily processes. We do not even know what the body can do, let alone what the mind can do! ‘The infant freely believes he wants milk, the angry man that he freely desires vengeance’.)
Acting ethically means organising good encounters, composing new relations, forming powers, experimenting, etc. , not in judging, blaming, imposing values on the world. It means the joy of discovering what we can do, and maximising what we can do.
The question left at the end of S:PP is: how do we enter into composition with one another to heighten our power, ad infinitum?
Spinozist ethics give us a beautiful way of living. By denouncing everything that separates us from life, they allow us to become free.
Deleuze’s approach in all his books about other philosophers is as follows: to imagine himself ‘ass-fucking’ other philosophers and producing ‘offspring that are recognisably both [his] and the other’s’ (paraphrased). Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (S:PP) is a book that begins with the name ‘Nietzsche’. So, we can imagine it as a kind of threesome between Deleuze, Spinoza and Nietzsche, and via some strange m-preg antics Deleuze gives birth to pretty beautiful offspring.
S:PP is a book about two things: ontology (the study of what is out there in the world, of reality) and ethics. But you see, and here’s the catch, Deleuze in S:PP derives his ethics from his ontology. An ‘ethology’. I’ll only go briefly into Deleuze’s ontology here, I’ll focus on his ethics, as this is only a brief overview of the book and his ontology is… somewhat complicated to explain quickly.
Deleuze distinguishes between morality, which is transcendent, and ethics, which is immanent. Transcendent meaning above, outside, superimposed onto the world, and immanent meaning pervading, infusing, being present in the world. Deleuze argues that transcendent concepts (i.e. God, identity, etc.) are essentially repressive to life, for the most part: they remove us from what’s in front of us. They are symptoms of our alienation from the world. Morality is a transcendental idea: the idea of a kind of plan imposed from above on us, acting as a kind of system of law demanding our obedience, with Good referring to obedience and Evil to disobedience. Morality is the concept of a system of law.
On the other hand, ethics is a ‘voyage in immanence’. Instead of being a top-down plan, ethics is a diagram of encounters. Ethics is concerned with how we experience the world and ourselves, with how we act and how we live. Ethics is not a system of law with pretensions of objective values, or even values at all. Ethics is our practise of life.
Deleuze rejects morality and embraces Spinozist ethics. Deleuze’s ethics consists in maximising joy and minimising sad passions. Joy occurs when my body comes into contact with something that joins with me to create something greater. Joy consists in composition between me and something else, in short, in good relations. The sad passions - sadness itself, hatred, aversion, mockery, fear, despair, pity, indignation, envy, humility, anger, regret, vengeance, cruelty, etc.. - occur when my body comes into contact with something poisonous to it, something it does not agree with, something that in short decomposes me. The sad passions decompose my relations in negative ways, make me withdraw from the world.
Joy increases my power, and sadness decreases my power. Sad passions occur when I am most alienated, mystified, most separated from power, and the sad passions make me act in ways harmful to others - ways that are symptomatic of the pathetic life I must live to act in such ways.
What is so important here, is that myself, as an I, as a subject, is not the focus of Deleuze’s ethics. The ethics here is an ethics of intensities, an ethics of increasing power. Power here is not to be understood as domineering (a sad passion!), but as a creative force, as the ability to exert oneself in the world. Power is the capacity of acting. Deleuze’s ethics is based on speeds, accelerations, unformed elements, nonsubjectified values. They are not based on anything relating to me as an identity at all.
(I mean, let’s think for a moment: why should our ethics be based around the subject, the self? Consciousness is only the small part of thought we are aware of, yet we exalt it as some special thing above the rest of thought. Similarly, we are aware of very little of our bodily processes. We do not even know what the body can do, let alone what the mind can do! ‘The infant freely believes he wants milk, the angry man that he freely desires vengeance’.)
Acting ethically means organising good encounters, composing new relations, forming powers, experimenting, etc. , not in judging, blaming, imposing values on the world. It means the joy of discovering what we can do, and maximising what we can do.
The question left at the end of S:PP is: how do we enter into composition with one another to heighten our power, ad infinitum?
Spinozist ethics give us a beautiful way of living. By denouncing everything that separates us from life, they allow us to become free.
February 5, 2021
Deleuze imo is right on the money when suggests that Spinoza's Ethics mobilizes the order of causes and effects to purify all traces of a moral imperative. Things and deeds are deemed good because we desire them and because through joining with them we feel that our own capacity to act is being augmented. Only ignorance of the true causes and of art of selecting compositional encounters leads one to mistake the law of cause and effect for a moral command, a kind of biblical 'thou shall not'. Why shouldn't Adam ingest the apple from the tree of knowledge? For Deleuze's Spinoza it is because the apple will fatally decompose Adam's body and force the extensive parts that compose the latter to enter into new relations. Pace Heidegger, death is not an ownmost possibility of the Dasein. Each finite mode seeks to preserve in its own force of existence and death only invades from the without. Nature/God/Substance is the sole Individual that always maintain net compositional gain by producing everything immanently and comprehending everything immanently without divorcing itself from its products. This is because Deleuze's Spinoza recognizes only one modality--necessity and therefore does not recognize modality at all. Hence such bold theses as "Interiority is selected exteriority and exteriority is projected interiority". However it is contentious to what extent Deleuze himself endorses the wholesale demystification of the normative in his interpretation of Spinoza. To go back to the thesis advanced above, both 'selection' and 'projection' imply agency, which Deleuze's Spinoza grants provisionally in the form of the mind's power to form adequate ideas. But then the impasse is whether the mind really possesses this power on its own accord or whether it has to be determined from without to seek after the second knowledge (common notions, compositional laws) and third and the ultimate knowledge (singular essences of things and their order of connection; i.e. the mind's comprehension of God as he comprehends himself).
August 23, 2015
"gerçek bir devlet, yurttaşlarına ödül umudu ya da mal güvencesi değil, özgürlük sevgisi sunar; çünkü iyi davranışları karşılığında kölelere ödül verilir, özgür insanlara değil."
"yaşamıyoruz, sadece görünüşte bir yaşam sürüyoruz, tek düşündüğümüz ölümden kaçmak ve bütün hayatımız bir ölüm tapınması."
"yaşamıyoruz, sadece görünüşte bir yaşam sürüyoruz, tek düşündüğümüz ölümden kaçmak ve bütün hayatımız bir ölüm tapınması."
January 1, 2018
I cried at 9:37 pm on December 31st 2017 in a small bar in the middle of the Bible Belt. Surrounded by University of West Georgia undergrad Greek life students watching football, waiting for the year, they waited for some difference, for new relationships, for new days. Meanwhile I cried feeling I was already anew. Chapter 2 and 5 were clarity and serious solidarity to my first reading of Spinoza. There is not much in the world that seems to have a harmony with my vision of this universes' ontology than Spinoza's Ethics. And there isn't a more brief "interpretation" than this to justify that Spinoza is present in the modern mind of the academic and in need of being grasped by the modern theist than this work. I've never read something more wholesome than Deleuze's idea of Spinoza's life and work.
This one is for anyone searching...
2018, take my lead.
This one is for anyone searching...
2018, take my lead.
March 14, 2018
This book consists of 6 chapters. The first examines the life of Spinoza. This helps the read to gain an understanding, or at least a connection with Spinoza in his writing. It also helps bring about some of the concepts that Deleuze puts forward later (such as the idea that Spinoza was never a Cartesian). Chapter 2 interrogates the three denunciations which Spinoza must make before moving towards the univocity of being. They are the devaluation of consciousness, values, and sad passions. The third chapter examines the correspondence between Blyenbergh and Spinoza in regard to the problem of evil. Through this correspondence, Deleuze unpacks what Spinoza might mean when he states that there is no evil. The fourth and longest chapter contains an index of terms used by Spinoza. This might be useful when reading through texts written by Spinoza, and speaks to Deleuze's understanding of philosophy as creating concepts. The fifth chapter returns to essay form. In this essay Deleuze talks about the evolution of Spinoza's thought, and why his later understanding of 'common notions' undoes much of his work from his initial, unfinished Treatise. Finally, the sixth chapter, and fifth essay, places us in the middle of Spinoza's philosophy. It places bodes as modes which are situated in the plane of immanence. Bodies are described by their affective capacity. This chapter helps set the stage for Deleuze's plane of immanence and the body without organs.
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September 6, 2008As a long time fan of both Mssrs. Spinoza and Deleuze, this made for a very impressive synthesis. Deleuze loses his weird, babbling writing style and becomes pretty lucid, showing the linkages between his own philosophy and the ecstatic monist perspective of Spinoza, showing subversive possibilities everywhere.
January 29, 2024
After some years of studying Spinoza I thought to have finally understand him, but leave it to Deleuze to doubt such a claim to knowledge.
This work contains a deep and thourough delving into the complicated concepts of Spinoza's ontology. What follows is a succession of reflections and explications of said concepts, that, although difficult, later in the book become clearer by ways of examples and the comparison with Spinoza's philosophy with ethology.
What results is a harmonious view on the inter-connectivity of all things, meaning that it are not subjects that are the focus of philosophy, but relations between all 'bodies' that affect each other. A body, as a mode of being of the one Substance from which everything has a flow of causes, can be anything: a physical human or animal body, a linguistic concept, a mind or idea. The study of these modes of being is related to how all these body affect one another, and either increase their strength (bringing joy), or diminish it (bringing sadness) through the relations their are part of.
In this sense, one gets a beautiful image of how everything is whole, and everything is connected and dependent on one another.
Reading Spinoza thus can lead to an almost mythical experience.
This work contains a deep and thourough delving into the complicated concepts of Spinoza's ontology. What follows is a succession of reflections and explications of said concepts, that, although difficult, later in the book become clearer by ways of examples and the comparison with Spinoza's philosophy with ethology.
What results is a harmonious view on the inter-connectivity of all things, meaning that it are not subjects that are the focus of philosophy, but relations between all 'bodies' that affect each other. A body, as a mode of being of the one Substance from which everything has a flow of causes, can be anything: a physical human or animal body, a linguistic concept, a mind or idea. The study of these modes of being is related to how all these body affect one another, and either increase their strength (bringing joy), or diminish it (bringing sadness) through the relations their are part of.
In this sense, one gets a beautiful image of how everything is whole, and everything is connected and dependent on one another.
Reading Spinoza thus can lead to an almost mythical experience.
September 14, 2024
It's so soft and lucid, simple and straightforward. The living reader is drawn into a vast field of workability. Theory: Icy landscape without coldness, like looking through polished glass. Spinoza was grinding lenses so that you might see clearly. Practice: warmly, innocently you walk around the neighborhood gazing at random objects that never lived for you before: you stare flabbergasted at a rock, a window, or flower, like an enlightened fool, like what can this body do? Of what sort of affections and affects are you capable? Can you conjoin, are you conjoining into a greater totality with me? A circuit of joy in the neighborhood? Why not!; It's ridiculous and true. The philosophical generosity of these two is genuinely so moving, almost too good to be true: that Spinoza and Deleuze continually provide us with such lovely life-saving, life-surging thoughts. Ensuing annihilation of confusion and sadness, and destruction of doom. These thoughts fulfill the strange desire I feel sometimes, the movement I want to make, articulated by Deleuze as exiting philosophy by means of philosophy. As if visiting a pharmacy that's always available, I got what I needed here: these are your means in this little blue book. Better keep it on hand or at least in the house.
August 10, 2021
I’m reading supplementary material around Deleuze before I dive into the big stuff. This led me down a rather extensive detour through Spinoza. Whether or not I actually end up enjoying Anti-Oedipus or A Thousand Plateaus, I have deeply enjoyed reading spinoza - this has been a reward in and of itself.
Deleuze does a fantastic job of explaining the terms and objectives of Ethics, and this book was valuable in sketching out some of the more complicated aspects for a non-philosopher like myself. I have a pretty good understanding of Nietzsche, so his decision to begin with him worked very well for me. The index of terms is particularly useful, although I far more enjoyed the short essays contained regarding Spinoza.
In short - a great work that was immensely helpful for understanding Ethics, and I think also valuable in understanding Deleuze’s philosophy as well.
Deleuze does a fantastic job of explaining the terms and objectives of Ethics, and this book was valuable in sketching out some of the more complicated aspects for a non-philosopher like myself. I have a pretty good understanding of Nietzsche, so his decision to begin with him worked very well for me. The index of terms is particularly useful, although I far more enjoyed the short essays contained regarding Spinoza.
In short - a great work that was immensely helpful for understanding Ethics, and I think also valuable in understanding Deleuze’s philosophy as well.
May 11, 2019
An absolute whirlwind (as Deleuze says of Spinoza) of ideas. Deleuze finds himself in the same awe as most readers of Spinoza - the humility in his words gives way to the beautiful composition and entwinement of Deleuze himself and Spinoza. One finds in this book more than an expository text concerning the systemat of Spinoza’s thought, but a living, breathing encounter with the Ethics - a road map for renewed experience in light of Spinoza’s radical thought.
If one wants to understand Deleuze, it is indeed through Spinoza.
If one wants to understand Deleuze, it is indeed through Spinoza.
June 29, 2013
Loving this. Brief but super introduction too by Robert Hurley. He warns that the bokk may be 'difficult', and advises the reader to read lightly. I didn't find ithard, I found it delightful and rich. Coming from Gilles it was easy!
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February 25, 2021И тогда ясен весь смысл философского одиночества. Ибо философ не может войти ни в одно сообщество, он чужд любому из них. Несомненно, как раз в демократической и либеральной среде он находит наилучшие условия жизни или, скорее, выживания. Но такое окружение лишь гарантирует ему, что те, кто настроен агрессивно, не будут отравлять или уродовать его жизнь, что они не смогут подавить его способность мыслить — способность, которая, пусть в малой степени, но выходит за рамки целей государства и общества, за рамки целей любого окружения как такового. Для каждой социальной среды, как покажет Спиноза, речь идет только о подчинении и более ни о чем: вот почему понятия [notions] вины, заслуги и проступка, добра и зла исключительно социальны, они имеют дело с послушанием и непослушанием. Тогда наилучшим будет лишь то общество, которое освобождает способность мыслить от обязанности подчиняться и которое заботится — в своих собственных интересах — о том, чтобы не подчинять мысль государственным указам, применимым лишь к поступку. Пока мысль свободна, а следовательно жива, нет никакой угрозы. Когда же она перестает быть таковой, возможно любое подавление, и оно уже осуществляется, так что каждый поступок заслуживает порицания, а каждой жизни что-то угрожает.
September 17, 2017
ถ้าถามว่าเมื่อพูดถึงสปิโนซ่า คุณจะนึกถึงอะไร หรือช่วยบอกได้ไหมว่าสปิโนซ่าพูดอะไรบ้าง เราก็จะตอบว่าสปิโนซ่าคือนักปรัชญาแห่งความรัก และเรื่องที่เขาเขียนก็คือความรัก แม้หาใช่ว่าทุกคนจะรักเขาก็ตาม โรแมนติกมุ้งมิ้งไหมล่ะ
April 1, 2020
More Spinoza is always a treat.
This book is wildly interesting because it goes beyond summarizing the ideas of Spinoza. Deleuze gives a fair reading of Spinoza and highlights certain of his ideas that didn't stick out to me when first reading him. He lays out the Ethics as a map of meaning to be explored tirelessly.
Firstly, this book improved my understanding of Spinoza, as well as made me see what outreach and application his ideas can have. Second, the way Deleuze passionately explores Spinoza is fascinating and has a contagious sense of energy.
Another thing I appreciated is that this book answered many of the questions I had when initially reading the Ethics. What about evil, what do we make of that? Why is this book called Ethics in the first place?
The latter is probably one of the biggest takeaways, which gives me a key understanding of the distinction between morality and ethics. This has illuminated some of my thought process, and seems to be an important concept to grasp to approach Deleuze himself.
It is also really interesting to see how a philosopher reads a philosopher. It shows the meta conversations that happen with thinkers across time and made me think about philosophy itself in a broader scope.
Deleuze's descriptions of Spinoza as a gust of wind or the scholia of the Ethics as an underground maze were simultaneously evocative while providing an enhanced intuitive meaning. It was refreshing and gave me appetite to read more meta-philosophical texts that are both analytical and entertaining.
This book is wildly interesting because it goes beyond summarizing the ideas of Spinoza. Deleuze gives a fair reading of Spinoza and highlights certain of his ideas that didn't stick out to me when first reading him. He lays out the Ethics as a map of meaning to be explored tirelessly.
Firstly, this book improved my understanding of Spinoza, as well as made me see what outreach and application his ideas can have. Second, the way Deleuze passionately explores Spinoza is fascinating and has a contagious sense of energy.
Another thing I appreciated is that this book answered many of the questions I had when initially reading the Ethics. What about evil, what do we make of that? Why is this book called Ethics in the first place?
The latter is probably one of the biggest takeaways, which gives me a key understanding of the distinction between morality and ethics. This has illuminated some of my thought process, and seems to be an important concept to grasp to approach Deleuze himself.
It is also really interesting to see how a philosopher reads a philosopher. It shows the meta conversations that happen with thinkers across time and made me think about philosophy itself in a broader scope.
Deleuze's descriptions of Spinoza as a gust of wind or the scholia of the Ethics as an underground maze were simultaneously evocative while providing an enhanced intuitive meaning. It was refreshing and gave me appetite to read more meta-philosophical texts that are both analytical and entertaining.
August 12, 2018
قد تتعرض للطرد والتهميش بسبب رأي مخالف أو فكرة تعتبر مشبوهه من قبل الآخرين.
والأدهى هو أنك ربما تتعرض للقتل ! ومن اقربائك ومن طائفتك نفسها، والسبب هو فكرة، ولشدة غبائهم يعتقدون إنها سوف تضمحل وتنتهي بمجرد قتلك! أغبياء لا يعلمون أن الأفكار لا تموت.
وحسب الكاتب فأن سبينوزا أحد أكثر الفلاسفة الذين جلبوا لنفسهم الكره والبغض، والنقد بسبب أفكارهم.
يقول سبينوزا أن القادة تستعبد الجماهير من خلال الدين، فرجال الدين دائمًا ما يتلون عليك أن هذا الحياة مؤقتة، ويزرعون الحزن داخلك من خلال تذكيرك بالخطيئة والمعاصي، الخ
إلى أن تصبح شخص ضعيف فارغ سهل الأنقياد ببضع طقوس وشعائر، حتى تصل لمرحلة تصبح فيها كالدمية، وبما أن هذه الحياة مريرة وفانية فسوف يجعلونك تحلم بالحياة الآخرة، وبذلك يصنعون امامك الطرق، ومن اجل التحليق للسماء سوف تكون مستعد لتضحي بنفسك بسهولة.
يتناول هذا الكتاب: حياة سبينوزا وموضع الأخلاق، ورسائل بين سبينوزا وبلينبيرغ حول مسألة الشر، ومعجم بعض المصطلحات والمفاهيم التي يستخدمها سبينوزا، وفصل حول عدم اكتمال رسالته في اصلاح العقل، واخيرًا نحن وسبينوزا، أي ماذا يعني سبينوزا بالنسبة لنا ومدى تأثيره.
عدد الصفحات ١٥٠
December 3, 2013
A genius writing about a genius - Deleuze's introduction to Spinoza is mind-blowing. As I am new to Spinoza, I definitely do not feel I have grasped everything Deleuze has packed into this little book. But this little work definitely encouraged me to see the audacity and originality of Spinoza's philosophy. Deleuze is perfectly suited to explain to the reader precisely what distinguishes Spinoza from his contemporaries, and what makes Spinoza still relevant today. The final chapter is especially pertinent in this regard. The A-Z glossary of Spinoza's philosophy was not as easy to read as the other chapters, but still well worth a ponder.
August 3, 2016
A specially bad introduction to Spinoza. Please read Deleuze's semminar on Spinoza at Vicennes instead. It presents the uniquely nietzschean reading of Spinoza that informs Deleuze work as a whole.
August 21, 2018
Oldukça başarısız buldum. Adı Pratik Felsefe ama ne pratik olarak kullanabileceğimiz konular üzerinde fazla durulmuş ne de kolay yoldan Spinoza'yı anlamayı sağlıyor.
Filozofu anlamak için ilk ilkelerini bilmek gerektiği ve bu ilkelerin ne olduğu söyleniyor ama bu kısım en son bölümde yazılmış.
Yarısından çoğu sözlük ve bu sözlük kitabın tam ortasında yer alıyor. Belli ki sıra ile okumak için tasarlanmış ama burada öğrenilmesi gereken kelimeler kitabın çok başlarında kullanılıyor ya da sözlükte bir kelimeyi açıklarken sözlükte henüz sırası gelmemiş diğer bir kelimeyi kullanıyor. Kelimelerin açıklamaları sayfalar boyu sürdüğünden hemen göz atıp, yazıya kalındığı yerden devam etmek mümkün değil. Dolayısı ile sözlük kesinlikle sözlük gibi kullanılamıyor ve sıra ile okumak gerekiyor.
Ayrıca kullandığı latince terimleri açıklama gereği duymamış, sanırım her okuyucunun latinceye aşina olduğu varsayılmış.
Kesinlikle Spinoza'ya yeni başlayacak olanlar için değil. Spinoza'yı iyice okuyup yazarın yorumunu merak edenler ya da anlamadığı yerleri anlamak isteyenler için uygun olabilir.
Çeviriyi de hiç beğenmedim. Modern Türkçeleri varken eski kelimeler kullanılmış. Sözlükte bile anlamını bulamadığım kelimeler var. Terimlerin orjinalleri ile ilgili de bir ipucu verilmediğinden Türkçe'sini anlamadığım ya da tam olarak anlayamadım terimlerle ilgili araştırma yapamadım.
Filozofu anlamak için ilk ilkelerini bilmek gerektiği ve bu ilkelerin ne olduğu söyleniyor ama bu kısım en son bölümde yazılmış.
Yarısından çoğu sözlük ve bu sözlük kitabın tam ortasında yer alıyor. Belli ki sıra ile okumak için tasarlanmış ama burada öğrenilmesi gereken kelimeler kitabın çok başlarında kullanılıyor ya da sözlükte bir kelimeyi açıklarken sözlükte henüz sırası gelmemiş diğer bir kelimeyi kullanıyor. Kelimelerin açıklamaları sayfalar boyu sürdüğünden hemen göz atıp, yazıya kalındığı yerden devam etmek mümkün değil. Dolayısı ile sözlük kesinlikle sözlük gibi kullanılamıyor ve sıra ile okumak gerekiyor.
Ayrıca kullandığı latince terimleri açıklama gereği duymamış, sanırım her okuyucunun latinceye aşina olduğu varsayılmış.
Kesinlikle Spinoza'ya yeni başlayacak olanlar için değil. Spinoza'yı iyice okuyup yazarın yorumunu merak edenler ya da anlamadığı yerleri anlamak isteyenler için uygun olabilir.
Çeviriyi de hiç beğenmedim. Modern Türkçeleri varken eski kelimeler kullanılmış. Sözlükte bile anlamını bulamadığım kelimeler var. Terimlerin orjinalleri ile ilgili de bir ipucu verilmediğinden Türkçe'sini anlamadığım ya da tam olarak anlayamadım terimlerle ilgili araştırma yapamadım.
March 13, 2022
buen resumen y el último texto <> m ha gustao un monton👍
January 5, 2024
Deleuze, como Spinoza, es un poco "línea volcánica discontinua, segunda versión bajo la primera que expresa todos los furores del corazón y propone las tesis prácticas de denuncia y liberación".
April 1, 2017
Text opens with a biographical note on Spinoza, but it is more a rumination based on Nietzsche’s belief that the “mystery of a philosopher’s life” was in how one “appropriates the ascetic virtues—humility, poverty, chastity—and makes them serve ends completely his own, extraordinary ends that are not very ascetic at all”; they are by contrast “an expression of his singularity” (3). These are not a morality, but the “effects of philosophy itself,” a superabundance that has “conquered thought and subordinated every other instinct to itself” (id.). For Spinoza, this is ‘Nature,’ “a life no longer lived on the basis of need, in terms of means and ends, but according to production, a productivity, a potency, in terms of causes and effects” (id.). For the agambenians, it might strike one as the philosopher’s bios, or perhaps even the eidos zoe, the form-of-life of the philosopher, wherein this form is inseparable from life itself, wherein the rule and the life coincide without remainder. Curious! (a philosopher is also marked out by ‘solitude’ in this FoL; perhaps a comparison with the eremite in Homo Sacer part VIII is in order.)
Spinoza may have spoken about the “harmfulness of revolutions” in a period wherein “’revolutionary’ ideology is permeated with theology and is often, as with the Calvinist part, in the service of politics of reaction” (9). Spinoza was interested in popular irrationality, in pride in enslavement, in the reasons that peoples fought for their own bondage—quite simply, he was curious about the existence of rightwing populism. Like the Frankfurt School centuries later, “Why is it so difficult not only to win but to bear freedom?” (10). This political critique extends to those “bent on self-destruction” and “the union of the tyrant and the slave” (12).
The basis of spinozist (love that adjectival form) ethics is a “triple denunciation of ‘consciousness,’ of ‘values,’ and of ‘sad passions’” (17), which led him to being accused contemporaneously of “materialism, immoralism, and atheism” (id.). Spinoza is famous for the doctrine of parallelism, which “does not consist merely in denying any real causality between the mind and the body, [but] disallows any primacy of the one over the other” (18). This results in a “reversal of the traditional principle on which Morality was founded as an enterprise of domination of the passions by consciousness” (id.). Plenty on this. Lotsa nifty insights, such as “the confusion that compromises the whole of ontology,” “the history of a long error whereby the command is mistaken for something to be understood, obedience for knowledge itself” (24), a fatal commingling of power with truth, one supposes. Ultimately, the Ethics as composed of “great theories” regarding “the oneness of substance, the univocity of the attributes, immanence, universal necessity, parallelism,” but also how the aforesaid “cannot be treated apart from the three practical theses concerning consciousness, values, and the sad passions” (28).
Thereafter follows a brief essay on the ‘letters on evil,’ which is correspondence with one Blyenbergh, a numbnut “amateur Calvinist theologian” (30), whom Spinoza crushed in a series of letters, via working out his ontological theses on composition/decomposition. The main section of the volume, however, is an index of concepts from the Ethics (44 ff); it is weighty, and likely only becomes fully significant if read directly in conjunction with the principal text for which it is supplement (my reading of the Ethics is 20 years distant, and accordingly I am an incompetent reader of this text). For instance, the article on ‘Mode’ (91 ff) includes the argument that “one of the essential points of Spinozism is in its identification of the ontological relationship of substances and modes [cf. Agamben HS IX, of course] with the epistemological relationship of essences and properties and the physical relationship of cause and effect” (loc. cit.).
Or, the article on ‘Necessary’ (93 ff) notes that “Spinoza’s critique has two culminating points: nothing is possible in Nature; that is, the essences of nonexisting modes are not models or possibilities in a divine legislative intellect; there is nothing contingent in Nature; that is, existences are not produced through the action of a divine will which, in the manner of a prince, could have chosen a different world with different laws” (94). Or on ‘Power’ (97 ff): “one of the basic points of the Ethics consists in denying that God has any power analogous to that of a tyrant” (loc. cit.).
Thoughtful concluding essays on Spinoza’s intellectual development as well as his continuing relevance.
Recommended for those who believe in philosophy’s function as a radical enterprise of demystification, thinkers who conceal their boldest and least orthodox arguments in appendices and notes, and readers who present ethics as a theory of power rather than a theory of obligations.
Spinoza may have spoken about the “harmfulness of revolutions” in a period wherein “’revolutionary’ ideology is permeated with theology and is often, as with the Calvinist part, in the service of politics of reaction” (9). Spinoza was interested in popular irrationality, in pride in enslavement, in the reasons that peoples fought for their own bondage—quite simply, he was curious about the existence of rightwing populism. Like the Frankfurt School centuries later, “Why is it so difficult not only to win but to bear freedom?” (10). This political critique extends to those “bent on self-destruction” and “the union of the tyrant and the slave” (12).
The basis of spinozist (love that adjectival form) ethics is a “triple denunciation of ‘consciousness,’ of ‘values,’ and of ‘sad passions’” (17), which led him to being accused contemporaneously of “materialism, immoralism, and atheism” (id.). Spinoza is famous for the doctrine of parallelism, which “does not consist merely in denying any real causality between the mind and the body, [but] disallows any primacy of the one over the other” (18). This results in a “reversal of the traditional principle on which Morality was founded as an enterprise of domination of the passions by consciousness” (id.). Plenty on this. Lotsa nifty insights, such as “the confusion that compromises the whole of ontology,” “the history of a long error whereby the command is mistaken for something to be understood, obedience for knowledge itself” (24), a fatal commingling of power with truth, one supposes. Ultimately, the Ethics as composed of “great theories” regarding “the oneness of substance, the univocity of the attributes, immanence, universal necessity, parallelism,” but also how the aforesaid “cannot be treated apart from the three practical theses concerning consciousness, values, and the sad passions” (28).
Thereafter follows a brief essay on the ‘letters on evil,’ which is correspondence with one Blyenbergh, a numbnut “amateur Calvinist theologian” (30), whom Spinoza crushed in a series of letters, via working out his ontological theses on composition/decomposition. The main section of the volume, however, is an index of concepts from the Ethics (44 ff); it is weighty, and likely only becomes fully significant if read directly in conjunction with the principal text for which it is supplement (my reading of the Ethics is 20 years distant, and accordingly I am an incompetent reader of this text). For instance, the article on ‘Mode’ (91 ff) includes the argument that “one of the essential points of Spinozism is in its identification of the ontological relationship of substances and modes [cf. Agamben HS IX, of course] with the epistemological relationship of essences and properties and the physical relationship of cause and effect” (loc. cit.).
Or, the article on ‘Necessary’ (93 ff) notes that “Spinoza’s critique has two culminating points: nothing is possible in Nature; that is, the essences of nonexisting modes are not models or possibilities in a divine legislative intellect; there is nothing contingent in Nature; that is, existences are not produced through the action of a divine will which, in the manner of a prince, could have chosen a different world with different laws” (94). Or on ‘Power’ (97 ff): “one of the basic points of the Ethics consists in denying that God has any power analogous to that of a tyrant” (loc. cit.).
Thoughtful concluding essays on Spinoza’s intellectual development as well as his continuing relevance.
Recommended for those who believe in philosophy’s function as a radical enterprise of demystification, thinkers who conceal their boldest and least orthodox arguments in appendices and notes, and readers who present ethics as a theory of power rather than a theory of obligations.
December 25, 2023
Beautiful exposition that's bisected by a very dense and confusing glossary of Spinoza's terminology, but I get the sense the latter will prove its worth as reference material in the longer term.
December 21, 2021
De essays in dit boek waren verrassend helder, de reputatie van Deleuze in achting genomen. De woordenlijst in het midden van het boek is dat iets minder, maar poogt dat ook niet te zijn.
Het boek sluit af met een ontroerend hoofdstuk best beschreven als Deleuze's liefdesverklaring aan Spinoza. Een plezier om te lezen en onverwacht meeslepend en emotioneel.
Het boek sluit af met een ontroerend hoofdstuk best beschreven als Deleuze's liefdesverklaring aan Spinoza. Een plezier om te lezen en onverwacht meeslepend en emotioneel.
November 6, 2016
This short work is an amazing aid for those interested in the thought of both Spinoza and Deleuze. It makes abundantly clear how close Deleuze's thought is to that of Spinoza - how the thought of Spinoza flows not through Deleuze's mind, but through his heart.
"The entire Ethics is a voyage in immanence, but immanence is the unconscious itself, and the conquest of the unconscious. Ethical joy is the correlate of speculative affirmation" (29). Life is an ever moving flow, without beginning or end. It is always taken or experienced from a middle point, from within, immanently. It is never consciously known or governed by any law or consciousness beforehand; we don't even know what a body can do. And so is life an experience, a testing, an experiment, an attempt.
This is but one way of understanding the interrelations between Spinoza and Deleuze. The final section of this work, "Spinoza and Us," is imperative for any understanding of Deleuze (with or without Guattari); it is by far the peak of this piece. The life and affirmation flow through it so strongly, coalescing in a final encomium to Spinoza and all that his thought and writings may do for us - opening us up to the nonphilosophical, affective life of joy that we are always already participating in and as, however blindly.
Helpful to those studying Spinoza, though a general understanding of his thought is definitely useful here, it is of even greater value to the student of Deleuze, of which it may perhaps be the best introductory text. Regardless, this work is beneficial for any who seek to live a joyful life, to every gay scientist.
"The entire Ethics is a voyage in immanence, but immanence is the unconscious itself, and the conquest of the unconscious. Ethical joy is the correlate of speculative affirmation" (29). Life is an ever moving flow, without beginning or end. It is always taken or experienced from a middle point, from within, immanently. It is never consciously known or governed by any law or consciousness beforehand; we don't even know what a body can do. And so is life an experience, a testing, an experiment, an attempt.
This is but one way of understanding the interrelations between Spinoza and Deleuze. The final section of this work, "Spinoza and Us," is imperative for any understanding of Deleuze (with or without Guattari); it is by far the peak of this piece. The life and affirmation flow through it so strongly, coalescing in a final encomium to Spinoza and all that his thought and writings may do for us - opening us up to the nonphilosophical, affective life of joy that we are always already participating in and as, however blindly.
Helpful to those studying Spinoza, though a general understanding of his thought is definitely useful here, it is of even greater value to the student of Deleuze, of which it may perhaps be the best introductory text. Regardless, this work is beneficial for any who seek to live a joyful life, to every gay scientist.
April 23, 2024
1era vez (marzo 2023)
Lo que más me ha gustado son el apartado 6 que se llama «Spinoza y nosotros» junto al glosario de términos que desarrolla y ocupa casi todo el libro. Me ha gustado mucho y me parece un librazo, aunque quizá esperase más profundidad (que seguramente lo hará Deleuze en su Spinoza y el problema de la expresión).
2da vez (abril 2024)
Posiblemente pueda ser uno de los estudios más fructíferos y breves que existen. Es cierto que condensa muchísima información y que hay capítulos que resuenan sueltos, pero no hay más que una breve localización de las intensidades spinozianas. A partir de ahí, todo lo demás.
Además, el último capítulo, titulado «Spinoza y nosotros» puede ser la mejor exposición de por qué es importante estudiar a Spinoza y con lentes inmanentistas para nuestro mundo.
Lo que más me ha gustado son el apartado 6 que se llama «Spinoza y nosotros» junto al glosario de términos que desarrolla y ocupa casi todo el libro. Me ha gustado mucho y me parece un librazo, aunque quizá esperase más profundidad (que seguramente lo hará Deleuze en su Spinoza y el problema de la expresión).
2da vez (abril 2024)
Posiblemente pueda ser uno de los estudios más fructíferos y breves que existen. Es cierto que condensa muchísima información y que hay capítulos que resuenan sueltos, pero no hay más que una breve localización de las intensidades spinozianas. A partir de ahí, todo lo demás.
Además, el último capítulo, titulado «Spinoza y nosotros» puede ser la mejor exposición de por qué es importante estudiar a Spinoza y con lentes inmanentistas para nuestro mundo.
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