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The Destruction of Convoy PQ17
This book tells the Real History of a naval disaster of World War II. In June 1942, the great Anglo-American convoy PQ-17, laden with cargoes for the Soviet Union, headed for North Russia, escorted by a mighty array of British and American warships. On July 4 the British Admiralty ordered the convoy to scatter and the escorts to escape. Codebreakers had wrongly put the mighty battleship Tirpitz at sea. The Germans hunted down and sank almost every ship. David Irving chronicled their fate, and spoke with the bomber and submarine crews. He gained access to US and British naval records, and to the admirals and politicians too. The book was a best seller - with consequences. A defamation action brought by a British Royal Navy officer led to one of the biggest libel awards ever made. The battle that began in the Barents Sea in the summer of 1942 lingered on through two more closely fought actions in the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords thirty years but that s another story.
337 pages, Hardcover
First published January 1, 1968
About the author
David Irving
49 books338 followersDavid John Cawdell Irving is an English author who has written on the military and political history of World War II, especially Nazi Germany. He was found to be a Holocaust denier in a UK court in 2000 as a result of a failed libel case.
Irving's works include The Destruction of Dresden (1963), Hitler's War (1977), Churchill's War (1987) and Goebbels: Mastermind of the Third Reich (1996). In his works, he argued that Adolf Hitler did not know of the extermination of Jews, or, if he did, he opposed it. Though Irving's negationist claims and views of German war crimes in World War II (and Hitler's responsibility for them) were never taken seriously by mainstream historians, he was once recognised for his knowledge of Nazi Germany and his ability to unearth new historical documents, which he held closely but stated were fully supportive of his conclusions. His 1964 book The Mare's Nest about Germany's V-weapons campaign of 1944-45 was praised for its deep research but criticised for minimising Nazi slave labour programmes.
By the late 1980s, Irving had placed himself outside the mainstream of the study of history, and had begun to turn from "'soft-core' to 'hard-core' Holocaust denial", possibly influenced by the 1988 trial of Holocaust denier Ernst Zündel. That trial, and his reading of the pseudoscientific Leuchter report, led him to openly espouse Holocaust denial, specifically denying that Jews were murdered by gassing at the Auschwitz concentration camp.
Irving's reputation as a historian was further discredited in 2000, when, in the course of an unsuccessful libel case he filed against the American historian Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books, High Court Judge Charles Gray determined in his ruling that Irving willfully misrepresented historical evidence to promote Holocaust denial and whitewash the Nazis, a view shared by many prominent historians. The English court found that Irving was an active Holocaust denier, antisemite and racist, who "for his own ideological reasons persistently and deliberately misrepresented and manipulated historical evidence". In addition, the court found that Irving's books had distorted the history of Hitler's role in the Holocaust to depict Hitler in a favourable light.
Irving's works include The Destruction of Dresden (1963), Hitler's War (1977), Churchill's War (1987) and Goebbels: Mastermind of the Third Reich (1996). In his works, he argued that Adolf Hitler did not know of the extermination of Jews, or, if he did, he opposed it. Though Irving's negationist claims and views of German war crimes in World War II (and Hitler's responsibility for them) were never taken seriously by mainstream historians, he was once recognised for his knowledge of Nazi Germany and his ability to unearth new historical documents, which he held closely but stated were fully supportive of his conclusions. His 1964 book The Mare's Nest about Germany's V-weapons campaign of 1944-45 was praised for its deep research but criticised for minimising Nazi slave labour programmes.
By the late 1980s, Irving had placed himself outside the mainstream of the study of history, and had begun to turn from "'soft-core' to 'hard-core' Holocaust denial", possibly influenced by the 1988 trial of Holocaust denier Ernst Zündel. That trial, and his reading of the pseudoscientific Leuchter report, led him to openly espouse Holocaust denial, specifically denying that Jews were murdered by gassing at the Auschwitz concentration camp.
Irving's reputation as a historian was further discredited in 2000, when, in the course of an unsuccessful libel case he filed against the American historian Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books, High Court Judge Charles Gray determined in his ruling that Irving willfully misrepresented historical evidence to promote Holocaust denial and whitewash the Nazis, a view shared by many prominent historians. The English court found that Irving was an active Holocaust denier, antisemite and racist, who "for his own ideological reasons persistently and deliberately misrepresented and manipulated historical evidence". In addition, the court found that Irving's books had distorted the history of Hitler's role in the Holocaust to depict Hitler in a favourable light.
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Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews
January 30, 2024
ადრე დაახლოებით მსგავსი წიგნი წავიკითხე, მარა ბისმარკის ჩაძირვაზე. ეს შეუდარებლად უკეთესი იყო!
July 17, 2021
An account of the PQ17 incident in WWII. Essentially the allies were suppling the communist and Germany took out the convoy while the Allied escort abandoned their charge and escaped.
April 15, 2022
A true story of one terrible Russian convoy run by the British from Iceland to Murmansk in the summer of 1942 about six months after the USA joined the Second World War (World War II in the US). The action is initiated in a series of strict time lines within each side of the battle. I am not sure what would be better however I found this part of the story a little difficult to keep track of as it goes back and forth and overlaps. The story relies heavily on the logs and diaries of both key players and the better writers of those present. These are important in getting the true flavour of what was faced by the men, and a few women, on the ships. This book was written initially in 1968; my version was revised and updated in 1980.
Unlike the North Atlantic where the battle was fought almost exclusively against the U-boats, the Russian convoys also battled German surface ships and land based aircraft, both based in Norway. Convoy routes were constricted by the southern edge of the ice field. In the summer this could be 350 to 400 miles north of the Norwegian coast with weeks of all daylight. In winter it could be as little as 100 to 150 miles and weeks of all darkness. While the Germans could use uboats and aircraft against these convoys, the British were getting better at protecting them and the cost was growing. Also the tonnage sunk was no longer increasing but was actually decreasing.
The Germans wanted to use their large ships: battleships and “pocket” battleships. These ships could sink the merchantmen much faster with little risk to themselves from normal, small ship, escorts designed to keep uboats down and away. The British wanted to lure the German large ships out so they could be sunk with British battleships and aircraft carriers. This was problematic as the British were not prepared to bring their large ships within range of German land-based aircraft with their larger payloads, extended air time, and longer range. In the event, by the time the convoy got about half way to Russia, both sides did a little dance, then both sides ran away with their larger ships. In the fog of war (and the scattered fog on the Bering Sea) the British, thinking the German big ships were still about, told the merchantmen and their small escorts to “scatter’ and run for their lives to the nearest Russian port.
The scattered merchantmen took a beating from aircraft and uboats. Something like 12 of 37 got to Russia, some with significant damage.
A fascinating story for those interested in the Second WW. Particularly interesting for those interested in naval warfare or the battles of the convoys. How did one battleship, the Tirpitz, shape British naval strategy and cause a disaster without firing a shot. Three stars.
Unlike the North Atlantic where the battle was fought almost exclusively against the U-boats, the Russian convoys also battled German surface ships and land based aircraft, both based in Norway. Convoy routes were constricted by the southern edge of the ice field. In the summer this could be 350 to 400 miles north of the Norwegian coast with weeks of all daylight. In winter it could be as little as 100 to 150 miles and weeks of all darkness. While the Germans could use uboats and aircraft against these convoys, the British were getting better at protecting them and the cost was growing. Also the tonnage sunk was no longer increasing but was actually decreasing.
The Germans wanted to use their large ships: battleships and “pocket” battleships. These ships could sink the merchantmen much faster with little risk to themselves from normal, small ship, escorts designed to keep uboats down and away. The British wanted to lure the German large ships out so they could be sunk with British battleships and aircraft carriers. This was problematic as the British were not prepared to bring their large ships within range of German land-based aircraft with their larger payloads, extended air time, and longer range. In the event, by the time the convoy got about half way to Russia, both sides did a little dance, then both sides ran away with their larger ships. In the fog of war (and the scattered fog on the Bering Sea) the British, thinking the German big ships were still about, told the merchantmen and their small escorts to “scatter’ and run for their lives to the nearest Russian port.
The scattered merchantmen took a beating from aircraft and uboats. Something like 12 of 37 got to Russia, some with significant damage.
A fascinating story for those interested in the Second WW. Particularly interesting for those interested in naval warfare or the battles of the convoys. How did one battleship, the Tirpitz, shape British naval strategy and cause a disaster without firing a shot. Three stars.
August 8, 2019
Irving's updated account of Convoy PQ.17 is well researched and complete. This book is about tragedy upon tragedy due to political requirements trumping sound strategy. The Germans reacted to the attempt to supply the Russians with aviation assets and submarines. Although the threat of a sortie by their surface fleet drove the allies decisions, they were never a real factor and were not needed. At the time of this event American submarines and air force were plagued by torpedoes that didn't work while the Germans were having a field day. The loss in life was unnecessary. The shipping lost was crucial. Readers interested in a little known tragedy during the dark days of WWII will find this book enlightening and depressing.
July 31, 2020
Anatomy of a naval cockup in WW2.
Tragedy described in the Irving style.
Tragedy described in the Irving style.
January 28, 2024
I was surprised to find this book, a very fresh hardback copy, for sale for 25 cents at a Midwestern library years ago. I began reading it and enjoyed it for a little while.
Gradually I noticed that the English author seemed to prefer, or at least was rather sympathetic toward the Germans, as opposed to the Allies, hostile to the Soviets in particular. I shrugged that off lightly at first.
It has been a long time since reading this particular book, going on 35 years I would guess. My memory is a bit spotty on the subject, but what I recall is this. Overall the story of the strategic arctic convoys and the risky plans put in action to aid the Russians is a greatly detailed and thorough in the telling. But I do also recall an uneasy feeling, towards the end of the book when loose ends are usually wrapped up and conclusions drawn, that the Germans were given a great deal of credit for being smarter and generally, well just better than the allies. The edition that I read did not contain the passages that were determined to be libelous regarding the actions of the convoy escort's commander in an English court in the original printing.
It was only later that I learned more about David Irving, and how he had made himself a pariah in his own country, with most good people anyway. I was only vaguely aware of holocaust denial at the time, but through a few connections was made more aware of denial and David Irving's part in it. And why that brand new book had been on the sale table for twenty five cents.
Gradually I noticed that the English author seemed to prefer, or at least was rather sympathetic toward the Germans, as opposed to the Allies, hostile to the Soviets in particular. I shrugged that off lightly at first.
It has been a long time since reading this particular book, going on 35 years I would guess. My memory is a bit spotty on the subject, but what I recall is this. Overall the story of the strategic arctic convoys and the risky plans put in action to aid the Russians is a greatly detailed and thorough in the telling. But I do also recall an uneasy feeling, towards the end of the book when loose ends are usually wrapped up and conclusions drawn, that the Germans were given a great deal of credit for being smarter and generally, well just better than the allies. The edition that I read did not contain the passages that were determined to be libelous regarding the actions of the convoy escort's commander in an English court in the original printing.
It was only later that I learned more about David Irving, and how he had made himself a pariah in his own country, with most good people anyway. I was only vaguely aware of holocaust denial at the time, but through a few connections was made more aware of denial and David Irving's part in it. And why that brand new book had been on the sale table for twenty five cents.
June 29, 2023
The Destruction of Convoy PQ-17 is the best single account of the Allied Arctic convoy PQ-17. It is a highly detailed and well told account of the fate of this convoy as it made its way to the port of Archangel in the Soviet Union from Iceland in the summer of 1942.
Of the 35 merchant ships that left Iceland with wartime supplies for the Soviet Union, 24 were sunk by the German Navy and Air Force, leaving only 11 ships to reach the safety of ports in the Soviet Union, and over 150 merchant seamen dead. This book is the story of that savage destruction.
When originally published in 1968 The Destruction of Convoy PQ-17 ran in to legal difficulties when the Commander of the Royal Navy close escort group sued the author for libel over allegations contained in the book relating to his decision to withdraw his destroyers. On the face of it those allegations were easily arrived at, as some of the Royal Navy decision making clearly amounted to blundering. The reality is, there was more than a few shortcomings in the Royal Navy command structure that contributed to the destruction of convoy PQ-17, one man was not solely to blame. This updated version has been corrected and it is the definitive story of that ill-fated convoy.
Of the 35 merchant ships that left Iceland with wartime supplies for the Soviet Union, 24 were sunk by the German Navy and Air Force, leaving only 11 ships to reach the safety of ports in the Soviet Union, and over 150 merchant seamen dead. This book is the story of that savage destruction.
When originally published in 1968 The Destruction of Convoy PQ-17 ran in to legal difficulties when the Commander of the Royal Navy close escort group sued the author for libel over allegations contained in the book relating to his decision to withdraw his destroyers. On the face of it those allegations were easily arrived at, as some of the Royal Navy decision making clearly amounted to blundering. The reality is, there was more than a few shortcomings in the Royal Navy command structure that contributed to the destruction of convoy PQ-17, one man was not solely to blame. This updated version has been corrected and it is the definitive story of that ill-fated convoy.
June 11, 2011
My father served on one of the escort ships HMS Pozarica an anti aircraft destroyer so this book brought it vividly to life for me. It is a very good account of the detruction of the most devastated of the Russia convoys.
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July 23, 2011David Irving has done an exceptional job in researching the details of this tragic episode in British naval history. He has retold the story from it's many perspectives with an eye to detail while capturing the human experience in all its misery and terror. A book well worth reading.
Displaying 1 - 9 of 9 reviews