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Epiphenomenal Qualia
Published in the Philosophy Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 127. In this article, Jackson seeks to challenge physicalism by using the knowledge argument.
- GenresPhilosophyNonfiction
First published April 1, 1982
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Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews
December 8, 2020
Frank Jackson starts this article with a critique against physicalism --- which is the general idea that the whole world can be explained in physical terms--- and in doing so also defines QUALIA: “there are certain features of the bodily sensations especially, but also of certain perceptual experiences, which no amount of purely physical information includes.” This means that one can describe everything physical there is to know about a human brain, and yet they won’t be able to describe the “hurtfulness of pain, the characteristic experience of tasting a lemon, etc”
Thus, this is what Qualia means: individual instances of subjective, conscious experience, which cannot be explained through physicalism; no such characterizations can capture the phenomenal character, or “qualia”, of experiential states such as perceptions, emotions, and bodily sensations, since they would leave out certain essential properties of those experiential states, namely, “what it's like”. Hence, physicalism is false; Jackson, however, admits that though these arguments are perfectly valid, many may not find it as intuitively obvious as he does. So he compares and contrasts three different kinds of arguments, namely The Knowledge Argument, The Modal Argument and "What's it like to be" Argunent, with each other, and in the end tackles the question of the causal role of qualia by arguing that the view that qualia are epiphenomenal is a perfectly possible one.
Believers in epiphenomenalism don’t necessarily deny that there are qualia. Instead they believe that it’s “possible to hold that certain properties of certain mental states” can indeed be seen as qualia. However, “their possession or absence makes no difference to the physical world”. They are “causally impotent”. He's not saying that mental states are not causally efficacious, but only certain properties of them, namely, the qualia. Finally, Jackson says that although there are no good arguments against epiphenomenalism, the fact remains that epiphenomena are inexplicable and don't fit in with the scientific way of looking at things, they are merely “to soothe the intuitions of dualists”. Although this is true, Jackson finds that this objection rests on an overly optimistic view of what it is possible for us humans to understand.
We are the products of Evolution. We understand and sense what we need to understand and sense in order to survive. Epiphenomenal qualia are totally irrelevant to survival. At no stage of our evolution did natural selection favour those who could make sense of how they are caused and the laws governing them, or in fact why they exist at all.
To explain why he thinks physicalists are overly optimistic, he makes an analogy with imaginary sea-slug scientists and philosophers; the tough-minded may think their restricted science suffices to explain everything, at least in principle if not quite yet; in weaker moments, they may say that it leaves something out; but they resist this temptation and their tender-minded opponents by arguing that no one has ever shown how this residue fits in with their successful science.
And there might also exist super beings which stand to us as we stand to the sea slugs. We cannot adopt the perspective of these super beings, because we are not them, but the possibility of such a perspective is, I think, an antidote to excessive optimism.
Thus, this is what Qualia means: individual instances of subjective, conscious experience, which cannot be explained through physicalism; no such characterizations can capture the phenomenal character, or “qualia”, of experiential states such as perceptions, emotions, and bodily sensations, since they would leave out certain essential properties of those experiential states, namely, “what it's like”. Hence, physicalism is false; Jackson, however, admits that though these arguments are perfectly valid, many may not find it as intuitively obvious as he does. So he compares and contrasts three different kinds of arguments, namely The Knowledge Argument, The Modal Argument and "What's it like to be" Argunent, with each other, and in the end tackles the question of the causal role of qualia by arguing that the view that qualia are epiphenomenal is a perfectly possible one.
Believers in epiphenomenalism don’t necessarily deny that there are qualia. Instead they believe that it’s “possible to hold that certain properties of certain mental states” can indeed be seen as qualia. However, “their possession or absence makes no difference to the physical world”. They are “causally impotent”. He's not saying that mental states are not causally efficacious, but only certain properties of them, namely, the qualia. Finally, Jackson says that although there are no good arguments against epiphenomenalism, the fact remains that epiphenomena are inexplicable and don't fit in with the scientific way of looking at things, they are merely “to soothe the intuitions of dualists”. Although this is true, Jackson finds that this objection rests on an overly optimistic view of what it is possible for us humans to understand.
We are the products of Evolution. We understand and sense what we need to understand and sense in order to survive. Epiphenomenal qualia are totally irrelevant to survival. At no stage of our evolution did natural selection favour those who could make sense of how they are caused and the laws governing them, or in fact why they exist at all.
To explain why he thinks physicalists are overly optimistic, he makes an analogy with imaginary sea-slug scientists and philosophers; the tough-minded may think their restricted science suffices to explain everything, at least in principle if not quite yet; in weaker moments, they may say that it leaves something out; but they resist this temptation and their tender-minded opponents by arguing that no one has ever shown how this residue fits in with their successful science.
And there might also exist super beings which stand to us as we stand to the sea slugs. We cannot adopt the perspective of these super beings, because we are not them, but the possibility of such a perspective is, I think, an antidote to excessive optimism.
January 16, 2021
“All that you see is not all that is there”
October 17, 2023
Jackson's essay is a masterful treatise in the argument for qualia. It is beautifully illustrated, easy to understand, and a very comprehensive view into the existence of qualia and its impact. Although Jackson's argument against the evolutionary argument is a bit shaky, the rest of the essay is a masterpiece.
May 5, 2020
The quality and clarity of Jackson's writing appears to me to be one of the most valuable aspects of this essay.
October 26, 2023
Native American x philosophy/consciousness
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January 6, 2021Even Jackson doesn't believe this... but I might.
Displaying 1 - 6 of 6 reviews