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A Survey on the Cyber Attacks Against Non-linear State Estimation in Smart Grids

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Information Security and Privacy (ACISP 2016)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 9722))

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Abstract

It is well-known that critical infrastructures would be targets for cyber attacks. In this paper, we focus on smart grids. In a smart grid system, information from smart meters would be used to perform a state estimation in real time in order to maintain the stability of the system. A wrong estimation can lead to diastrous consequences (e.g. suspension of electricity supply or a big financial loss). Unfortunately, quite a number of recent results showed that attacks on this estimation process are feasible by manipulating readings of only a few meters. In this paper, we focus on nonlinear state estimation which is a more realistic model and widely employed in a real smart grid environment. We summarize and categorize all possible attacks, and review the mechanisms behind. We also briefly talk about the countermeasures. We hope that the community would be able to come up with a better protection scheme for smart grids.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    As given in Table 2, \(P_j\) and \(Q_j\) refer to the real power injection and reactive power injection on bus j.

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Acknowledgments

The work described in this paper was partially supported by the HKU Seed Fundings for Applied Research 201409160030; HKU Seed Fundings for Basic Research 201311159149 and 201411159122; National Natural Science Foundation of China (61572157, 61401176, 61402136), PRC; Shenzhen Strategic Emerging Industry Development Foundation (JCYJ2015040316 1923509 and JCYJ20150617155357681), PRC, National High Technology Research and Development Program of China (2015AA016008), Projects of International Cooperation and Exchanges NSFC (61361166006), China, NSFCRGC Joint Research Scheme (N_HKU 72913), Hong Kong, Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province, China (2014A030310205, 2014A030313697), and Excellent Young Teachers Program of Guangdong High Education, China (YQ2015018), and China State Scholarship Fund.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

    Jingxuan Wang, Lucas C. K. Hui, S. M. Yiu & Xingmin Cui

  2. Harbin Institute of Technology Shenzhen Graduate School, Shenzhen, China

    Eric Ke Wang

  3. Department of Optoelectronic Engineering, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China

    Junbin Fang

Authors
  1. Jingxuan Wang
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  2. Lucas C. K. Hui
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  3. S. M. Yiu
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  4. Xingmin Cui
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  5. Eric Ke Wang
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to S. M. Yiu .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

    Joseph K. Liu

  2. Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia

    Ron Steinfeld

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Wang, J., Hui, L.C.K., Yiu, S.M., Cui, X., Ke Wang, E., Fang, J. (2016). A Survey on the Cyber Attacks Against Non-linear State Estimation in Smart Grids. In: Liu, J., Steinfeld, R. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9722. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40253-6_3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40253-6_3

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-40253-6

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