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The authors wish to thank Morris P. Fiorina, David M. Grether, and Forrest Nelson for their helpful comments. Brian Binger, Mary Doan, James Hong, Mark Isaac, Carl Lydick, and Merle Splitter helped recruit subjects and run experiments. Support provided by the National Science Foundation and the Guggenheim Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.
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Hoffman, E., Plott, C.R. Pre-meeting discussions and the possibility of coalition-breaking procedures in majority rule committees. Public Choice 40, 21–39 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00174994
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00174994