This paper deals with a specific aspect of the problem of coalition formation in a situation described by a TU-game. First, we define a very simple normal.
Abstract. This paper deals with a speci�c aspect of the problem of coalition formation in a situation described by a TU-game. First, we de�ne a very.
This paper deals with a specific aspect of the problem of coalition formation in a situation described by a TU-game. First, we define a very simple normal�...
Abstract. This paper deals with a specific aspect of the problem of coalition formation in a situation described by a TU-game.
The main objective of this paper is ascertain what conditions of the allocation rule lead to the grand coalition being a strong equilibrium of the normal�...
Original language, English. Pages (from-to), 211-217. Number of pages, 7. Journal, International Journal of Game Theory. Volume, 27. Issue number, 2.
Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games. International Journal of Game Theory, 27(2), 211-217. General rights. Copyright and moral�...
Jul 1, 1998 � In this work we study cost sharing connection games, where each player has a source and sink he would like to connect, and the cost of the�...
Original language, English. Place of Publication, Maastricht. Publisher, University of Limburg. Number of pages, 10. Publication status, Published - 1996�...
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Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games. Ana Meca ... structure associated to a strong equilibrium of I(v,ш) for a convex game �.