A stable matching is Rawlsian if it is amongst the stable matchings that maximize the lowest payoff amongst all players. We denote the set of Rawlsian stable�...

This paper considers the marriage problem under dynamic rematching. It is shown that if players who obtain higher payoffs are less likely to experiment with�...

Jul 7, 2020 � This paper considers the marriage problem under dynamic rematching. It is shown that if players who obtain higher payoffs are less likely to experiment with�...

This paper considers the marriage problem under dynamic rematching. It is shown that if players who obtain higher payoffs are less likely to experiment with�...

This paper considers the marriage problem under dynamic rematching. It is shown that if players who obtain higher payoffs are less likely to experiment with�...

Sep 5, 2020 � Bibliographic details on Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching.

Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.06.004 �. Видання: Games and Economic Behavior, 2020, с. 68-80. Видавець�...

Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching. This paper considers the marriage problem under dynamic rematching. It is shown that if players who obtain�...

6. Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching, Games & Economic Behavior (2020). Coauthored with Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli. LINK. 7. When�...

Dec 22, 2022 � Rawl's originally presented the theory of Justice, highlighting that the concept he wanted to apply for a just distribution of resources had�...