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Indian Peace Keeping Force

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Location of Sri Lanka

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF), was the Indian military contingent performing a peacekeeping operation that was formed to oversee the peace accord signed between India and Sri Lanka in 1987, trying to solve the conflict between Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Sri Lankan armed forces.[1]

Mandate

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord signed between the governments of India and Sri Lanka provided for an end to the island's civil war. The mandate of the Indian troops, called the Indian Peace Keeping Force, was to keep the peace between the main Tamil rebel group, the LTTE, and the Sri Lankan armed forces.

From the start, the LTTE did not trust the IPKF fully. They had only signed the Accord with great reluctance and did not wish to disarm, as the accords stimulated. Sinhalese nationalists, led by the JVP loathed the foreign presence on their soil.[2]

Conflict with LTTE

There was a continuous growing rift between the LTTE, the Sri Lankan Government and the IPKF. Each party felt that the other was scheming and conspiring to destabilize the Accord.

In this environment of mistrust, the death of the LTTE leader Thilipeen in a hunger strike and the subsequent suicide of a group of LTTE men detained by the Sri Lankans on 5th October 1987 provided the immediate spark.[1] The very next day the LTTE executed eight Sinhalese policemen in its captivity and the IPKF had no choice but to attempt to disarm the LTTE by force.

In brutal fighting that took about three weeks, the IPKF took control of the Jaffna Peninsula from the LTTE, something that the Sri Lankan Army had tried and failed to achieve for several years. Supported by Indian Army tanks, helicopter gunships and heavy artillery, the IPKF routed the LTTE. But this victory came at a price, as the IPKF lost around 1200 soldiers.[3][4]

Withdrawal from Sri Lanka

Ranasinghe Premadasa was elected President on 2nd January 1989 and he on April 1989 demanded the IPKF withdraw within 3 months from Sri Lanka. In the 1989 elections both Premadasa and the SLFP wanted the IPKF to withdraw and they got 95% of the vote and Sinhala public opinion was against the accord.[2] Premadasa held peace talks with the LTTE and both of them demanded that the IPKF withdraw.[3] Rajiv Gandhi refused to withdraw the IPKF in a situation which clearly the failure of his Sri Lanka policy both diplomatically and militarily. Rajiv believed that the only way he could succeed was to politically force Premadasa and militarily force the LTTE to accept the accord. In December 1989 Indian elections V. P. Singh became the Prime Minister. He viewed Rajiv Gandhi's Sri Lanka as a miserable failure as it had cost over 1100 soldiers, over 5000 Sri Lankan lives and cost over 20 billion (2000 crore) rupees of Indian tax payers money in over 32 months and both politically and militarily it was a stalemate.V. P. Singh withdraw the IPKF and the last ship left on 24 March 1990. IPKF's arrival in India was boycotted by the Tamil Nadu government headed by Karunanidhi.

One of the main reson for the failure of the objectives of the IPKF was the political instability in India. Another reason is that an army was sent for peace keeping was made to fight the war. It can be described as the Indian soldiers had carried more toffees than bullets to Sri Lanka.

Intelligence Failures

Indian intelligence agencies failed to give foolproof info to the forces. One example is the Jaffna 'football ground massacre'. The LTTE's disinformation machinery leaked info to the Indian army that the LTTE leader Prabhakaran was hiding in a building near the Jaffna university football ground.[citation needed] The operation plan was chalked out. It was decided to airdrop commandos on the ground while subsequent movement by tank formation ensured that Parabhakaran was caught alive. It was a good plan on the paper. The formation moved out. Battle-hardened commandos of the Sikh regiment were selected for the operation. The commandos started moving down from helicopter. But soon a rain of bullets from the LTTE fighters and sharpshooters perched on the tree tops started to fall on the commandos. Only the dead bodies of the commandos came down. More to it. The choppers also came under fire and one was shot down. The other managed to get away. The fate of the tanks moving in pincer formation on the ground was not much different. The LTTE had laid anti-tank mines in the way leading to the operational zone. The tanks blew up like nine pins. And the football ground massacre was complete. The worst irony of the entire story was yet to come. The man they were hunting for was nowhere around the area on the day of the operation. [4] As a result, relations between India and Sri Lanka became extremely sour and India vowed never to offer any military help to Sri Lanka again. This policy has not been changed since and no defence pact has been signed between India and Sri Lanka. India has never been directly involved in the peace talks between the LTTE and Sri Lanka but has supported Norway's efforts.

Casualties

The IPKF suffered around 1,200 killed in action and several thousands in wounded. Its role in the Sri Lankan conflict was much maligned by voices both there and at home. On the international scene, it is all but forgotten. After several years, the Sri Lankan Armed Forces realised the role of IPKF and proposed building a memorial to the Indian dead in Sri Lanka. The debacle that was IPKF's intervention in Sri Lanka is raised at times in Indian political discourse whenever the situation in Sri Lanka shows signs of deteriorating, and there is a question of intervening; or, in Sri Lankan politics (particularly by the LTTE), when it is proposed that India, or, more broadly, other foreigners, had ought to have a role in promoting peace on the island nation.


Allegations of Human Rights violations by the IPKF

Indian forces were accused by LTTE of indulging in indiscriminate killing of civilians during their time in the Northeastern province of Sri Lanka[5].

On 2, 3, and 4 August 1989 it is alleged that over 50 Tamil civilians were killed by the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Valvettiturai, Jaffna. The shootings were precipitated by an ambush[6] of a patrol of 17 Sikh by the LTTE. Six soldiers from the patrol were killed. As was the norm, the attacking LTTE militants melted away after the initial attack - there being no way to differtiate the common civilian from a militant. The infuriated Sikhs were then accused of going on a rampage in the village, conducting house to house searches. In addition to the killings over 100 homes, shops and other property were also burnt and destroyed. The bodies of 52 Tamils were identified, including seven children and six women. Over 100 homes, over 40 shops, 70 vehicles, fishing boats and nets were allegedly burnt and completely destroyed. The town of 15,000 people was empty following the massacre and more than 5,000 people took refuge in churches and schools. In the days following the massacre, unsuccessful attempts were made to cover up the civilian killings, and few reporters managed to reveal the details of the massacre.[7]

Assassination of Rajiv Gandhi

The decision to send the IPKF in Sri-Lanka was taken by then prime-minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi. The LTTE assassinated him at a public rally that he was attending at Sriperumbudur on 21 May, 1991. The assassination was done by a suicide bomber named Dhanu, who was a member of the LTTE. The LTTE's motive may have been revenge, or it may have feared that Gandhi would send the IPKF back into India if he returned to power in New Delhi.

See also

References