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On Sensor Security in the Era of IoT and CPS

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Abstract

Sensors play an integral role in numerous devices across a diverse range of domains. While cyber-physical systems and the Internet of things use them extensively, sensors can also be commonly found in many standalone electronic devices. Concerns over the susceptibility of sensors to malicious attacks have led academia to focus on the security of these sensors. To help unite these efforts, we propose a lexicon to easily differentiate between types and methods of attacks on sensors. Using these definitions, one can quickly and clearly understand the method and the target of an attack. We examine the most recent and influential attacks on sensors, especially when they are acting as edge nodes of systems, as well as defenses against said attacks. We then seek to categorize these methods according to our lexicon, demonstrating its usefulness and solidifying the meaning of proposed terms.

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Acknowledgements

This work is partially supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF-1818500, NSF-1916175).

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Correspondence to Yier Jin.

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This article is part of the topical collection “Hardware-Assisted Security Solutions for Electronic Systems” guest edited by Himanshu Thapliyal, Saraju P. Mohanty, Wujie Wen, and Yiran Chen.

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Panoff, M., Dutta, R.G., Hu, Y. et al. On Sensor Security in the Era of IoT and CPS. SN COMPUT. SCI. 2, 51 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s42979-020-00423-5

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