Abstract
For two person games, stable sets in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens and quasi-stable sets in the sense of Hillas are finite. In this paper we present an example to show that these sets are not necessarily finite in games with more than two players.
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Hillas, J., Vermeulen, D. & Jansen, M. On the finiteness of stable sets. Int J Game Theory 26, 275–278 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01295856
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01295856