Abstract
It is shown that for every NTUmarket game, there is amarket thatrepresents the game whosecompetitive payoff vectors completely fill up theinner core of the game. It is also shown that for every NTU market game and for any point in its inner core, there is a market that represents the game and further has the given inner core point as itsunique competitive payoff vector. These results prove a conjecture of Shapley and Shubik.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D51.
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I wish to thank Lloyd Shapley for his guidance. I also thank Rod Garratt and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Research support is provided by the Academic Senate of University of California at Santa Barbara.
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Qin, C.Z. A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games. Int J Game Theory 22, 335–344 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240130
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240130