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Cartel instability and periodic price shocks

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Abstract

The paper explains periodic commodity price shocks in a market with a cartelized supply side. It is shown how the interactions of sluggish demand and the inherent instability of the cartel create cyclical behavior and price shocks. The theoretical model is applied to the world petroleum market.

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I am indebted to two referees for helpful comments and critique. None of them is responsible for any deficiencies of the paper.

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Rauscher, M. Cartel instability and periodic price shocks. Zeitschr. f. Nationalökonomie 55, 209–219 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227421

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227421

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