Abstract
What criteria should we use in deciding whether to accept any empirical statement as being true? A popular theory suggests that we should assign subjective probabilities to all possible statements representing alternative answers to any given question; and should assign cognitive utilities to acceptance and to nonacceptance of each statement in case it is true, and also in case it is false. Then, as to acceptance or nonacceptance of all these statements we should adopt that particular policy that would maximize our expected utility.
This paper will propose an alternative Bayesian theory of acceptance for empirical statements, which will make no use of special cognitive utilities. It will be argued that the new theory will avoid the paradoxes created by some other theories of acceptance and will help us in resolving some important philosophical problems.
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Harsanyi, J.C. Acceptance of empirical statements: A Bayesian theory without cognitive utilities. Theor Decis 18, 1–30 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134075
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134075