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A Model for Multi-party Negotiations with Majority Rule

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E-Commerce and Web Technologies (EC-Web 2004)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 3182))

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Abstract

Our model of multi-party negotiations is a many parties, many issues model. The whole multi-party negotiation consists of a set of mutually influencing bilateral negotiations that are focused on different bilateral issues. We propose to use majority rule to help parties reach group agreements. When a party is not satisfied with another party’s negotiation progress, he can send a primitive oppose to the other. Those negotiation parties who get a sufficient number of oppose primitives from others or those negotiation parties who lack support in opposing others will be warned to make satisfactory concessions in the following negotiation round. So the will of majority affects each party’s negotiation behavior and leads to the final group agreement.

This work was supported in part by NSF ITR 0312629.

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© 2004 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Zhang, S., Makedon, F., Ford, J., Ai, L. (2004). A Model for Multi-party Negotiations with Majority Rule. In: Bauknecht, K., Bichler, M., Pröll, B. (eds) E-Commerce and Web Technologies. EC-Web 2004. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 3182. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30077-9_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-30077-9_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-540-22917-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-540-30077-9

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