Abstract
Previous blind side-channel analysis have been proposed to recover a block cipher secret key while neither the plaintext nor the ciphertext is available to the attacker. A recent improvement has been proposed that deals with several first-order Boolean masking schemes. Unfortunately the proposed attacks only work if at least two intermediate states that involve a same key byte are protected by a same mask. In this paper we describe a quadrivariate analysis which involves a pair of key bytes and allows to threaten improved Boolean masked implementations where all masks on inputs of AddRoundKey, SubBytes and MixColumns (respectively \(r_m\), \(r_x\) and \(r_y\)) related to a same key byte are independant.
Our attack comes in two flavors: in a first variant the attacker learns Hamming distances between pairs of expanded key bytes of his choice while in the other variant he learns whether two pairs of extended key bytes share the same unknown Hamming distance. We provide an analysis and simulation results which demonstrate that the ciphering key can be recovered in both settings.
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Notes
- 1.
An m-x attack – respectively an m-y or m-x-y attack – is one that is based on the joint distribution of \(({{\mathrm{HW}}}(m),{{\mathrm{HW}}}(x))\) – respectively on the joint distribution of \(({{\mathrm{HW}}}(m),{{\mathrm{HW}}}(y))\) or of \(({{\mathrm{HW}}}(m),{{\mathrm{HW}}}(x),{{\mathrm{HW}}}(y))\). With this notation, Linge’s first blind side-channel analysis was an m-y attack.
- 2.
In that case, the distributions show linear structures like “walls”.
- 3.
Later, we show how to detect small errors. Once detected erroneous Hamming distances can simply be ignored.
- 4.
Or only the mask couple \((r_m,r_x)_{10}\) for \(K_{10}\).
- 5.
The leakage function does not even need to be a linear function of the Hamming weights. Though it must be the same in the target areas of all key bytes.
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Clavier, C., Reynaud, L., Wurcker, A. (2018). Quadrivariate Improved Blind Side-Channel Analysis on Boolean Masked AES. In: Fan, J., Gierlichs, B. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2018. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10815. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-89641-0_9
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