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Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 39
Volume 39, Number 1, January 2000
- Akihiko Matsui:
Expected utility and case-based reasoning. 1-12 - William Stanford:
On comparing equilibrium and optimum payoffs in a class of discrete bimatrix games. 13-20 - Burkhard Drees, Bernhard Eckwert:
Price volatility and risk with non-separability of preferences. 21-34 - Gilbert Laffond, Jean Lainé:
Representation in majority tournaments. 35-53 - Marco Slikker, Bhaskar Dutta, Anne van den Nouweland, Stef Tijs:
Potential maximizers and network formation. 55-70 - Luis C. Corchón, Miguel González-Maestre:
On the competitive effects of divisionalization. 71-79 - Lev A. Sholomov:
Explicit form of neutral social decision rules for basic rationality conditions. 81-107
Volume 39, Number 2, March 2000
- Kimmo Eriksson, Johan Karlander, Lars-Erik Öller:
Becker's assortative assignments: stability and fairness. 109-118 - Marilda Sotomayor:
Existence of stable outcomes and the lattice property for a unified matching market. 119-132 - Norman Schofield, Robert Parks:
Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining. 133-174 - Endre Boros, Vladimir Gurvich:
Stable effectivity functions and perfect graphs. 175-194 - Yasuhito Tanaka:
A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game. 195-206 - Kin Chung Lo:
Epistemic conditions for agreement and stochastic independence of ε-contaminated beliefs. 207-234 - John A. Weymark:
A generalization of Moulin's Pareto extension theorem. 235-240
Volume 39, Number 3, May 2000
- János Aczél, Attila Gilányi, Gyula Maksa, Anthony A. J. Marley:
Consistent aggregation of simply scalable families of choice probabilities. 241-262 - J. Abdou:
Exact stability and its applications to strong solvability. 263-275 - Hans van der Stel:
Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms. 277-301 - Matthias G. Raith:
Fair-negotiation procedures. 303-322 - Stephen J. Willson:
Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games. 323-348 - Haruo Imai, Hannu Salonen:
The representative Nash solution for two-sided bargaining problems. 349-365
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