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DOI: https://doi.org/10.33048/daio.2023.30.744

Abstract: The economy of small tourist towns has unique characteristics. Basically, small business in such towns is aimed at meeting tourists' needs. The competition between entrepreneurs engaged in service provision makes the pricing problem relevant. Some entrepreneurs need to define their goods value and decide where to sell them. If an entrepreneur often changes the sell point due to the competition, he may lose the profit. An interesting case is when the sell point choice is based on pure strategies. By the concept of congestion games with player-specific payoff functions and ordinal potential functions, the paper demonstrates the pricing game equilibrium under inherent restrictions. An equilibrium distribution of individual entrepreneurs by sell points in Gelendzhik is found. Tab. 3, illustr. 2, bibliogr. 22.

Keywords: game theory, pure Nash equilibrium, pricing game, potential games.

Funding agency	Grant number
Russian Science Foundation	22-21-20070
This research is supported by the Russian Science Foundation (Project 22–21–20070), and the St. Petersburg Science Foundation grant in accordance with the Agreement 65/2022 of April 15, 2022.

Received: 03.06.2022
Revised: 23.06.2022
Accepted: 29.06.2022

Bibliographic databases:

Citation: V. V. Gusev, “Pure Nash equilibrium in a two-step pricing game: covering sell points in a tourist city”, Diskretn. Anal. Issled. Oper., 30:1 (2023), 5–27

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Citing articles in Google Scholar: Russian citations, English citations
Related articles in Google Scholar: Russian articles, English articles